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Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse
DAMEN LENARw HuTCHINSON"
i'm clear about why i am and how i am-i cannot extri-
cate the lesbian from my soul no more than i could the
chicana-i have always been both.'
I was mute,
tongue-tied,
burdened by shadows and silence.
Now I speak
and my burden is lightened
lifted
free?
* BA, Universitv of Pennsylvania 1990; JD., Yale Law School, 1993; Law Clerk for
Honorable Mary Johnson Love United States District Court, Southern District of New York;
1994-1996. Presently, Associate, Clear, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. I would ILL to thank
Hubert L. Allen, Robin D. Barnes, L Bennett Capers, Harlon L. Dalton, Bonnie Scott Jone,
Teny Smith and James Q. Walker for their Insightful comments on earlier versions of this
Article.
I. Naomi Littlebear, Earth-Lover, Survivor, Afusiclan, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK:
RADICAL WariNGs BY WOMuN OF COLOR 157 (Cherde Moraga and Gloria Anzaldfa eds., 1981)
[hereinafter THis BRInac CALLED MY BACK].
2. Marion T. Riggs, Tongues Untied, in BROTIHER TO BROTHMR NEw VRITIGS BY BLACK GAY
MEN 200,205 (Essex Hemphill ed., 1991) [hereinafter BROTHM TO BROTHER]. The original source
of this excerpt is Riggs' film Tongues Untied. MAMtLON T. RIGGS, TONGUES U I ED (1987) (doc-
umentary on black gay men) The film Tongues Untied presents poetry of several authors.
Marion Riggs died on April 5, 1994, due to AIDS. Marion Riggs Dies, Film Maker Was 37,
N.Y. TIMs, Apr. 6, 1994, at B9.
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I. INTRODUCTION: "TONGUEs UNTIED"
In the poem "Tongues Untied," Marlon T. Riggs, a black gay
filmmaker and writer, recounts childhood confrontations with racism
and homophobia. Riggs remembers being labelled a "nigger" and ex-
cluded by white students at Hepzibah Junior High in Augusta, Georgia,
where he was "bused" at age twelve, and being called a "homo" by the
older brother of a childhood friend.3 Through these "coming-of-age"
experiences, a young Riggs learns to "[dis]claim" 4 his marginalized
racial and sexual statuses: he hides "deep inside [him]self where it is
still. Silent, safe .... 
While living in the largely white gay and lesbian community of
San Francisco, an adult Riggs begins to acknowledge his gay identity.
Riggs, however, tries to ignore the "absence of black images" in the
"Castro" or the fact that the "few" existing images---'joke, fetish, car-
toon, caricature or disco diva adored from a distance"'-affirmn racial
hierarchy. Nevertheless, Riggs eventually learns that in the Castro, he
is "an alien, unseen, and seen, unwanted."7
The turning point in the poem-and in Riggs' life-occurs when,
after persistent introspection and reclaiming of suppressed racial identi-
ty, Riggs escapes "delusion, pain, alienation, [and] silence" 8-- and inte-
grates (instead of treating as separate) his black and gay identities.
Thus, at the poem's conclusion, the knots of silence and invisibility
caused by interlocking racism and homophobia are "untied."
The symbolic meaning of the phrase "tongues untied" has grown to
identify a small, yet expanding, cultural, intellectual, and artistic "move-
ment" aimed at revealing-or ending the silence around-the interac-
tions of race, class, gender, and sexuality,9 what one participant in the
3. Riggs, Tongues Untied, in BROTHER TO BROTHER, supra note 2, at 201.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 202.
6. Id. at 203.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 204.
9. See Introduction to TONGUES UNTIED 7 (Martin Humphries ed., 1987) (explores racism,
sexism and homophobia through poetry in order to "end- the silence that has surrounded the
lives of Black gay men.") While the phrse "tongues untied" has been associated primarily with
work by black gay men, a broader and related movement has formed across racial and gender
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movement described as "the transformation of silence into language and
action."10 The work of this movement contrasts starkly with that of the
"dominant" gay and lesbian culture and scholarship, where issues of
racial and class subordination are neglected or rejected and where a
universal gay and lesbian experience is assumed." The work of this
movement highlights the need for an examination of racial, gender, and
class subordination within gay and lesbian political discourse and legal
theory. These concerns, however, remain largely outside of traditional
legal fora' 2
lines. In fact, women of color published the earliest scholarship in this movement. See, e.g,
AmKEE (Catherine B. McKinley & B. Joyce DeLaney eds, 1995) (black lesbian anthology);
BLACK MEN[WHrrE MEN: A GAY ANTHOLOGY (Michael Smith ed, 1983) (black gay themes); Krni
BoYx, ONE MORE RiVE To CROSS: BLACK Al,D GAY IN AhmcA (1996) (same); THrs BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK, supra note I (women of color feminstilesblan anthology); BROTHER To BROTHER,
supra note 2 (black gay themes); CHCA LESBIANS: THE GIRLS OUR MOHERS WARNED Us ABOUT
(Carla Trjillo ed., 1991) (anthology) [hereinafter CHIcANA LESBIANS]; COMPAPRAS: L4TINA LES1I-
ANS (Juanita Ramos ed., 1987) (anthology); STEVEN CORBIN, FRAG.meS THAT REMAIN (1993) (nov-
el with black gay themes); MELvIN DIXON, VANISHING ROOMs (1991) (novel with black gay
themes); JEWELLE GOMm, FORTY-TiRE SEPTEBiERS (1993) (essays with black lesbian themes);
EssEx HEHIL, CEREMONIES: PROSE AND POETRY (1992) (black gay themes) [hereinafter CratMO-
NIES]; HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY (Barbara Smith ed., 1983) (black femi-
nist/lesbian anthology) [hereinafter HoME GIRLS]; IN Tm LIFE: A BLACK GAY ANTHOLOGY (Joseph
Beam ed, 1986) [hereinafter IN TE LIFE]; RANDALL KENAN, A VIsrXON OF SPiRrrs (1989) (novel
with blak gay themes); AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHE [heSeinaflarSISTER
OUTSIDER] (1984) (black feminist/lesbian anthology); AUDRE LORD, ZAmI: A NEW SPELLING OF MY
NAIvm (1982) (autobiography of black lesbian writer); A LOTus OF ANOTHER COLOR: AN UNEOLDING
OF THE SOUH ASIAN GAY AND LESBIAN ExPERIVCE (Rakesh Ratti ed., 1993) (anthology) [hereinaf-
ter A Lous OF ANorHR COLOR]; PIECE OF MY HEART. A LESBIAN OF COLoR ANTOLOGY (Makeda
Silvara ed., 1991); THE ROAD BEFORE Us: 100 GAY POETS (Assoto Saint ed., 1991) (black gay
poetry); DARIECK SCOTT, TRAITOR TO TiH RACE (1995) (novel with black gay themes); SHADE: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF FICTION BY GAY MEN OF ArICAN DESCENT (Bmce Morrow & Charles H. Rowell
eds, 1996); SOJOURNER: BLACK GAY VOICES IN ie AGE OF AIDS (B. Michael Hunter ad., 1993)
(poetry); TALuNG BLACK: LESBIANS OF AFRICAN AND ASIAN DESCENT SPEA OUr (Valeie Mason-John
ed., 1995) (anthology); WALTER L. WILIAMS, THE SPIRrr AND mm FLESH: SEXAL DIvERITY IN
AlvEiacAN IN IXAN CULTURE (1986). See atso URVASi VAiD, VaTuAL EQuALI'y: THE MAJsTREAmr
OF GAY & LESBIAN LIBERATION (1995) (a critique and historical sketch of gay and lesbian poli-
tics, written by an Indian lesbian and former head of the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, which urges gay rights movement to locate itself within broader movements for social
change--including racial, gender and class equality).
10. LORDE, The Transformation of Silence Into Language and Action, in SISTER OursiDER,
supra note 9, at 44. Audre Lorde died on November 17, 1992 of breast cancer. Audre
Lord, 58, A Poet Memoirist and Lecturer, Dies, N.Y. Tms, Nov. 20, 1992, at A23.
11. See VAID, supra note 9, at 286 (A false assumption underlies all gay and lesbian orga-
nzng: that there is something at once singular and universal that can be called gay or lesbian
or bisexual or even transgendered identity.").
12. The body of legal scholarship on the interaction of race and sexuality remains in its
infancy-much of the scholarship published during the completion of this Article-and Is not
formally linked. Also, most of the articles in this area offer only a brief exposition of the
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This Article introduces the concerns of this movement 3 into legal
issue. For a sampling of literature exploring the subject, see Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodl-fled: Speculation on Law's Discourse, Race, and the Construction of Sexual Identify [hereinaftcr
Homosexual Unmodifiedl, in LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 46-
76 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin eds., 1995) (arguing that homosexuality is coded as "whit"
in judicial opinions) [hereinafter LEGAL INVERSIONS]; Cynthia Petersen, Envisionhig A Lesbian
Equality Jurisprudence, in LEGAL INVERSIONS, supra at 118-37 (criticizing omission of race In
lesbian legal analysis); Elvia R. Arriola, Fairies, Marimachas, Queens and Lezzles: The Con.
struction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 33
(1995) (attributing police harassment of gay participants in New York City's Stonewall riots to
their race, class, and gender role nonconformance); Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequaltl: Les.
bians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9 BERK. WOMEN'S LJ. 103, 132-35 (1994) (discussing
omission of race and class in lesbian legal theory) [hereinafter Gendered Inequality]; Mary
Eaton, At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orientation: Toward Lesbian Jurisprudence, 3
S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 183, 212-18 (1995) (criticizing omission of race in lesbian
legal analysis) [hereinafter At the Intersection] Angela Gilmore, They're Just Funny That Way:
Lesbians, Gay Men and African-American Communities As Viewed Through the Privacy Prism,
38 How. LJ. 231 (1994) (discussing relationship of black gays and lesbians with the black
community); Eric Heinze, Gay and Poor, 38 How. LJ. 433 (1995) (arguing that poor gays and
lesbians may have specific needs requiring further sociological and legal analysis); Darren
Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionalio and the Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Vctories," 4
LAW & SE.UA.ITY 83 (1994) (arguing that gay and lesbian litigation "victories" may not uniform-
ly benefit the gay and lesbian community due to race, class, gender, and gender Identity differ-
ences). The Southern California Review of Law and Women's Studies has also published a
series of essays, presented at a symposium, that add to this literature. See Sheila M. Aguilar,
Los Angeles Asian Pacific Islander Sisters (_A0IPIS), 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 75
(1995) (discussing political and social activities of Asian lesbian organization); Isabelle R. Gun-
ning, Stories firom Home: Tales from the Intersection of Race, Gender and Sexual Orientation,
5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 143 (1995) (discussing impact of racism and homophobla
on black lesbians); Joan W. Howarth, First and Last Chance: Looking for Lesbians in Fiflies
Bar Cases, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 153 (1995) (discussing issues of race, class,
and gender status implicated in 1950s California cases challenging state efforts to close gay
bars); D. Lisa Powell, United Lesbians of African Heritage, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 81 (1995) (discussing political and social activities of black lesbian organization); Ruthann
Robson, To Market, To Market: Considering Class in the Context of Lesbian Legal Theories
and Reforms, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 173 (1995) (discussing impact of class and
economic markets upon lesbians); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture:
Ruminations on Identities and Interconnectivities, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 25
(1995) (arguing that sex and race create internal conflicts within "sexual minority communities"
and that these communities must, therefore, develop a discourse on the connections between
race, gender, and sexuality).
13. This Article is also greatly inspired by a body of critical race, antiracist, and feminist
scholarship that explores the relationship between race and gender. See, e.g., ALL THE WOMm
ARE WHI*, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, Bur SOME OF US ARE BRAVE (Gloria Hull & Patricia B.
Scott eds., 1982); ANGELA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1981); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND
WHERE I EWER: TH IMPACt OF BLACK WoamN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984); BELL HOOKS,
AIN'T I A WOMAN? BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981) [hereinafter AIN'T I A WOMAN?]; BELL
HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CmT'R (1984) [hereinafter FROM MARGIN TO CEmR];
BEIL H-cs . YEAR~ RAC, GENDER AN CLURAL ParCS (1991); ELUABET V. SPMA EN.
TIAL WOMN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMN THou9zr (1988); MICHELLE WALLACF, BLACK MA-
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discourse in an attempt to initiate a dialogue around issues of race and
class 4 between those scholars presently engaged in the construction of
gay and lesbian legal theories.15 Part II examines specific acts of vio-
lence and discrimination against gay, or perceived as gay, people of
color, and the legal and political challenges to these acts, in order to
demonstrate the ready interplay between race, class, and sexual subordi-
nation-or the multidimensionality of oppression. Part 1H contrasts the
cuo AN THE MYTH OF Tm SupmawomAN (1979); Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Afadonnas, Babls,
Bath Water, Racial Imagery and Stereojqes: The African-American Woman and the Battered
Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1003; Armi Laddn Bamard, The Application of Critical
Race Feminism to the Anti-Lynching Movement: Black Women's Fight Against Race and Gender
Ideology 1892-1920, 3 UCLA WOMiEN's LJ. 1 (1993); Darci B. Burrell, )4th, Stereoope, and
the Rape of Black Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN's L. 87 (1993); Klmberle Crenshaw, Demargi-
nalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antldiscrimlnation Doc-
vine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CL LEGAL F. 139 [hereinafter
Demarginalizing the Intersection]; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margin. Intersectlonallt;
Identi ' Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L REV. 1241 (1993) [herein-
after Mapping the Margins]; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentiallsm In Feminist Legal Teory,
42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist Legal 7hor)y, 12 HARV.
WoMEN's LJ. 115 (1989); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harasment of
Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817 (1993); Dorothy . Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Pri'ary, 104 HARv. L.
REV. 1419 (1991); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place,
Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R-C.L.L. REV. 9 (1989); Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identi-
ties: Black Women, Work and Title II, 14 HARV. WoMEN'S LJ. 21 (1991); Deborah J. Krauss,
Note, Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth
Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HARV. CI-CL. L. REV. 523 (1991); Cathy Scarborough,
Note, Conceptualizing Black Women's Enply'nent Fzperlences, 98 YALE LJ. 1457 (1989).
14. Because race and class are interlocking forces, I have Included a significant discussion of
class inequality and poverty in this "racial" critique of gay and lesbian legal theory and politi-
cal discourse. This Article, however, does not "extensively" analyze "female" status and patr-
archy-although they also inform sexual subordination. Because this Article largely omits patri-
archy from analysis, it essentializes, to some degree, the experiences of people of color and is
subject to the criticism that it tends to reflect gay male experiences. I do not intend, however,
to represent the experiences of all gay people of color. Accordingly, I have explicitly stated,
where appropriate, how "maleness," the negative construction of men of color, and female sta-
tus-rather than the essentialist notion of "race"--have informed my discussion of anti-gay dis-
crimination.
Furthermore, even though this Article attempts to portray incidents In the lives of gay
men of color, it cannot fully capture the complexity of their experiences. No single article
could complete such a feat. Instead, I hope this Article will sere as a starting point for a
more intense examination of the various complexities of gay life. Accordingly, I invite and
encourage similar discussions, including feminist critiques of this Article, surrounding gender,
class, race, and other sources of disempowerment.
15. For an excellent compilation of the rapidly growing body of legal scholarship pertaining
to gay and lesbian issues, see Standing Comm. on Lesbian and Gay Issues, Am. Assoc. Law
Libraries, Sexual Orientation and the Law:. A Selective Bibliography on Homosexualb and thz
Law 1969-1993, 86 LAw LIR. 3. 1 (1994).
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multidimensional nature of these gay and lesbian experiences with gay
and lesbian legal theory and political discourse, which, by excluding
issues of racial and class subordination from analysis, have a narrow
and essentialist 6 focus. In Part III, I argue that gay and lesbian
essentialism negates and obscures the experiences of people of color
and the poor, centralizes the experiences of race- and class-privileged
individuals, renders inadequate the theories and solutions proposed to
explain and confront sexual subordination, and fosters tension with
antiracist political agendas and with people of color. In Part IV, I lo-
cate my racial critique of gay and lesbian legal theory and political dis-
course within the extensive and ongoing anti-essentialist debates in
feminist legal theory and critical race theory." I also demonstrate how
this Article develops and extends these debates. Finally, I invite gay
and lesbian legal theorists and political activists to engage in a conver-
sation around sexual, racial, and class inequality and to adopt a "multi-
dimensional framework"--or multidimensionality-to analyze and chal-
lenge sexual subordination. By offering multidimensionality to gay and
lesbian legal theorists and political activists, I wish to provide them
with a methodology by which to analyze the impact of racial and class
oppression (and other sources of social inequality) upon sexual subordi-
nation and gay and lesbian experience and to cease treating these forces
as separable, mutually exclusive, or even conflicting phenomena. In
time, gay and lesbian scholars and activists may begin to see the terms
"gay," "lesbian," and "homophobia" as multilayered. Furthermore, a
multidimensional construction of sexual identity oppression can enrich
gay and lesbian legal theory and political action by permitting a deeper
analysis of power inequality among gays and lesbians and between
gays, lesbians, and heterosexuals. Finally, multidimensionality will
allow gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists to reformu-
late their theories and activism so that they no longer relegate people
16. In this Article, "essentialism" refers to an attempt to define a group as unitary despite
its members' diverse, as opposed to "essential,' experiences. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's
Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
639, 674 n.4 (1993); Harris, supra note 13, at 584. The discussion of essentialism In this
Article is, therefore, distinct from the essentialism/constructivism debates In gay and lesbian
legal theory which discuss whether a "homosexual orientation" is an "essential," "deep.rooted,
fixed, and intrinsic feature of individuals" or whether "it is a contingent, socially malleable trait
." Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argumentfirom Immutabili, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 547 (1994). I do not wish to Imply, how-
ever, that these debates are necessarily distinct
17. See supra note 13.
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of color and the poor (and racism and poverty) to "shadows and si-
lence."
For the wages of sin were visible everywhere, in every wine-
stained and urine-splashed hallway, in every clanging ambulance
bell, in every scar on the faces of the pimps and their whores,
in every helpless, newborn baby being brought into this danger,
in every knife and pistol fight on the Avenue, and in every di-
sastrous bulletin: a cousin, mother of six, suddenly gone mad,
the children parcelled out here and there; an indestructible aunt
rewarded for years of hard labor by a slow, agonizing death in
a terrible small room; someone's bright son blown into eternity
by his own hand; another turned robber and carried off to jail."8
]1. HETEROSEXISM AND HOMOPHOBIA:
A COMBINATION OF RACIAL, CLASS, AND SEXUAL OPPRESSION
In the early morning dawn in Queens, New York, June 2, 1990,
three male members of a neo-Nazi, white supremacist gang murdered
Julio Rivera-a 29-year-old, gay, Puerto Rican male." Rivera's killers
attacked him repeatedly with a hammer, wrench, beer bottle, and knife.
One of the white supremacist assailants later confessed, in connection
with a plea agreement, that they killed Rivera "because he was gay." 0
Rivera's murder tragically reminded gay and lesbian people of their
vulnerability to hate-inspired violence. Rivera's death also presented
intersecting issues of racial, class, and sexual marginalization-issues
that were largely omitted from political discourse surrounding his death.
Immediately following Rivera's death, gay and lesbian activists
monitored and criticized the police investigation. In particular, they
objected to the police refusal to classify the murder as an anti-gay
crime.2 ' The police refused to characterize the crime as gay-related
18. JAMES BALDWIN, THE Fn NExr T m 20 (1963).
19. For a detailed account of the murder, see Alessandra Stanley, The S7nbols Spaimed b)
a Killing, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1991, at BI.
20. Joseph P. Fried, A Murder Verdict Becomes a Ral4,Ing C3- N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 24,
1991, § 4, at 6.
21. See a at 6. Under New York law, persons who commit acts of violence on the basis
of sexual orientation are not subject to any enhanced or special penalties. See Martin S.
Zwerling, Legislating Against Hate in New York: Bias Crimes and the Lesbian and Gcy Con-
munity, 11 ToURo L. REV. 529, 561 (1995) (citing Arthur S. Leonard, Bias Motiated Crime
Require New Law, N.Y. W., Sept. 25, 1989, at 2). Rather, the statute only provides cn-
1997l
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despite its extreme brutality and its occurrence in an isolated schoolyard
known as a meeting place for gay men.? Instead, the police insisted
that the crime was drug-related, noting Rivera's "cocaine habit" and the
fact that "drug dealers" also frequented the park.' The police never
assigned a full-time investigator to the case.U The police's response to
the crime outraged gay and lesbian groups, which proclaimed Rivera's
murder "the Gay Howard Beach."'s
Although gay and lesbian activists compared Rivera's slaying to the
racially motivated Howard Beach incident, the racial and class subordi-
nation issues implicated by Rivera's killing and the police response es-
caped analysis. 6 The most obvious reason for believing that racism
hanced penalties for acts of violence based on the "race, color, religion, or national origin" of
the victim. See 39 N.Y. Penal Law § 24030 (McKinney 1996 Supp.). Furthermore, "the
current penalty scheme does not cover [any] acts motivated by the defendant's prejudice which
result in the death of the victim." Zwerling, supra, at 562. Nevertheless, classification of
Rivera's murder (and other acts of anti-gay violence) as "gay-related," could have bolstered
political efforts to make "sexual orientation" a protected status under New York penal law.
22. See Fried, supra note 20, at 6. In his groundbreaking study of homophobic violence,
Gary David Comstock notes that such violence often involves tortur, mutilation, and excessive
physical assault, and that many of these crimes against gay men occur in gay cruising areas by
groups of perpetrators. GARY DAVD Comsmc, VIoLENCE AaAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 46-51,
66 (1991).
23. See Fried, supra note 20, at 6.
24. See Donna Minkowitz, It's Still Open Season on Gays: Prosecution of Gay Bashers, 254
THE NAnON 368 (1992).
25. See Joseph P. Fried, Trial in Gay Man's Killing Opens In Court in Queens, N.Y.
TUMS, Nov. 7, 1991, at B3. Gay and lesbian activists compared Rivera's slaying to the racial-
ly motivated attack of three black men by a group of whites in Howard Beach, Queens, on
December 20, 1986. The gang of whites beat the black men with bats and sticks and then
chased them into a road where one of the black men was struck by a car and killed. Police
characterized the attack as a bias crime. One of the survivors reported that the gang shouted
"niggers, you don't belong here," as they attacked the men. See Robert D. McFadden, Black
Man Dies Afier Beating by Whites in Queens, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1986, § I, at 1.
26. See Infra pp. 584-85, 626-34 (discussing how use of sex-race analogies by gay and
lesbian political activists preclude discussions of race). Although gay and lesbian activists re-
sponded to Rivera's murder with needed vigor, they explained his victimization and the police
responses largely as manifestations of homophobia. See, e.g, sources cited supra notes 19-21,
24-25. See also TiE QUESTION OF EQUALri' (1995) (documentary on gay civil rights movement);
Robert Vazquez-Pacheco, In Their Own Words, In THE QuESmiON OF EQUALITY 124 (David
Deitcher ed., 1995) (companion book to documentary) ("No one wanted to discuss race in
relation to the Rivem case, even though race was one of the most blatant things about iW).
But see Gays Seek Justice for Victim of Hate, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Dec. 1 1991, at A13
(reporting activist's belief that the police "branded Julio as a Latino, drug user, hustler and
therefore not worthy of anything ... .") (quoting Matt Foreman, head of the New York City
Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project); Vazquez-Pacheco, supra, at 124 (noting racial activism
of Latino gay men in the aftermath of Rivera's death). Consequently, issues of race and class
which led to his murder and shaped the police response remained unexamined and unchal-
[Vol. 29:561
OUT YET UNSEEN
may have contributed to Rivera's slaying is the fact that he was killed
by members of a white supremacist organization. Although one of the
assailants testified that the group killed Rivera because he was gay,
Rivera's Latino status likely rendered him particularly vulnerable to the
homophobic attack2 7 Viewed in this manner, Rivera's assault can be
characterized as an act of "racist-homophobia," rather than a "gay"
bashing.
Newspaper articles reporting the murder, and the public and police
responses to it, vividly highlight racial and class aspects of the crime.
Several articles emphasize that Rivera was a Puerto Rican man with a
cocaine addiction who grew up "in a South Bronx project'--a combi-
nation resulting in the archetype of urban violence. They also report
that Rivera was "very Latin [and] very macho." Thus, as one article
reports, "Rivera... was the most improbable gay martyr-a Hispanic
drug user from Queens who lived on the far fringes of gay society."'3
These articles use racial and heterosexist stereotypes of men of color to
construct a portrait of Rivera as a "hot, macho, Latin" 3 1-a man whose
lenged.
27. &ee Julie hness, Going to the Bottom, 9 BMK. WomEN's LJ. 162, 170 (1994) C'When
a Black lesbian is called a 'dyke,' the word cannot be understood as directed at her only as
a lesbian; her attacker wishes to harm her because he sees her as a Black lesbian . ..-).
Members of the skinhead group denied charges of racism, see Peg Tyre, Former "Skinheads"
Deny Racism, NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 1991, at 19, as well as homophobla, see Curtis L Taylor,
Accused Killer: Im Not Homophobc, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1991, at 21. Given the context in
which they were made-the wake of a criminal trial--these statements were likely self-saving,
offered only to garner public support for the assailants and, thus, devoid of any credibility.
28. Stanley, supra note 19, at BI. The "South Bronx" refers to a largely poor and Puerto
Rican neighborhood in the Bronx, New York.
29. Id. See also Donatella Lorch, An Unlikely Afartyr Focuses Gay Anger, N.Y. TM5,
Nov. 15, 1991, at BI (reporting that Rivera "loved to 'play macho'").
30. Stanley, supra note 19 at Bl.
31. Jenny Rivera comments that
[h]istorically, Latinos have been stereotyped as violent and allen. This misrepresenta-
tion of the "Latino character" has developed during the past ce.ntuy, and non-Latino
society today continues to express and exploit inaccurate Images of Lalinos and 1Lad-
no family life.
Popular myth has become accepted as truth; Latino males are believed to be
irrational and reactive. The standard description of Latino males as hot-blooded,
passionate, and prone to emotional outbursts Is legendary. 'Macho' is the. accepted
-and expected-single-wrd description 4ron)ous "ulth Latino men and male cul-
tre. Consequently, it is natural to expand and apply this construct to the entire
Latino community, and thereby justify the assumptions that Latlnos are violent.
Jenny Rivera, Domestic VIolence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysls of Race, Na-
tional Origin, and Gender DIfterentlals, 14 B.C. TmD WORLD LJ. 231, 240 (1994) (dIscussing
racial stereotyping of Latino males) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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status as a symbol of sexual subordination was, therefore, deemed "un-
likely" and "improbable." '32
While the subtext of race and class clearly impacted the reporting
of Rivera's murder, the conclusion that racial and class biases may
have also influenced the police reaction can be inferred from the cir-
cumstances of the crime, the nature of the police response, and the
greater social context of racial, class, and sexual subordination. There
are at least two possible explanations for the police department's initial
failure to classify the crime as an anti-gay murder. Each involves a
combination of racial, class, and sexual oppression issues. First, the
police may not have actually believed Rivera was gay. Second, the
police may have known or discovered Rivera was gay but, despite the
compelling evidence of anti-gay motive, decided against labelling the
crime a gay bashing.33
Under the first explanation, the police did not believe Rivera was
gay. Such disbelief possibly resulted from competing stereotypical
images which construct "gay" men as effeminate and weak34 and poor
"Latin" men as "macho" and violent?5-- thus heterosexual.36 These neg-
ative class, racial, gender, and sexual constructs may have made it
difficult-or impossible-for the officers to comprehend that Rivera
was actually "gay" and the victim of anti-gay violence.37 Under these
competing stereotypes, a "Latino gay man" becomes an oxymoron.
Hence, as one newspaper reports, Rivera's victimization "do[es] not
hold up to . .. perfunctory logic."'3 Under racial and class hierarchy,
32. Lorch, supra note 29, at BI.
33. These explanations are not necessarily exclusive of each other, that is, both may explain
the police response.
34. See RICHARD A. ISAY, BEING HoMosEIxuAL: GAY MEN AND THEIR DEvELoPMENr 20 (1989);
A.p . MacDonald, Jr., Homophobta: Its Roots and Meanings, 3 HOMoSEXUAL COUNSELING . 23,
30 (1976).
35. See Rivera, supra note 31, at 240.
36. The clash between Rivera's "Latino" and "gay" statuses reveals that "gay" stereotypes
are culturally, racially and class contingent. See infra pp. 609-13 (discussing multilayered na-
ture of gay and lesbian stereotypes).
37. Under racial hierarchy, Rivera could possibly not be a '.'victim" at all, but rather a threat
and a criminal. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see generally Stephen L. Carter,
When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE Li. 420, 421 (1988), which argues that the
"meaning of victimhood in our society is constructed by a dominant culture that often displays
difficulty conceiving that important harms can come in varieties unlikely to afflict its members:'
38. Stanley, supra note 19, at B1. This article suggests that the status of Rivera as a "vic-
tim" and Daniel Doyle, one of his assailants, as a killer, is ironic because "[i]t was Mr.
Rivera, a longtime cocaine user, whom close friends describe as deeply troubled and unhappy,"
id, while Mr. Doyle had a 3A grade point average and was "very smart, very sweet, very
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however, one has less difficulty visualizing a poor, heterosexual, "ma-
cho," Latino drug addict killed in an illegal narcotics transaction.
The second explanation assumes that the police actually knew
Rivera was gay--either after their own investigation or the activists'
forceful protests-but declined to classify the crime as a "gay" bashing,
despite evidence of anti-gay motive. Racial, class, and sexual bias
again may have informed the police inaction. Homophobic police
would not want to draw greater public attention to the problems of
homophobic violence by truthfully labelling the crime as an act of anti-
gay bias?9 The police, if they were homophobic, needed an alternative
interpretation of the crime--one that diminished or erased the signifi-
cance of Rivera's sexuality. Rivera's race and class provided this nec-
essary diversion and helped the police reconstruct the facts of Rivera's
murder and negate his homosexuality. The police invoked the class-
and race-based images of poor Latinos as "criminals" and "drug-users"
to detract from Rivera's victimization and to recast him as responsible
for his own murder. The police then manipulated these racial and class
constructs to suppress the homophobic nature of the crime and to ex-
cuse their own inaction. Consequently, racism served to reinforce ho-
mophobia.
The activists' essentialist framing of the crime as a "gay" bashing,
rather than a racist-homophobie attack, may actually have invited the
police to use Rivera's race to erase his gayness. Had the activists
stressed both the homophobic and racial motivations of the skinhead
assailants and portrayed Rivera as a gay. Latino victim, the police's
racially-coded explanation would have backfired: it would have but-
tressed a claim that racial bias contributed to Rivera's death and to
their own indifference to his attack. A multidimensional response, by
contrast, exposes and confronts the negative class, racial, and
heterosexist forces that may have informed the police inaction. Under
a multidimensional framework, the police's race- and class-based expla-
nation would have failed or been problematic from the outset.40
The race and class issues implicated by Rivera's death demonstrate
committed to his work," Id. (quoting Doyle's college English professor).
39. The activists' focus on homophobia suggests that they believe this reason explains the
police response.
40. I do not wish to imply that a multidimensional response would have prevented the offi-
cers' manipulaion of race and class. Given the irrationality of racism, such a response may
have occurred even under multidimensional activism. Rather, I believe that multidimensionality




the importance of considering multiple sources of disempowerment
when responding legally and politically to sexual subordination.4'
Rivera, however, suffered a violent combination of class, racial, and
sexual subordination during his life as well. Placing Rivera's death in
the context of his life, instead of viewing him solely at the moment he
was killed, permits a better understanding of the interplay between
racial, class, and sexual subordination. Rivera, like scores of Puerto
Ricans in New York City, was poor,42 unemployed,43 uneducated (for-
mally)," and gay. During his short life, Rivera attempted to "deal"
with these statuses. In order to escape poverty-and "the far fringes of
gay society"--an adolescent Rivera entered into a series of relationships
with "wealthy, older men who introduced him to the theater, fine food
and wine, designer clothes, cocaine and the club scene."' 5 Soon Rivera
grew to "likefl the best of everything ... and he got it from the men
in his life; Armani suits, crystal, the best colognes. Once he saw the
good side of life, he could never go back to where he came
from"--the South Bronx.46 Rivera, however, "was never a really happy
person [due to the homophobia of] his uncles and aunts . . . [and] the
stigma of being from the South Bronx." ' Instead, Rivera developed
self-destructive habits, eventually succumbing to a cocaine addiction and
apparently sustaining this addiction by exchanging sex for "money or
drugs" in risky, anonymous encounters." Rivera's self-destructive be-
-41. Under a multidimensional paradigm, for example, gay and lesbian legal theorists and
civil rights attorneys might challenge police inaction to violence against gays and lesbians by
filing claims of racial discrimination. See in fra pp. 578-81 (discussing racial discrimination suit
brought to remedy police inaction in wake of a physical assault on person of color whom
police perceived as "gay").
42. A sampling of social statistics with respect to the Latino community shows that Rivera's
plight was all too common. In 1990, 25% of Latino families lived below the poverty level,
compared to 9.5% of non-Latinos. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Econ. and Stat. Admin., Bu-
reau of the Census, The Hispanic Population in the United States 8 (Current Population Reports
Population Characteristics Series P-20, No. 455, Mar. 1990). Also, Latino children accounted
for 21% of children living in poverty although they represented only 11% of the total popula-
tion of children. See Id Among Latinos, Puerto Rican families had the highest rate of pover-
ty-37.5%.
43. In 1990 the Latino unemployment rate was 10% compared to 6.9% for non-Latinos.
See id at 3.
44. In 1991 only 51% of Latinos had completed at least four years of high school. Only
10% had completed four years of college. See id
45. Stanley, supra note 19, at B1.
46. Id. (quoting Rivera's sister).
47. Id.
48. Curtis L Taylor, Witness Recounts Gay Man's Death, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 1991, at 8 (the
assailants "usfed] money or drugs for sex to lure Rivera into a hidden alcove in the school-
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haviors, possibly spawned by the oppression he faced,49 helped to create
the circumstances surrounding his death5 Rivera never overcame the
combination of homophobia, racism, and poverty in his life, and he
died without "ever lik[ing] himself."'
Thus, a "re-reading" of Rivera's life reveals that the debilitating
forces of racial, class, and sexual subordination worked violence against
him long before his death. These forces limited his life choices, con-
tributed to his murder, and explain the ambivalent police response to
the crime 2
Another tragedy of racial, class, and sexual subordination is present-
ed by the life and death of Venus Xtravaganza, a young, poor, Puerto
Rican, transsexual male featured in the film Paris Is Burning;" a docu-
mentary on poor, gay and transgendered blacks and Latinos who live in
New York City. Paris Is Burning examines Harlem's "drag ball" cul-
ture, which has its roots in the Harlem Renaissance. Venus, a partici-
yard").
49. Several studies have linked alcohol and substance abuse to stress associated with sexual
subordination. See Dennis Anderson, Fami*v and Peer Relations of Gay Adolescents, 14 ADO-
LESCENT PsYcImATRY: DEe. AND CLINICAL Su. 162, 176 (1987); Robert J. Kus, Alcoholism and
Non-Acceptance of Gay Sef." The Critical Link, 15 . HOMosaUAITY 25, 25-26 (1988); David
J. McKiman & Peggy Peterson, Stress, Expectancles, and Yulnerabllttv to Substance Abuse: A
Test of a Model Among Homosexual Men, 97 J. ABNOnfAL PSYCHOL. 461, 465 (1988); Rosario,
Hunter & Rotheram-Borus, HV Center for Clinical and Behavioral Studie New York State
Psychiatric Institute, Unpublished Data on Lesbian Adolescents (1992).
50. See Taylor, supra note 48, at 8.
51. Stanley, supra note 19, at BI (quoting Rivera's sister).
52. Two of River's assailants were convicted by a jury of second-degree murder. The
third, who testified against the other two, pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Joseph P. Fried, 2
Accomplices Guilh of Murder in "Gay Bashing" Case in Queens, N.Y. Tvas, Nov. 21, 1991,
at Al. During the trial, the judge sparked a controversy by privately questioning prospective
jurors regarding their sexual orientation and their attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Joseph P.
Fried, Judge in Queens Murder Trial Admits Asking Juror Whether She Is Homosexual, N.Y.
TIM's, Nov. 5, 1991, at BI. The judge did not permit defense counsel or prosecutors to at-
tend the questioning. Id. An appellate court subsequently reversed the convictions, finding
that the private questioning denied defendants their right to a "public trial" under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See New York v. Bid, 621
N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1995); New York v. Brown, 621 N.Y.S2d 668 (App. Div. 1995).
Brown, one of the defendants whose conviction was overturned, subsequently pleaded guilty to
a reduced charge of first-degree manslaughter and agreed to testify for the prosecution in the
re-trial of the remaining co-defendant. See Joseph P. Fried, Alan Guth), in '90 KMlling in
Queens, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1996, at B3. Bic, the remaining co-defendant, failed to appear
for a court hearing after his accomplice agreed to cooperate with authorities. Defendant In
Killing Fails to Appear, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1996, at B6. A judge subsequently revoked
Bidi's bail and ordered his arrest. See la Bici, however, remains missing. See Scott Fallon,
Gay Activists Blast Stay--Case Release, NEWSDAY, June 23, 1996, at A29.
53. PARS Is BURNING (Prestige Films 1991).
54. See HEM PHILL To Be Real, in CERiO.NIES, supra note 9, at 119 (citing Edc Garber, A
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pant in the balls, wants to taste "power," which life has taught her is
clustered around whiteness, wealth, and heterosexuality. To this end,
she desires to become "a spoiled, rich white girl [because tihey get
what they want whenever they want it . . . and they don't have to
really struggle with finances." '55 Other individuals in the film share
Venus' desires. Participants in the drag balls competitively "mockli
and playj- out the rituals of a fashion show."'56 In their contests, as in
the "high" fashion world they mimic,
power remains almost exclusively defined in materialistic, Cau-
casian, and consumer terms. Many long to be rich and famous.
Some long to be white and female, clearly an escapist longing,
a longing that if realized would then place them in collusion
with white supremacy-the primary source of their present
disempowerment. They want to be stars in a world that barely
wants to see them alive and thriving. They want things in a
world that has caused more than a few of them to not want
themselves.57
The fantasy of drag ball culture, however, cannot negate the reality
Spectacle in Color: The Lesbian and Gay Subculture of Jazz Age Harlem, in HIDDEN FROM
HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST (Duberman, Vicinus & Chauncey cds., 1990).
All references in this Article to Paris Is Burning are taken from Ceremonies in which Hemphill
discusses the film at length. See 1d. at 111-21. Hemphill, a black gay poet, died on Novcm-
ber 4, 1995, due to complications from AIDS. Essex Hemphill, 38, Poet and Performer, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at B7.
55. HEMPHILL, supra note 54, at 118.
56. Id. at 111.
57. Id. at 116. See also BELL HOOKS, Is Paris Burning?, in BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRE-
SENTATION 14748 (1992) ("What viewers [of Paris Is Burning] witness is not black men longing
to impersonate or even to become like "real" black women but their obsession with an Ideal-
ized, fetishized vision of femininity that is white."). Hemphill draws a parallel between the
oppression-induced fantasy of drag ball culture and similar manifestations in rap music. He
argues that
[iTt would be inaccurate to suggest that using illusion to construct identity Is unique
to Black gay reality. Everyone is capable of creating and employing illusion and
fantasy for whatever purpose. An immediate example can be cited in a style of rap
music known as "gangsta rap." The rapper boasts of being an outlaw, of having
control and power, guns and money; again, things longed for by the disempowered.
h . . T ey are seductive longings, mutated dreams forged from the multitudinous
oppressions constructing American society.
HEMP-]LL, supra note 54, at 116. Although I agree with Hemphill's observation that rap music
often expresses a longing for masculinist power, I disagree with his implicit, though possibly
unintended, assumption that rap culture is external to "Black gay reality." For a fictional,
"popular culture" account of the relationship between "hip-hop" and black gay and bisexual cul-
ture, see JAMES EARL HARDY, B-BOY BLuES (1994).
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of multilayered subordination-but can only "temper" and "obscure"
it. Thus, Venus never realizes her escapist longings. Instead, she
begins to engage in sex work to survive: "she always took a chance.
She always went into a stranger's car. She always did what she want-
ed to get what she wanted ... ."" Later, Venus, as a friend recounts,
is murdered, and police discover "her dead after four days, strangled,
under a bed in a sleazy hotel in New York City . . .. But that's part
of life; that's part of being a transsexual in New York City and surviv-
ing.' 'W Venus' disempowerment was caused by an active interplay of
poverty, racism, and sexual subordination, and her life and death may
not be understood without considering these multiple sources of oppres-
sion."
One final illustration of the multidimensional nature of oppression
is provided by the case of Jeffrey Dabmer. In July 1991 Dahmer, a
young white male, confessed to police that he had killed and dismem-
bered seventeen males in his Milwaukee apartment.6  Most of
58. HEwHnL, supra note 54, at 116. The balls, however, do not only temper oppression
through fantasy. Rather, they may offer concrete support as participants, organized as teams
(or "houses"), sometimes "function as surrogate families for Black and Puerto Rican gay youth
who may be homeless, orphaned, or rejected by their [biological] families because of their
gayness." Id. at 119.
59. Id. at 118 (quoting friend of Venus).
60. Id. (quoting friend of Venus) (emphasis added).
61. The murder of Moses Preston Walter, a black, transgendered sex worker, also illustrates
the intersection of race, class, and sexuality In acts of violence against transgendered, lesbian,
and gay people, particularly, the vulnerability of transgendered sex workers to acts of violence.
Waller, nicknamed "Silver," was robbed and stabbed in the chest by a prospective client.
Andrew Jacobs, No Burial Aid for Moses Preston Waller, N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1996, § 13, at'
6.
The New York State Crime Victims Board denied a request by Silver's grandmother,
Rosalie Roots, for reimbursement of Silver's burial expenses. See d. The board denied her
request on the grounds that Silver "contributed to the infliction of his injury." Id. A board
attorney, however, stated that "it was not common practice for members to reject claims for
victims who had engaged in prostitution." Id. (quoting Everett A. Mayhew). Furthermore,
Roots claims that a board spokesperson informed her that the board has previously reimbursed
families of white heterosexual female prostitutes. See Id.
The New York Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project has filed an appeal on Roots'
behalf, Id. Windy Brown, the attorney representing Roots, recognizes the racial and sexual
aspects of the board's ruling. Brown asks: "Why Is a straight white prostitute any more inno-
cent than an African-American prostitute?" See Id. The board's decision adds further support
for my thesis that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation Is linked with racism and
class oppression.
62. See Sinthasomphone v. Milwaukee, 838 F. Supp. 1320, 1321-22 (ED. Wis. 1993). On
November 28, 1994, while serving fifteen consecutive life sentences for the murde, Dahmer
was beaten to death by a fellow inmate. See Don Terry, Jeffrey Dahmer, Multiple Killer, Is
Bludgeoned to Death in Prison, N.Y. TIwEs, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
19971
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
Dahmer's victims were black gay men.63 Dahmer lived in an economi-
cally depressed neighborhood." Like Rivera and Venus Xtravaganza,
many of Dahmer's victims were lured to their deaths by promises of
money for sexual favors, namely, posing nude for photographs. 5
Dahmer's confession stunned the nation. Perhaps more surprising
than the murders, however, was the revelation that three white police
officers had once (prior to Dahmer's confession) responded to emergen-
cy calls by Dahmer's neighbors-two black women-and found four-
teen year-old Konerak Sinthasomphone, a Laotian youth, drugged, na-
ked, bleeding, and fleeing Dahmer's apartment." Despite the imperiled
condition in which they found Konerak, two of the officers returned
him to the apartment after Dahmer convinced them that he and
Konerak were "lovers involved in a spat."67 When the officers returned
to the police station, they described the case as a "boy-boy" incident
and joked that they needed "de-lousing." ' The officers also failed to
enter Dahmer's name into police computers or file an official report of
the incident.69 Dahmer killed Konerak after the police left. 7" Subse-
quent to Dahmer's confession, it was revealed that he had previously
been convicted of molesting an older brother of Konerak in 1988.71
63. See Edward Walsh, Sweeping Changes Urged in Milwaukee Police Department: Civilian's
Report Prompted by Dahmer Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at A3. Eleven of Dahmer's
victims were black. Sinthasomphone, 838 F. Supp. at 1321. I found no sources that verify
the exact number of gay men among Dalimer's victims.
64. See Don Terry, Milwaukee Grasping for Answers As Horror Mounts Over Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1991, at Al.
65. See William Booth, Dahmer Charged in 8 More Murders, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1991, at
Al. I have not located any helpful sociological or criminological analysis on the relationship
between class, race, sexuality, gay male sex work, and anti-gay violence. The discussion In
this Article, however, suggests that this relationship warrants examination.
66. See James Barron, Milwaukee Police Once Queried Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991,
§ 1, at 6. Dahmer met Konerak at a Milwaukee mall and enticed the child to accompany him
to his apartment with promises of money in exchange for his posing nude or semi-nude for
photos. See Sinthasomphone, 838 F. Supp. at 1322. Dahmer testified that he had "drilled a
hole" in Konerak's head and drugged him with hydrochloric acid before the youth attempted to
escape. Id.
67. Debbie Howlett, Police Were in Dahmer's Room, USA ToDAY, Aug. 2, 1991, at 3A.
68. Id
69. See Barron, supra note 66, § 1, at 6. The officers were suspended for falling to exe-
cute these procedures. See Id. The two officers who returned Konerak to Dahmer's apartment
were subsequently fired but won reinstatement after a judge found the dismissals "shocking to
one's sense of fairness." Victory for Two in Dahmer Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at
BIG (quoting Judge Robert Paris).
70. See Barron, supra note 66, § 1, at 6.
71. See William Cells I1, Family Sought New Lfe Only to Find New Pain, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 1991, at A14. Dahmer received an eight-year prison term for this crime, but he was
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Had the police officers conducted a computer search of Dahmer's
name, they would have discovered his prior molestation conviction n
The police inaction implicates a combination of racial, class, gender,
and sexual subordination issues.
The police officers dismissed the concerns of the two poor black
women who reported their fear that a "child [was] being raped and mo-
lested by [Dahmer]." Instead, one officer tried to assure the women
that "it wasn't a child, it was an adult ... I can't do anything about
somebody's sexual preferences in life."'74 An officer also threatened to
arrest one of the black women if she persisted in seeking help for
Konerak.' Finally, the officers turned away an ambulance crew that
arrived on the scene-although one of the paramedics concluded that
Konerak needed medical treatment26
Thus, the police ignored Konerak's obvious injuries, denied him
necessary medical care, portrayed the incident pejoratively, dismissed
the black women, and accepted Dahmer's characterization of the horri-
ble scene they discovered as a lovers' quarrel. Furthermore, the offi-
cers apparently believed that violence, drugs, and dramatic differences
in age are common features of "boy-boy" relationships-a patently
homophobic conclusion.' The officers may have also acted on racist
stereotypes of Asian men as effeminate-thus "homosexual" 7 --when
they "read" the scene as a domestic dispute.
In response to the officers' egregious conduct, Konerak's estate and
several of his family members have filed a lawsuit against the officers
and the City of Milwaukee under Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 ("Sec-
released and placed on probation after serving one year of the sentence. See Id.
72. See Barton, supra note 66, § 1, at 6.
73. See Howlett, sr pra note 67, at 3A (quoting police transcript).
74. Id. (quoting police transcript) (emphasis added).
75. Sinthasomphone, 838 F. Supp. 1324. Istorically, black women have been perceived as
lacking credibility as witnesses in legal proceedings due to intersecting racial and gender stereo-
types, particularly when they allege that they have suffered sexual assault or harassment
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sesual Harassment, S. CAL. L REv. 1467, 1470 (1992).
In this case, however, they lacked credibility as witnesses of a thrd.par/'s sexual assault.
76. See Sinthasomphone, 838 F. Supp. at 1324.
77. Neither Dahmner's nor Konerak's sexual orientation is publicly laiown. In any event, this
information is irrelevant for my analysis. The relevant facts in this scenario are the officers
belief and Dahmer's declaration that he and Konerak were lovers (read "gay") and the officers'
anti-gay and racial bias.
78. See Peterse supra note 12, at 122 (discussing "racist Iconography of manhood" that
"typically depicts Asian men as effeminate and passive"); David Mura, How America Unsx




tion 1983")."9 The complaint alleges that the officers' failure to pro-
vide protection for Konerak resulted from discrimination on the basis of
race and sexual orientation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution."0 The
complaint also alleges that the City of Milwaukee maintained a policy
or custom of discrimination against people of color and sexual minori-
ties, pursuant to which the officers acted." Thus, this litigation is one
79. This statute provides, in relevant part, that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The term "person" used in the statute includes "municipalities" and
other local government units. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serys. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 690" (1978).
80. Although the published decisions in this case do not make clear, through conversations
with plaintiffs' attorney, I discovered, as the facts of the case suggest, that plaintiffs' race
claim is based on discrimination against Konerak and the two black women and the sexual
orientation claim is based on Konerak's perceived sexual orientation.
Police officers generally have no affirmative duty to provide protection. See DeShancy
v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). If they discriminate In
providing such protection, they may nevertheless violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 197 n.3 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886));
Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); Watson v. Kansas
City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
81. See Sinthasomphone v. Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (com-
plaint alleges that City of Milwaukee "has a longstanding practice of intentional discrimination
against and reckless disregard of the rights of racial minorities and homosexuals'). In order to
prevail on a claim of discrimination against a municipality under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the constitutional deprivation was made pursuant to an official municipal policy
or custom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
The complaint also alleges that the officers violated Konerak's rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect him. See Slnthasomphone
838 F. Supp. at 1328. The court, however, relying upon DeShaney, held that the officers were
entitled to "qualified immunity" and granted them summary judgment on plaintiffs' due process
claim. See Sinthasomphone, 838 F. Supp. at 1327-28. The qualified immunity defense shields
state officials from liability unless the officials' conduct violates "clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Shockingly, the court attached semi-nude photos of Koncrak, taken
by Dahmer, to its opinion granting summary judgment and West Publishing Co. reprinted them
in the Federal Supplement. The police officers submitted the photographs into evidence to
support their claim that they believed Dahmer and Konerak were lovers. Sinthasomphone, 838
F. Supp. at 1323. The court based its finding of qualified immunity on its conclusion that
"one does not inevitably know that getting a naked person off the streets, taking him to an
apartment where his clothes and near-naked pictures of him are present and leaving him there
with a person who convincingly presents himself as a friend will result in death and dismem-
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of the few reported discrimination cases brought by actual or perceived
as gay or lesbian people of color, in which the racially and sexually
subordinate statuses of the plaintiff is mentioned in the opinion. It is
also the only reported case in which the court found as "factually via-
ble" a multidimensional claim of sexual and racial discrimination.
Therefore, although the case overall lacks controversy" and any particu-
larly groundbreaking judicial analysis, it nevertheless merits some atten-
tion in this Article.
After conducting discovery, the officers and the City of Milwaukee
moved for summary judgment, but the court denied both of these mo-
tions. In the affidavits accompanying their motion, the officers disput-
ed that they acted with discriminatory intent.84  The court, however,
held that the undisputed facts would permit a jury to infer that they
acted with discriminatory intent." Discriminatory intent may be shown
with direct or indirect evidence.86 In this case, the officers' intent, as
in most discrimination cases, is subject to proof by circumstantial evi-
dence.s7 Because plaintiffs' discrimination claim requires proof of the
officers' intent or motive through inferences from the surrounding-and
compelling-evidence of bias, the claim does not lend itself to summa-
ry judgment." Thus, the court appropriately denied the officers' mo-
berment." I. at 1328. The court's decision to attach the photographs to its opinion and
West's decision to reprint them further marginalized Koneral.
82. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, In., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989) (af-
firming award of summary judgment to defendant in Title VII and Section 1981 racial discrimi-
nation suit, brought by black gay male plaintinf on the grounds that plaintiff's allegations relat-
ed to "homosexuality" a status not protected by Title VII or Section 1981, rather than race);
Watkins v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), amended, 847 F2d 1329, different
results reached on reh'g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cert denied, 498 U.S. 957
(1990) (finding military estopped from discharging black gay plaintiff on the basis of his admit-
ted gay status); Rhyne v. Perry, 1995 WL 77970 (S.DN.Y. Feb. 24, 1995) (dismissing, for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Title VII complaint alleging discrimination due to
plaintiff's status as a "black male homosexual"). For a criticism of the courts' essentialist
treatment of race and sexual orientation in the Williamson and Watldns cases, see Eaton, Ho.
mosexual Unmodified, supra note 12.
83. But see supra note 81 (arguing that the court further marginalized Konerak).
84. See Sinthasomphone v. Milwaukee, 878 F. Supp. 147, 151 (ED. WIS. 1995). In order
to prevail on their equal protection claim against the police, the Sinthasomphone estate and
family must demonstrate that the officers acted with "discrminatory Intent" See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 US. 252, 256 (1977); Washington v.
Davis, 426 US. 229, 241-42 (1976).
85. See Sinthasomphone, 878 F. Supp. at 151.
86. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1985); 'lllage of Arlington Helghtr, 429 US.
at 266.
87. See Sinthasomphone, 878 F. Supp. at 151.




The City of Milwaukee moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that in 1991-the same year Konerak was murdered-it alleg-
edly implemented official measures to correct any problems of bias
within its police department.89 The City of Milwaukee thus argued that
the only relevant evidence for determining whether it has a policy of
discrimination was its conduct subsequent to 1991 and that this evi-
dence demonstrated that no such policy existed."° The court rejected
this argument and held that the police department's pre-1991 history of
discrimination was relevant for determining whether the City of Mil-
waukee had an unwritten "policy" of discrimination against people of
color and gays and lesbians at the time of Konerak's death. 9 The
court's ruling is consistent with legal precedent. As the Supreme Court
has held, a custom or policy of discrimination may arise in the Section
1983 context when "practices of state officials could well be so perma-
nent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force
of law."' Thus, evidence of the department's pre-1991 history is nec-
essary for the trier of fact to determine whether the police department
had been engaging in a pattern of discriminatory practices at the time
the officers returned Konerak to Dahmer's apartment and whether these
practices were "so permanent and well settled" so as to carry "the force
of law.193
199, 205 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1058-59 (2d Cir.
1984)); Suydam v. Reed Stenhouse, Inc., 820 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987); CHARLES A.
WPJGHT & ARThR R. MILLER, 10A FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE (CIViL) 2d § 2730, at 236-38
(2d ed. 1983). Often, civil rights actions will involve a question of fact regarding the defen-
dant's intent or motive, thereby precluding summary judgment. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra §
2732.2, at 349-50. There is, however, no general bar to granting summary judgment In civil
rights actions, and courts will grant summary judgment in these actions when the material facts
are not in dispute or when there is no legal basis for the relief a plaintiff seeks. See Id. at
362-65.
89. In particular, the City of Milwaukee argued that in 1991 it hired a new police chief
who was an advocate of "community-oriented policing." Sinthasomphone, 878 F. Supp. at 150.
Nevertheless, the City of Milwaukee conceded that the police department had "problems" with
discrimination prior to 1991. See id. at 149.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 150-51. The court, however, held that the City of Milwaukee could rely on
evidence of corrective measures so that a jury could determine whether these measures reme-
died any policy of discrimination that existed prior to Konerak's murder. See Id. at 151.
92. Monel, 436 U.S. at 691 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1970) (emphasis added)). See also St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1987) (citing
Adickes supra).
93. The court's opinion lists a "few" of the "many" historic signs of a possible policy of
discrimination by the police department. They include: (1) a 1984 opinion by the Court of
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The court's rulings regarding the factual viability of plaintiffs' dis-
crimination claims are consistent with my argument that both racial and
sexual subordination informed the police's improper response to
Konerak's subjugation. This case also demonstrates that multidimen-
sionality need not remain exclusively a creature of legal scholarship,
but that it may (and should) influence civil rights cases brought to
remedy acts of discrimination.
One final aspect of the Dahmer tragedy merits attention. The offi-
cers' racial and sexual bias not only subordinated Konerak but also
privileged Dahmer. Affirming racial privilege, the officers accorded
Dahmer deference and credibility-allowing him to settle his "spat'
alone. Thus, the police subjected Konerak to further "domestic
abuse."' Dahmer, meanwhile, negotiated a favorable resolution, from
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upholding a jury verdict, which found that Milwaukee police
officers conspired for twenty years to "cover up" a racially motivated shooting of a black man
by white officers; (2) a 1972 finding by the Wisconsin Advisory Commission to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights C'WAC") that "[tihe charge of racism among policemen
[wa]s not a new one, nor one foreign to Milwaukee"; (3) a 1979 finding by the Office of
Revenue Sharing that the Milwaukee Police Department "had engaged In procedures and poli-
cies that adversely affected employment opportunities for black police officers"; (4) a 1981
conclusion by "consultants" that "a substantial degree of racial polarization [exists] within the
[Milwaukee] police department'; (5) a 1991 study by the Wisconsin Fire and Police Commis-
sion "report['mg] overt racism and sexism at the Police Academy"; (6) a 1991 finding by the
Milwaukee Citizen's Commission on Police-Community Relations "that several [Milwaukee] resi-
dents complained of 'racist and homophobio attitudes and a general lack of respect' from police
officers"; (6) a 1993 finding by the Police Foundation, with which the Milwaukee mayor and
chair of the Wisconsin Fire and Police Commission agree, that "institutionalized racism and
sexism" in the Milwaukee Police Department "needs to bo openly discussed and dealt with";
(7) a 1994 finding by the WAC that the "Milwaukee Police Department has for the past two
decades 'manifested a police culture unsympathetic, and even antagonistic, in its dealings with
minority communities of the City"'; and (8) a recommendation by the WAC that the Milwau-
kee police department adopt "a clearly stated unambiguous policy against discriminatory practic-
es." Sintiasomphone, 878 F. Supp. at 150.
94. The officers' inaction in the wake of Konerak's abuse mirrors the responses of law
enforcement to male-female domestic violence cases where police have often failed to protect
women from their battering husbands and lovers. See generally Susanne M. Brown, Note,
Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the Inadequate Response of the Police in
Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1295 (1995); Developments In the Law. Legal
Responses to Domestic flolence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1501 (1993); Amy Eppler, Note, Battered
Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them Wh7en the Police
Won't?, 95 YALE LJ. 788 (1986). In this context, the police inaction affirms gender hierarchy,
and "the state... is thus complicit in one of the most fundamental and extreme acts of male
domination over women in contemporary American society:' Eppler, supra, at 790 (citing R.
DOe.SH & R. DoBm., VIOLENCE AGAINST Wirs: A CASE AuAwr TIM PATIARCIW (1979); . FLEf-
ING, STOPPING WEE ABUSE (1979); R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIE B.ATNo, Tim SLrr CRISIS
(1977); D. MARTIN, BATrmE WIVEs (Ist ed. 1976); E. Pimzy, SCREAM QUIEMY oa TiE NEIGHBORS
WILL HEAR (1974); S. SCHECETER, WOMEN AND MA:LE VIOLENCE (1982)). Several courts have held
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his perspective, of the encounter. He maintained dominion over his
home and Konerak, who in this context becomes his sexual property
(read "it"). The efforts of Konerak and the black women, on the other
hand, proved unavailing. Their attempts to secure protection were met
with threats, disregard, slurs, jokes, and inaction."
that police inaction to incidents of male-female domestic violence may support claims of sex
discrimination (most of the victims of such abuse are women) in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Freeman, 911 F.2d at 52; Balistred v.
Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1990); Pinder v. Conm'rs of Cambridge, 821 F.
Supp. 376 (D. Md. 1993); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn.
1984).
95. One might argue, however, that the police responded to Konerak's (and Rivcra's) abuse
solely out of anti-gay bias (they did not want to help a couple of "queers"). Indeed, one
commentator has made such an observation and claims that "[i]f Konerak Sinthasomphone had
been a young woman, the Milwaukee police would have responded very differently . . . "
Nancy E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic
Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335, 336 (1995). Not only does this sweeping statement fall to
recognize police indifference to female victims of male domestic violence, it also completely
rules out race and class as possible factors in the police treatment of Konerak and Dahmer.
While I am mindful that heterosexist police, judges, and legislators often fall to treat incidents
of gay and lesbian domestic violence seriously, see Carla M. Da Luz, A Legal and Social
Comparison of Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies In Legal
Recognition and Response, 4 S. CAL. R .L. & WOEN's STUD. 251 (1994); Sandra E. Lundy,
Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence
in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273 (1993); Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-
Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 567 (1990);
Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome Fxpert Testi-
mony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379 (1993),
Murphy, supra, we must also remain aware that racial and class biases may also influence their
responses. Otherwise, we may suggest that race and class have no importance in the lives of
gay people of color-that a homosexual orientation eclipses or otherwise overshadows racial and
class statuses. The persistence of racial and class inequality speaks against such a conclusion.
Furthermore, it is likely that the results of this scenario would have differed if the race of
Dahmer and Konerak had been reversed or if the two women were white and upper-class.
Indeed, the fact that "a large number of hate-motivated criminals tend to be young middle-class
white males" Zwerling, supra note 21, at 545 (citing David Chang, Beyond Uncompromising
Positions: Hate Crimes Legislation and the Common Ground Between Conservative Republicans
and Gay Rights Advocates, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1097, 1101 (1994)); see also CoMsTOCK,
supra note 22, at 60 ('Regardless of the gender or race of the victim, perpetrators [of homo-
phobic violence] are more likely to be white than of color ... :), provides an additional
reason (besides homophobia) for law enforcement officers to treat anti-gay violence lightly. If
the case, however, involves a person of color as the assailant and a white victim, racial biases
might bring it greater attention. Therefore, both the Rivera and Dahmer cases could have had
different results if the races of the assailants and the victims were inverted.
During the completion of this Article, the City of Milwaukee settled the suit with
Konerak's estate and family, agreeing to pay them $850,000. See Milwaukee to Pay $850,000
to Family of Dahmer Victim, WASH. PosT, Apr. 26, 1995, at A6. In a final show of "diploma-
cy" toward the Sinthasomphone family, the County of Milwaukee, upon discovering the terms
of the settlement, asked Konerak's family to repay $65,000 (of a total of $106,368) in welfare
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As the Rivera, Venus Xtravaganza, and Dahmer tragedies illustrate,
racial, class, and sexual subordination are interrelated. Several of these
forces may contribute to a single act of discrimination, as the killing of
Rivera and the police behavior in the Rivera and Dahmer tragedies
reveal. These sources of disempowerment may also combine to limit
an individual's life choices, as the short lives of Rivera, Venus, and the
Dahmer victims demonstrate. Moreover, because race and class also
create privilege, these statuses may offer some insulation from forces of
oppression.' For instance, the police deferred to Dahmer, who was
white (and male), although they believed he was gay. Despite the mul-
tidimensional nature of social reality, prevailing gay and lesbian legal
and political responses to sexual subordination, as Part MI illustrates,
omit racial and class inequality from analysis and, instead, focus almost
exclusively upon the experiences of race- and class-privileged individu-
als. Consequently, gay and lesbian legal theory and political discourse
fall to reflect the complexity of gay and lesbian experiences and ex-
clude people of color and the poor from equality debates.
In this great gay mecca,
I was an invisible man, still
I had no shadow, no substance
No history, no place
No reflection9 7
III. ESSENTIAUST LEGAL THEORY AND POLITICAL ACTION
Although race, class, and sexual subordination actively interact in
the lives of gay and lesbian people, gay and lesbian equality discourse
invariably excludes racial and class inequity from analysis. The exclu-
sion of race typically occurs when it is treated as analogous to-hence
separate from-sexual orientation. For example, one gay theorist, Wil-
liam Paul, has specifically endeavored to determine whether "homosexu-
als are a minority group with issues identical to the movements for
benefits the family received during the past ten years. See Give Back Welfare, Comity Tells
Family, Wis. ST. J., Apr. 27, 1995, at 3B. A "county spokesman" stated that such demands
are routinely made when families receive "windfalls" from other sources. See Id.
96. See infra. pp. 605-08 (discussing how class privileges gays and lesbians).
97. Riggs, Tongues Untied in BROHR To BRoTHER, supra note 2, at 203.
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racial and ethnic minority civil rights."98 To reach his conclusion that
"people with a homosexual orientation do constitute a minority
group," '99 Paul purports to analyze the "differences in the discrimination
directed by the majority toward Lesbians and Gay men on the one
hand and toward racial and ethnic minorities on the other.'' I°0 Al-
though Paul acknowledges passively that gays and lesbians "are mem-
bers of all races, both sexes, and all socioeconomic groups,"' 0' his anal-
ogy of racial "minorities" to gays and lesbians treats the two as mutu-
ally exclusive groups, thereby omitting gays and lesbians of color. A
statement by Benjamin Schatz, the Executive Director of the American
Association of Physicians for Human Rights, captures, rather strikingly,
the essentializing effects of analogical reasoning in gay and lesbian
political discourse. During an interview in which Schatz explains how
the AIDS epidemic has forced gay and bisexual men to reveal their
sexual identities, Schatz states that "AIDS [has] de-invisibilized us...
. The biggest difference between us and blacks was that we were invis-
ible."' 2  Clearly, Schatz excludes "blacks" from his population of
"gays" ("us" and "we"). Thus, black gays are "invisible" under
Schatz's analogy.'
Race and sexuality analogies, as this Part demonstrates, also pre-
clude an examination of the ways in which racial domination and privi-
lege impact gay and lesbian people. By omitting people of color and
ignoring white racial privilege, the analogies obscure the potent social
role of race.104
98. William Paul, Minority Statusfor Gay People, in HOMOSExuAITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL,
AND BIOLOGICAL IssUS 351, 353 (William Paul et al. eds., 1982).
99. IM[ at 368.
100. Id. at 355.
101. Id at 353.
102. Jeffrey Schmialz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992 (Magazine),
at 29 (emphasis added).
103. Mary Eaton has observed that:
analogical reasoning inserts a space between the things analogized that may be nar-
rowed according to degrees of logical correspondence, but remains ultimately un-
bridgeable. The effect of this is plain: The possibility of cross-identification or
consubstantial oppression is utterly unintelligible in a mode of reasoning that depends
upon a separation between identities of oppressions. "Black homosexual" Is therefore
an oxymoron in an analogical comparison of blacks and homosexuals.
Eaton, Homosexual Unmodifed, supra note 12, at 62.
104. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Dis-
course of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 297 (1994) (attempts to compare ho-
mosexuals and other groups "erases 'vertical' differences within a group... [and] 'horizontal'
differences across the spectrum of legally protected groups"). Cf. Trina Grillo & Stephanie M.
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A. The Exclusion of Race and Class from Gay and Lesbian
Legal Theory
I. Essentialist Legal Solutions to Gay and Lesbian Inequality
Gay and lesbian legal theorists embrace essentialism by excluding
issues of race from analysis.0 s As a result, the legal theories and solu-
Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between
Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE LJ. 397, 401 (1991) ("Comparing sexism to
racism perpetuates patterns of racial domination by marginalizing and obscuring the different
roles that race plays in the lives of people of color and of whites."). Comparisons of racial
and sexual subordination abound in both gay legal theory and political discourse. See, e.g
Robert Dawidoff & Michael Nava, WIhy Martin Luther King, Jr. Is a GayRights Hero: His
Lie and His Message Resonate Beyond the Fight Against Ractal Prejudice, LA. TIMs, Jan.
16, 1994, at M5; William Eskridge, Race and Sexual Orientation In the Mlitaty: Ending the
Aparheid of the Close RECONSTRUCTION, No. 2, at 52 (1993); Gerald Gilerman, Dred Scott
Revisited: A Comment On Bowers v. Hardwick 30 BOST. BAR J. 4 (1986); Note, The Constitu-
tional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Cla.sificatlon, 98 HARV. L
REV. 1285 (1985). These comparisons separate racial privilege and subordination from sexual
orientation and thereby preclude discussions of power differentials created by racial hierarchy
within the population of gays and lesbians and between white gay people and people of color.
105. Before I develop this argument, I wish to note, preliminarily, that lesbian theorists have
already criticized gay male and feminist legal theorists and, mor so, political activists for fail-
ing to acknowledge the intersection of sexism and homophobla, equating lesbian and gay male
experience, and omitting lesbian issues from analysis. See, eg., RnimAeNN RolsoN, LESBIAN
(OuT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 21-22 (1992). Some theorists, most notably
Robson, am attempting to construct a more specific, lesblan-centermd "lesbian legal theory."
See, e.g., id; Paula L Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?. The Need to Develop a Lesbian Con-
scious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L SCE. . HUM. RTS. 513 (1993); Ruthann Robson, Embodment(s):
The Possibilities of Lesbian Legal Theory in Bodies Problematfed by Postmodernismts and
Feminisms, 2 LAw & SEXUALITY 37 (1992); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(7ers: Lesbi-
ans as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEmPLE L. REv. 511 (1990); Ruthana
Robson, The Specter of a Lesbian Supreme Court Justice: Problems of Identity In Lesbian Le-
gal Theorizing, 5 ST. THOMAS L REv. 433 (1993). Hence, there is a history of anti-essentiallst
criticism, focusing on "gender," in gay and lesbian legal theory and political discourse that prm-
dates the scholarship exploring race and sexual orientation.
Although lesbian theorists have correctly criticized the respective "male-centered" and
heterosexist nature of gay and feminist theory and political action, they too have faced criticism
for failing to consider how race informs lesbian experience. See SuANF PHELAM GEsNG SPE-
cmc POSTMOERN LE BIAN POLICS (1994) [hereinafter GErTNG SIoc]; SRANE PHELA, IDENIrTY
PoLmcs: LESBIAN FEMNSM AND Ti LMffTS OF CO.MUNITY 161-66 (1989) [hereinafter IDENnrr"
PoLrIcs]; Arriola, Gendered Inequality, supra note 12, at 132-35; Jackie Goldsby, Queen for
307 Days, in AFREKEZ supra note 9, at 165-88; LoRDF, Man Chld" A Black Lesbian Feminist's
Response, in SISTER OtlISIDER, supra note 9, at 72; LORDE, An Open Letter to Mary Da4;, In
SISTER OUTSIDER, supra note 9, at 66; Eaton, At the Interjection, supra note 12, at 212-18;
Petersen, supra note 12 at 118-37; Barbara Smith & Beverly Smith, Across the Kitchen Table:
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tions they propose for "gay" and "lesbian' inequality may have limited
benefits-if any-for people of color and the poor. Recent works by
William Eskridge on same-sex marriage'" serve as a perfect example of
gay and lesbian essentialism and the problematic impact it has upon
theory. In these publications, Eskridge advocates legal recognition of
same-sex marriage.'07 A significant portion of Eskridge's analysis at-
tempts to dispose of the concerns of lesbian theorists who argue that
achieving legal legitimacy for gay and lesbian unions would actually
affirm traditional power differences supplied by gender, assimilate gays
and lesbians into middle-class society, and divide the gay and lesbian
community along race, class, and gender lines.' The lesbian critiques
of the pursuit of same-sex marriage have been the site of the most
contentious anti-essentialism debate-primarily around issues of "gen-
der"--in gay and lesbian legal theory and politics."0 9 As my discussion
A Sister to Sister Dialogue, in THS BIDGE CALLED MY BACIC, supra note 1, at 120-24;. Thus,
while the gender-based lesbian feminist critiques of gay and lesbian legal theory and politics
support my thesis that gay and lesbian equality theory and activism are essentialist, they gener-
ally have not provided much illumination on issues of race in lesbian experience. I note, how-
ever, that most of the racial critics in gay and lesbian legal theory are lesbian.
106. &e WILLIAM N. ESmIwxDE JP, Ti CASE FOR SAm-SEX MARRIAGE: FRoM SEwUAL LmmER To
CVILIZED COMMnWENT (1996) [hereinafter TBE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993). This Article
initially addressed arguments Eskridge makes in A History of Same-Sex Marriage. I have ex-
tended my analysis to focus upon arguments Eskridge develops in The Case for Same-Sex Mar-
riage, which was published during the completion of this Article.
107. See generally sources cited supra note 106.
108. For a survey of these criticisms, see generally Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage
a Path to Liberation?, In LEsBLS, GAY MEN, AND TM LAW 401 (William B. Rubenstein cd.,
1993) [hereinafter LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW]; Nancy D. Polikoff, Me Will Get What We
Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure
of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Robson & Valentine, supra note
105.
109. In addition to the debates cited supra, note 108, Law and Sexuality: A Review of Gay
and Lesbian Legal Issues, a journal produced by students at Tulane Law School, has sponsored
a symposium on the issue and published the papers presented at the forum. See Nitya Duclos,
Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 L & SEXUALIrF 31 (1991) (arguing that
members of the gay and lesbian community will not uniformly benefit from the legalization of
same-sex marriage due to racial and class differences); Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay
Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, I L. & SEUALITY
63 (1991) (arguing that the legalization of same-sex marriage will help counter societal homo-
phobia); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 9
(1991) (arguing that same-sex marriage will help subvert gender-based distinctions in marriage).
Other scholars and attomeys have also contributed to the debate. See ESKRiDGE, Ti CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 106, at 51-85 (1996) (defending efforts to legalize same-sex
marriage and responding to lesbian critiques); Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L. & FE MNISM
321 (1991) (arguing that gays and lesbians should seek to make the private and governmental
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benefits of marriage available for everyone); Eskidge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, supra
note 106, at 1419 (defending efforts to legalize same-sex marriage and responding to lesbian
critiques); Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Many, In LESBIANS,
GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 108, at 398 (same); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threho."
Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Communi y Critique, 21
N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1995) (same).
Outside of these contentious debates, gay and lesbian legal theorists, civil rights attorneys,
and other commentators have extensively explored legal issues pertaining to s-ane-sex marriage,
giving gay and lesbian marriage extreme priority in the contemporary legal struggle for gay and
lesbian equality. For a survey of the voluminous scholarhip on same-sex marriage, see gener-
ally sources cited supra and supra note 108; Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism
and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L REV. 745 (1995);
Anne M. Burton, Gay Marriage-A Modern Proposa" Applying Baehr v. Lewin to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 177 (1995); Rob-
ert L. Cordell, II, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and an Eamlna-
tion of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUML Hum RlS. L REV.
247 (1994); Barbara J. Cox Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: Jf We Many In Hawaii,
Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L REV. 1033 (1994); Jonathon
Dietriech, The Lessons of the Law:. Same-Sex Marriage and Baehr v. Lewin, 78 MARQ. L REV.
121 (1994); Lisa Farabee, Marriage, Equal Protectlon, and New Judicial Federalism: A f7ew
From the States, 14 YALE L & PoL'Y REV. 237 (1996); Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Mar-
riage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural Canonical, and Natural Law Based
Definitions of Marriage, 35 How. LJ. 173 (1992); Vincent C. Green, Same-Sex Adoption: An
Alternative Approach to Gay Marriage in New York, 62 BROOK. L REV. 399 (1996); Joseph W.
Hove-mill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's Recog-
nition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450 (1994); Christine Jax, Same-Sex Afar-
riage-Why Not? 4 WIDrrEe J. PuB. L 461 (1995); Nancy Lingeman & Kenneth May, For
Better or for Worse, In Sickness and in Health, Until Death Do Us Part: A Look at Same-Sex
Marriage in Hawaii, 16 U. HAW. L REV. 447 (1994); Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay
Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. PoL'Y 215 (1995); William B. Rubansten, We Are
Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relatlonsh6ps, 8
JL. & POL 89 (1991); Edward A. Slavin, Jr., What Makes a Marriage Legal: Here Is the
Case for Legalizing Gay Relationships, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 16 (1991); Jeffiey J. SwAt, The W$ed-
ding Luau-Who Is Invited?: Hawaii Same-Sex Marriage, and Emerging Realities, 43 EMORY
LJ. 1577 (1994); Erik J. Toulon, Call the Caterer Hawai to Host First Same-Sex Marriage, 3
S. CAL. REV. L & WOMctZ's STUD. 109 (1993); Kevin A. Zambrowicz, "To Love and Honor
All the Days of Your Lfe". A Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, 43 CAt. L REV.
907 (1994); Marty K. Courson, Note, Baehr v. Lewin: Hawaii Takes a Tentative Step to Legal-
ize Siame-Sex Marriage, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 41 (1994); Anthony Dominic D'Amato,
Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marrages, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 911 (1995); Otis R. Damslet, Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.YJ.L S tL J. Hut.
RTS. 555 (1993); William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy,
103 YALE LJ. 1495 (1994); Note, In Sickness and In Health, In Hawall and 37here Fe?:
Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARv. L REV. 2038 (1996);
Edward J. Juel, Note, Non-Traditional Family Values: Providing Quasi-Marital Rights to Same-
Sex Couples, 13 B.C. Trm3 WORLD L.i. 317 (1993); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marrage?
Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Afarrlages, 47 SrAN.
L. REV. 499 (1995); Scott K. Kozurna, Note, Baehr v. Lewin and Same-Sex Marriage: The
Continued Struggle for Political and Human Legitiracy, 30 WLLA.MrrE L REV. 891 (1994);
Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L. 573 (1973); Claudia A. Lewis, Note,
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will reveal, however, the lesbian feminist critiques themselves have
also, at times, suffered from a lack of racial analysis.
Eskridge criticizes lesbian feminists who argue that gays and lesbi-
ans should not pursue marriage because that institution has traditionally
subordinated women."' Eskridge argues that the fact
[tihat Western marriages have traditionally been the social in-
strument by which women have been subordinated does not
mean that marriage "causes" that subordination. Women's sub-
ordination may be more deeply related to social attitudes about
gender differences than to the formal construct of marriage per
se. If that is true, same-sex marriage does not buy into a rot-
ten institution; it only buys into an institution that is changing,
as women's roles and status are changing in our society.'
Eskridge further notes that the feminist critique of marriage as a
major source of women's oppression "comes perilously close to
essentializing marriage as an inherently regressive institution ... ,,n2
Eskridge's general observation regarding the essentialist nature of the
lesbian feminist critique is correct. In particular, the negative feminist
From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE LJ.
1783 (1988); Candace L. Sage, Note, Sister-State Recognition of Valid Same-Sex Marriages:
Baehr v. Lewin-How Will It Play in Peoria?, 28 IND. L. REv. 115 (1994); James Trosino,
Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV.
93 (1993).
In addition, same-sex marriage has been the subject of substantial litigation and scrutiny
by state legal authorities. See ESRDGE, THE CAsE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 106, at
232-33 & n24 (listing numerous cases rejecting same-sex couples' petitions for equal marriage
rights), and 248-49 & n.18 (same; listing opinions of attorneys general of several states who
have argued that their states' marriage laws can constitutionally prohibit same-sex marriage).
110. See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 108, at 402 (stating that marriage is "steeped in a pati-
archal system that looks to ownership, property, and dominance of men over women as Its
basis . .. !); Polikoff, supra note 108, at 1536 ("desire to marry .. . betrays the promise of
... radical feminism"); Robson & Valentine, supra note 105, at 535 ("Marriage has remained
interwoven with both the development and the perpetuation of patriarchy and women's status
within patriarchy.). The lesbian, gender-based opposition to marriage arises out of feminist
criticism. Robson & Valentine, supra note 105 at 535 ("Underlying the lesbian critique of
marriage is the gendered perspective on marriage developed by feminists."). For a sampling of
feminist critiques of marriage see ?MlCnE BA~iterr & MARY MCINTOS-, THE ANT-SOCIAL FAMILY
(1982); SHULAMITH FIRESTOm , THE DALECTIC OF S: THE CASE FOR FEmiNr REVOLtrnfON (1970);
PA1EmA, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Sheila Cronan, Marriage, in RADICAL FEMINSm 213-21
(Anne Koedt et al. eds., 1973). See also ALICE ECHOS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMI'ISM
IN AMERICA 1967-75 (1989) (cataloguing feminist anti-marriage politics).




depiction of marriage contrasts with the portrait of marriage advanced
by feminist legal scholars and social theorists of color. Feminists of
color have challenged this negative portrait of marriage (and the priva-
cy sphere more broadly), noting that women of color often view mar-
riage and family life as a "site of solace and resistance against racial
oppression. '' 1
Eskridge, however, covers the narrow feminist critique of marriage
with his own overlay of essentialism by failing to examine the impact,
and even dismissing the importance, of racism and poverty on the
claims he makes. For example, Eskridge opposes the contention that
the pursuit of same-sex marriage is a negative attempt to "assimilate"
mainstream norms, which gay and lesbian politics should seek to under-
mine.' Eskridge argues that gays and lesbians "are gender rebels
because that role has been thrust upon us by oppressive dividing prac-
tices, including legal discriminations like the exclusion from marriage.
If those dividing practices were to collapse, we might tend to meld
back into society's mainstream, which does not inevitably strike me as
baleful.""' Assume for the sake of argument that gays and lesbians are
"gender rebels" and that "dividing practices" of "gender" exclusion
exist apart from other forms of social inequality. Even under these
assumptions, the people who would likely benefit from social change
limited to gender-linked "dividing practices," in particular the exclusion
from marriage, and quietly "meld back into society's mainstream" prob-
113. Roberts, supra note 13, at 1470-71; see also HOOKS, FROM MARGIN TO CENTER, supra note
13, at 37 (family lift and marriage allow black women to "experience dignity, self-worth, and
a humanization that is not experienced in the outside world."). This observation, however, Is
not without its problems. Because women of color may view the home as a sanctuary against
racist oppression, they may decline to seek state assistance (which they approach with distrust),
when they suffer domestic abuse from their male partners. See Crenshaw, Mapping the fargln,
supra note 13, at 1257; Miriam IL Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An
Analysis of Race and Gender in Domestic 1iolence, 2 AM. U. L GENDER & L 171, 182-84
(1994). In addition, lesbians of color may face homophobic violence and marginalization in
the home and battering from their intimate partners.
114. Eskrlidge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 106, at 1488. Again, lesbian
theorists have been the primary source of this criticism. Paula Ettelbrick, for example, argues
that "[t]he thought of emphasizing our sameness to married heterosexuals In order to obtain
[the right to marry] terrifies me ... .We end up mimicking all that is bad about the institu-
tion of marriage in our effort to appear to be the same as straight couples." Ettelbrick, supra
note 108, at 403. Similarly, Robson and Valentine argue that "[pursuing state approval of
[lesbian] relationships ... forces lesbian partners into potentially damaging attempts to calibrate
their lives to conform to heterosexual models." Robson & Valentine, supra note 105, at 539.
See also Polikoff, supra note 108, at 1536 ("desire to marry... is an attempt to mimic the
worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution.").
115. Eskridge, A HIfstory of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 106, at 1490 (emphasis added).
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ably do not face multiple forms of social and economic oppression.
Also, poor gays and lesbians and gays and lesbians of color, unlike the
white and affluent, are excluded from society before they ever discover
their sexual orientation. Therefore, they cannot meld back into the
mainstream-they have never been part of it."6  Furthermore, both
sides of the assimilation debate obscure the extent to which many gays
and lesbians, due to race, class and gender privileges, are already close-
ly linked to and "assimilated" within mainstream social power struc-
tures.
Eskridge also confronts lesbian theorists who argue that the legal-
ization of same-sex marriage will benefit primarily "affluent white male
couples" ' and divide the gay and lesbian community among racial,
class, and gender lines. Lesbian theorist Paula Ettelbrick has most
vigorously stated this argument. Ettelbrick believes that legal and polit-
ical efforts aimed at legalizing same-sex marriage reflect a universal
"need to be accepted by the broader society."'18 She, nevertheless,
contends that
[t]hose closer to the norm or to power in this country are more
likely to see marriage as a principle of freedom and equality.
Those who are more acceptable to the mainstream because of
race, gender and economic status are more likely to want the
right to marry. It is the final accept nce, the ultimate affirma-
tion of identity.
On the other hand, more marginal members of the lesbian
and gay community (women, people of color, working class
and poor) are less likely to see marriage as having relevance to
our struggles for survival. After all, what good is the affirma-
tion of our relationships (that is, marital relationships) if we are
116. As James Baldwin poignantly stated:
A black gay person who is a sexual conundrum to society is already, long before
the question of sexuality comes into it, menaced and marked because he's black or
she's black. The sexual question comes after [temporally] the question of color, it's
simply one more aspect of the danger in which all black people live.
Richard Goldstein, "Go the Way Your Blood Beats": An Interview With James Baldwin, In
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 108, at 43. See also Jewelle Gomez, Repeat
After Me: We Are Different. We Are the Same., 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 935, 938
(1986) Q"[B]y the time I learned that being gay was a reality with which I would have to
reckon, I was already struggling with another reality-black skin-that was immensely more
devastating in my daily life.").
117. Eskridge, 4 History of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 106, at 1491-93.
118. Ettelbrick, supra note 108, at 403.
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rejected as women, black, or working class?" 9
Ettelbrick's argument is compelling. Because most gays and lesbi-
ans of color remain invisible and marginalized within the larger gay
and lesbian community, 2 ° it is extremely unlikely that a marriage li-
cense will close much of the gulf between them and the center of a
heterosexual society that is stratified by race, class, gender, and sexuali-
ty. On the other hand, gays and lesbians who are privileged by inter-
locking racism, sexism, and class inequality stand a greater chance of
blending-if they have not already-into this multi-oppressive society.
As a result, persons who face multiple oppressions and those who pos-
sess social privileges will likely have disparate views on the ability of
marriage to place them within structures of power and acceptability and
to transform radically their lives.
Eskridge calls this assertion the "new insiders argument,' 2' because
it suggests that privileged gays and lesbians can marry and create a
class of "insiders" who fit neatly within the larger non-gay and lesbian
community.' "  The "new insiders argument" "underwhelms"'--even
"baffles" 2 -- Professor Eskridge. Eskridge dismisses this racial, gender,
and class critique by noting that "there is no evidence-neither polls,
surveys nor theoretical models-suggesting that the marriage option
would be disproportionately exercised by rich gay men as compared to
people of color or lesbians or less affluent homosexuals."" The lack
of "evidence" documenting the opinions of men of color, lesbians, and
the poor regarding the gay marriage movement, versus those of white
affluent gay men, may have less to do with their tacit acceptance of
and excitement for the movement than with their exclusion from and
invisibility within gay and lesbian political discourse."2
119. Ettelbrick, supra note 108, at 403-04. See also Duclos, supra note 109, at 51 n.75
("Lesbians and gay men who are oppressed because of their race, culture, andor disability will
probably not find that the respectability marriage confers is adequate to ameliorate these kinds
of discrimination.").
120. See supra p. 562; see also infra pp. 604-05.
121. Eskridge, .4 Hstory of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 106, at 1491.
122. See id. Again, many gays and lesbians may already fit neatly within structures of pow-
er.
123. Id at 1492.
124. ESKRDGE, HE CASE FOR SAAiE-S-x M AAGU, supra note 106, at 82-83.
125. It at 83.
126. Reflecting on the invisibility of black men in gay political discourse, Joseph Beam com-
mented that "[more and more each day, as I looked around the well-stocked shelves of
Giovanni's Room, Philadelphia's gay, lesbian, and feminist bookstore -where I worked, I won-
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Moreover, substantial sociological, historical, and anthropological
research demonstrates that Africans, American blacks, and other non-
white cultures place tremendous importance on "extended families,"'
27
rather than rigid nuclear bodies, as a means of social organization and
child rearing. 8  These patterns result from economic necessity and
cultural practice."2 Furthermore, Census data and significant sociologi-
cal studies indicate that heterosexual blacks "exercise the marriage op-
tion" less often than their white counterparts. 3
Although this family structure research and statistical data do not
explicitly focus on gays and lesbians, it is possible that gays and lesbi-
ans of color who grew up in this tradition and who have similar eco-
nomic backgrounds, will replicate these family structures. Indeed,
dered where was the work of Black gay men." Beam, Introduction to IN 7M LIFE, supra note
9, at 14.
127. "An extended family is one in which individual relationships extend beyond the conjugal
family-spouses and children-and include daily interaction with, and responsibilities for, other
family members such as aunts, uncles, grandparents, and cousins." Gilbert A. Holmes, The Ev-
tended Family System in the Black Communty: A Child Centered Model for Adoption Policy,
68 TEMP. L. REv. 1649, 1658 (1995).
128. See id. at 1658-67. See aso ANDREW BLLINSLEY, ComN JACOB'S LADDER: TE ENDuRING
LEGACY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAmLIES 94-95 (1992); ELMER P. MARTIN & JOANNE MARTIN, THE
BLACK EXTENDED FAMiLY (1978); THE ExTENDED FAmiLY IN BLACK SoCaEms (Demitri B. Shinkin ct
al eds., 1978); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY
(1974); Madeleine L. Kurtz, The Purchase of Families into Foster Care: Two Case Studies and
the Lessons They Teach, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 1467-68 (1994) ("Extended kinship networks
are found to be particularly prevalent and important within African-American communities.");
Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 132-33 ("mothering" In
black community involves "a rich tradition of women-centered, communal childcare. These
cooperative networks include members of the extended family ... as well as nonblood kin and
neighbors:); Note, Into the Mouths of Babes: La Familia Latina and Federally Funded Child
Welfare, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1319, 1322-23 (1992) ("To Latinos, familia brings to mind much
more than the nuclear family; familia encompasses broad, extended family ties including many
generations of aunts, uncles, grandparents, and cousins.") (citing ANGELA L. CARRASQUILLO, HISPAN-
IC CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN TiE UNITED STATES 70,72-73 (1991)); William A. Vega, Note, Hispan-
ic Families in the 1980s: A Decade of Research, 52 . MARRIAGE & FAM. 1015, 1016-17;.
129. See generally sources cited supra note 128. See also Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and
Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceed-
ings, 64 FORD. L. REV. 1505, 1546 (1996) ("shared parenting responsibilities among kin' pre-
dominate in many Caribbean, African, and African American contexts, in long-standing cultural
patterns, and as a hedge against poverty.") (citing Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on
Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 539, 541 (1983)).
130. See generally ANDREw CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND RE-MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1992). Sev-
eral sociological studies have attributed this disparity to class differences. Specifically, these
studies argue that individuals seek partners with financial and economic resources. These stud-
ies therefore conclude that the prevalence and persistence of poverty among blacks renders
marriage less beneficial or attractive to many of them. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,
THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978).
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many gays and lesbians of color have documented the significance of
extended family networks in their writings.' Noticeably absent from
their scholarship, however, are vigorous arguments in support of same-
sex marriage and nuclear family models. Also, several gays and lesbi-
ans of color have recently voiced criticism of the gay and lesbian mar-
riage movement.3
Thus, under a multidimensional analysis the argument that gay and
lesbian interest in and benefits from same-sex marriage may vary under
different racial, class, and ethnic contexts is not "baffling." Rather, it
speaks to the cultural differences and the incongruent dispersal of social
and economic power within the population of gays and lesbians. Ac-
cordingly, lesbians, men of color, and the poor may place less stock in
marriage as a means of ending, or substantially reducing, their oppres-
sion. Gays and lesbians of color, if their writings are a reliable indica-
tion, have been generally ambivalent towards the same-sex marriage
issue. Furthermore, Eskridge himself concedes that "lesbians . .. con-
tribute more than their share of marriage critics.""L3
131. ee, e.g., GOME, ILost It at the Movies, in FoRTY-THwE S EMBERS, SUlra note 9, at 9
(describing importance of author's relationship with her grandmother and mother, with whom
she grew up, and relating the process of coming out to them); HEpmn].., tss Emly5' Grand-
son Won't Hush His Mouth, in CRIEONES, supra note 9, at 43-46 (describing Hemphill's
relationship with his grandmother and the process of revealing his sexual orientation to her).
The prevalence and importance of extended family networks in communities of color does not
mean, however, that people of color do not marry or wish to marry. Rather, it suggests that
people of color may place less reliance upon marriage as an institution of social organization,
child rearing, and freedom.
132. See David Dunlap, Some Gay dghts Advocates Question Drh to Defend Same.Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TImls, June 7, 1996, at A12 ("there [are] several causes 'more fundamental to
survival' for gay men and lesbians... .:) (quoting black lesbian activist); Id. (reporting view
of Keith Boykin, executive director of the National Black Gay and Lesbian Lcadershlp Forum,
that marriage movement is "marching down the wrong path and running a disastrous course,"
given divisions within the gay and lesbian community, lack of public support, and the perva-
siveness of other forms of discrimination against gays and lesbians).
133. ESK ImDF, THE CASE FOR SAmi-SEx mIAGE, supra note 106, at 83. Eskidge also dis-
misses the lesbian critiques by citing recent surveys in gay and lesbian periodicals that purport
to indicate overwhelming support for same-sex marriage among lesbians and gays. See a at
78-79 (citing Janet Lever, Sezual Revelations, THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 1994, at 17, 24; Readers
Favor LegalMarriage, PARTms MAGAZINE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN COUPLES, July/Aug. 1990, at 1;
Elizabeth Rhodes, New 7Tes That Bind Same-Sex Couples Challenge the Sstem to Gain Legal
Recognition of Their Commitments to Each Other, SEATrLE TINIEs, July 21, 1991, § K, at 1).
Polls taken by gay and lesbian magazines, however, tend to be extremel, poor predictors of
gay and lesbian opinion because these polls are invariably based on biased samples that exclude
the poor and people of color. See infra pp. 605-08. Accordingly, the surveys Eskridge cites
likely tell us more about the desire for same sex-marriage among the white and affluent, rather
than the views held by people of color and the poor.
Eskridge also notes that "lesbians of color in 1920s Harlem" passed as "men" In order to
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By stark contrast, several white and economically advantaged gay
male legal and political commentators consider the legalization of same-
sex marriage crucial to the(ir) struggle(s) for legal, political, and social
equality. Eskridge, for example, claims that "[miarriage is the most
important right the state has to offer .... ."' He argues that once
gay marriages have "slowly blossom[ed] ...like dandelions in spring-
time,"'35 they will spawn a multitude of dramatic benefits for gays and
lesbians. In particular, Eskridge contends that same-sex marriage will
"undermine social homophobia,"'136 render the "insider-outsider issue..
. almost irrelevant" for the "next generations of homosexual youth,"'37
provide "discipline" for gay men,33 and help working-class lesbians
obtain marriage licenses. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 106, at 83.
Eskridge's "evidence" misses the point. The mere fact that some black lesbian couples "legal-
ly" married in the 1920s does not tell us much about general attitudes of gay and lesbian
people of color toward same-sex marriage in the 1920s or, more relevantly, in the 1990s. Sec-
ond, the occurrence of gay or lesbian marriage standing alone does not prove its importance as
a vital liberation tool, nor does it demonstrate the comparative views and gains of people of
color and affluent gay white men towards and from marriage.
134. Id at 8 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 81.
136. Id. at 82.
137. Id. Even if same-sex marriage could undermine homophobia, this limited change would
not eliminate the "insider-outsider" issue for young gays who are poor, female, or of color.
138. Id. at 83. Eskridge states that
[iln order to achieve committed relationships gay men need the discipline of marriage
more than lesbians do. Gay men are like Ulysses, who directed that he be bound to
the ship's mast as it passed the Sirens, sea creatures whose seductive voices enticed
men to their deaths. Likewise, gay men realize that they tend to lose their balance
and succumb to private sirens if they are not socially and even legally constrained.
Id
Eskridge argues that lesbians, by contrast "have achieved a balance of sexual freedom and
interpersonal commitment' and that same-sex marriage will "civilizef] gay men by making them
more like lesbians." Id. at 83-84.
Eskridge overstates the power of law. He fails to demonstrate how "legal constraints"
can push gay men toward (rather than repel them from) committed relationships. It is interest.
ing to note that the "law" in some states outlaws gay male sexual practice but has not stopped
many gay men from engaging in sex. According to Eskridge, their sexual lives are In fact
wanton-"unbalanced" and "uncivilized."
Furthermore, Eskridge's Homerian metaphor seems to accept, though possibly unintentional-
ly, caustic stereotypes regarding gay male sexual practice. Even if such stereotypes were true,
Eskridge's argument, extended to its logical conclusion, implies a false dichotomy between
heterosexual and gay men. Under Eskridge's analysis, gay men, who cannot legally marry, arc
vulnerable to "seductive voices"; heterosexual males, for whom marriage is available, are seem-
ingly immune from--or "deaf' to-these forces, supposedly, by the "social" and "legal" "con-
straint" of marriage. The prevalence of infidelity, rape, incest, pornography, and use of female
sex workers by heterosexual males (married and unmarried) speaks against such a dichotomy
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gain custody of their children. 39 Furthermore, Thomas Stoddard, a
and against a conclusion that marriage "tames" male sexuality. Finally, Eskridge does not ex-
plain why we should view unmarried, non-monogamous (and even promiscuous) males as "un-
civilized."
139. See Id. at 84. Specifically, Eskridge argues that the outcome of Bottoms Y. Bottoms,
444 S.S2d 276 (Va. CL App. 1994), reId, 457 S.E..d 102 (Va. 1995), might have differed if
Virginia recognized same-sex marriages. In the Bottoms case, Sharon Bottoms, a working-class
lesbian, lost custody of her child after the court granted a custody petition brought by Kay
Bottoms-Sharon Bottoms' mother.
The decisions in Bottoms are replete with gender and class hostility and homophobla. For
a more extensive analysis of this point see Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat MAe Not to Leave
Thee": Bottoms v. Bottoms and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WhL &
MARY BiLL RTs. 1 289 (1994); Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and
the Judicial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereos, 7 YALE J.L. & Fu.thS.M 341 (1995). For
a general discussion of the difficulties gays and lesbians face in custody battles due to judicial
bias, see Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Falls Lesbian and Gay Parents
and Their Children, 71 IND. LJ. 623 (1996). The trial judge, for example, based the award of
custody to Kay Bottoms on the following.
Sharon Bottoms has admitted that she Is living in an homosexual relationship. She
is sharing her bed with her female lover. Examples given were kissing, patting, all
of this in the presence of the child . . . . I will tell you first that the mother's
conduct is illegal. I will tell you that it is the opinion of the court that her conduct
is immoral. And it is the opinion of this court that the conduct of Sharon Bottoms
renders her an unfit parent.
Bottoms, 444 SE2d at 279 (quoting ruling of the trial court) (numerous ellipses omitted).
Sharon Bottoms appealed, and the appellate court reversed the decision, finding that "It]he fact
that a parent is homosexual does not per se render a parent unfit to have custody of his or
her child." Id. at 281 (citing Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (V. 1981)).
Kay Bottoms appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which reversed the oppellate
decision and remanded the case for the trial court to reinstate the order of custody. See
Botoms, 457 S.E2d at 102. The court's "reasoning" reinforces, and is informed by, class, gen-
der, and sexual biases. The court declared Sharon Bottoms unworthy of custody because it
found that she
moves her residence from place to place, relying on others for support, and uses
welfare funds to "do" her fingernails before buying food for the child. She has
participated in illicit relationships with numerous men, acquiring a disease from one,
and "sleeping" with men in the same room where the child's crib was located.
Id. at 108. The court also reasoned that "active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose
a burden upon a child by reason of the 'social condemnation' attached to such an arrangement
•.. ." Id. (citing Roe v. Roe, 324 S._.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)).
Eskridge correctly notes that the Bottoms case reflects judicial homophobla. ESKTDGE, THE
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARMIAG, supra note 106, at 84. Eskridge, however, argues that "most
judges would still have been reluctant to terminate married parental custody. Sharon was vul-
nerable because she was lesbian and working-class and unmarried." IcE (emphasis in original).
Eskridge therefore concludes that legal "recognition for same-sex marriages would have insu-
lating ripple effects for working-class lesbians like Sharon Bottoms." Id
Eskrlidges conclusion places too much importance on marital status rather than interwoven
class, gender and sexual subordination. Eskridge's "argument rests on the assunption that pos-
session of a marriage certificate will legitimize the lesbian or gay] sexual relationship ... so
that the judge will not consider the . . .relationship . .. a threat to the 'best interests of the
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lawyer and former Executive Director of Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund (a gay and lesbian civil rights organization), "would
like to see the [same-sex marriage] issue rise to the top of the agenda
of every gay organization . . . .""o Stoddard believes that "marriage is
. . . the political issue that most fully tests the dedication of people
who are not gay to full equality for gay people, and also the issue
most likely to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimination
against lesbians and gay men.""" Similarly, Evan Wolfson, a senior
attorney at Lambda, argues that Baehr v. Lewin is "the most important
gay rights victory that we have ever had . . ""'2 Wolfson contends
children' . . . ." Duclos, supra note 109, at 55-56 (challenging assumption that marriage will
aid gays and lesbians in custody disputes). Marriage will likely have little impact on homo-
phobia in gay and lesbian custody cases. See Id. at 56 ("The history of judicial treatment of
same-sex relationships in the custody context constitutes such appalling evidence of deep-seated
and visceral anti-lesbian and anti-gay feeling . . . that it seems naive to think such attitudes
can be wiped out by a marriage certificate:). Even if marriage will blunt homophobia, it will
not diminish the gender, class and racial subordination issues that also arise in gay and lesbian
custody cases.
140. Stoddard, supra note 109, at 400.
141. Id. (emphasis in original).
142. Maria De La 0, Profile: Evan Wolfson; The Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 21 HUM.
RTs. 22 (1994) (emphasis added). In Baehr v. Leiln, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Hawaii
Suprenie Court ruled that Hawaii's prohibition of same-sex marriage constitutes unlawful gender
discrimination, subject to strict scrutiny, under Hawaii's constitution. The court remanded the
case to the trial court for the state to offer a compelling interest for its policy. Id. During
the completion of this Article, the trial court held, on remand, after a bench trial, that the state
had failed to offer a compelling interest for the policy. This decision has been stayed pending
an appeal by the state. See Baehr v. Miike Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WIL 694235 (Haw. Cir.
Ct.) (1996).
Since the decision in Baehr, gay and lesbian legal theorists, political activists, and other
commentators have engaged in extensive debates over whether the full faith and credit clause
should compel other states to recognize same-sex marriages that may occur in Hawaii (if the
courts ultimately reject the state's "compelling" reasons for prohibiting same-sex marriage).
See, e.g., Cordell, supra note 109; Cox, supra note 109; d'Amato, supra note 109; Keane,
supra note 109; Sage, supra note 109. The enormous attention paid this issue by gay and
lesbian theorists underscores the class differences that exist among gays and lesbians and the
class assumptions that underlie pro-same-sex marriage arguments. Only individuals with ample
"economic resources could leave their homes, travel to Hawaii for a wedding (and perhaps hon-
eymoon), and return to their resident state to battle legal authorities for recognition of their
marriages. As a further indication of the class-based assumptions that inform the same-sex
marriage issue, Professor Jennifer Gerrarda Brown has argued that same-sex marriage could
become an economic "cash cow"-due to the formation of gay and lesbian matrimonial mar-
kets--in states that give it legal recognition. Brown, supra note 109. Brown concedes that
her argument is subject to the criticism that "it assumes wealth among gay men and lesbians.
This seems to leave out poorer people, or at least conditions the right of marriage upon a
couple's ability to travel." Id. at 748 n.10. Brown reasons however, that economically disad-
vantaged gays and lesbians "might take solace from the hope that" a greater number of states
will legalize same-sex marriage once they discover the economic benefits reaped by "first-mov-
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that the Baehr decision "shifted the very ground underlying gay peo-
ple's second-class status, and one of the, if not the major, barriers to
our full and equal citizenship has cracked wide open" 43 Wolfson also
believes that "marriage is the central legal and social issue of our sod-
ety.5
)144
Perhaps the most extreme example of the emphasis placed on same-
sex marriage comes from Andrew Sullivan, a conservative gay writer
and former Editor-in-Chief of the New Republic. In his recently re-
leased book, Virtually Normal, Sullivan argues that same-sex marriage
should be the "centerpiece" of a "new gay politics' 4k-a narrow poli-
tics limited only to combatting "state" discrimination against "homosex-
uals"'146  Sullivan believes that "denying [marriage] to homosexuals is
the most public affront possible to their public dignity.'1147 Sullivan
thus places the utmost reliance upon legal marriage as an instrument of
sexual freedom and equality. He contends that
[g]ay marriage . . . is the first step in any resolution of the
homosexual question . If nothing else were done at all, and
gay marriage were legalized, ninety percent of the political
er" states. Id. Although poor gays and lesbians can probably wait for marriage to spread
across the mainland, they would likely derive greater benefit from direct policies aimed at im-
proving their economic situations.
Congress has responded to the Hawaii litigation by enacting the "Defense of Mariage
Act" See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L No. 104-199, 110 StaL 2419 (1996). The legis-
lation adopts a federal, opposite-sex definition of marriage. Id. The legislation also purports
to grant states permission to decline recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other
states. Id. Several states have also moved to adopt opposite-sex marital statutes. See Eric
Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-Bias Ban and Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMS, Sept. 10, 1996, at
Al.
143. Wolfson, supra note 109, at 581 (emphasis added).
144. Joseph Hanania, The Debate Over Gay Marriages: No UnlM, L.A. TIMES, June 13,
1996, at El (emphasis added).
145. A DREW SULUIV, VIRTUALY NoamAi: AN AR Jmr ABour HOMo AUTAxnY 178 (1995).
146. Id. at 169-87. Sullivan's emphasis on fighting "state" discrimination stems from his
adherence to traditional liberalism and its opposition to state interference with "individual" liber-
ty and "private" affairs. See id. at 171 (Clit is the only politics that. .. fully respects liber-
alism's public-private distinction . . . *"). This position, however, directly conflicts with
Sullivan's vigorous support of marriage (both same- and opposite-sex), because by recognizing
marriage, the state attaches certain duties and economic incentives to traditionally "private" rela-
tionships. See EsKiDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 106, at 66-72 (discuss-
ing state-imposed duties and benefits of marriage). See also Bradley P. Smith, No, I'll Catego-
rize You, 105 YALE LJ. 2025, 2030 (1996) (noting Sullivan's conflicting positions and arguing
that "[govemment recognition of any marriage is an inherently nonneutral act, as it encourages
binary, exclusive coupling through a variety of economic incentives. Marriage aiso infuses a
variety of public rights and duties into the most private of human relationships.").
147. SULUVAN, supra note 145, at 179 (emphasis added).
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work necessary to achieve gay and lesbian equality would have
been achieved. It is ultimately the only reform that truly mat-
ters.
148
Only those individuals buffered from racial, class, and gender oppres-
sion and who, but for their (homo)sexual orientation are "virtually nor-
mal," could reasonably expect as narrow a reform as legal marriage to
bring them almost complete ("ninety percent") equality and liberation.
Women, men of color, and the economically disadvantaged (including
many white gay men) need much broader and deeper social change to
improve their lives. 14  Thus, the disparate responses of white men,
women, and gay men of color to the same-sex marriage movement
likely evidence that they are unequally affected by social power and,
therefore, would benefit differently-if at all-from state recognition of
their relationships. 5 '
Ultimately, however, the true issue for legal scholars and civil
rights attorneys involved in the same-sex marriage debates is not
whether some gays and lesbians of color (or white lesbians or the poor)
desire marriage. These populations are large and diverse. Some of
these individuals will find marriage important;' others will not. Rath-
148. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
149. See Smith, supra note 146, at 2029 (arguing that Sullivan's disapproval of political and
legal challenges to "private" discrimination against gays and lesbians is "pragmatically question-
able" and unprincipled).
I50. Eskridge's own explanation for the recent explosion of interest in same-sex marriage
among gays and lesbians actually confirms the anti-essentialist concern that marriage Is driven
by white, upper-class interests. Eskridge attributes the marriage movement, in part, to the fol-
lowing 1980s demographic patterns:
The "queer boomers" were aging, making more money than love, and settling down
with partners. The guppie (gay urban professional) with a partner and a Porsche
was replacing the free love advocate with a placard and a toke. The new Genera-
tion Xers were open to the diverse sexuality offered by gay liberation but more
skeptical of its early barn-burning radicalism.
ESKRID E, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 106, at 58. Clearly, marginalized seg-
ments of the gay and lesbian community do not reside within this exclusive, Porsche-owning,
urban, professional, marriage-seeking community.
151. In fact, despite their general ambivalence toward the issue, several people of color-both
gay and heterosexual-have voiced support for same-sex marriage. Michelle Garcla, Altered
States: Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Rights, ETHac NEwsWATCH, Apr. 30, 1996, at 16 (describ-
ing support for marriage among gays and lesbians of color); Deb Price, Japanese-American
Group Backs Gay Marriages, STAR TRiB., Oct. 5, 1994 (reporting support for same-sex marriage
by the Japanese American Citizens League, a racial civil rights organization); Liz Spayd &
Brigid Quinn, The Gay Marriage Trap: We Fell Into a Right-Wing Ambush, WASH. POST, Juno
16, 1996, at C1 (noting that black gay activist Keith Boykin supports same-sex marriage,
though critical of its priority in gay and lesbian politics and of the movement's political strata-
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er, gay and lesbian legal theorists, given the multidimensional nature of
heterosexism, must continue to problematize and rethink grand claims
that gay and lesbian marriages will "undermine social homophobia,"
place gays and lesbians into "society's mainstream," eliminate "insider-
outsider issues," and "fully test" society's commitment to complete
equality for gays and lesbians. They certainly need to question the
troubling assertion that same-sex marriage is "the only reform that truly
matters." When we consider race, class, and gender inequality-and
the virulence of homophobia--these lofty claims tumble, regardless of
the interest individual gays and lesbians of color may have in marriage.
Venus Xtravaganza, for example, wanted desperately to marry. 2 Mar-
riage alone, however, would likely have provided her few-If any--ma-
terial benefits"' and surely would not have thrust her into "society's
mainstrea"-due precisely to the persistence of racism, poverty, and
hostility toward transgendered people." Thus, racial, class, and gender
gies). Also, people of color have brought legal challenges to prohibitions of same-sex mar-
riage. See ESKIDGEE THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MAPRIAGE, Supra note 106, at 55-56 (discussing
"firs't" black lesbian couple to bring suit challenging same-sex marriage prohibition); Carty
Goldberg, Couple Who Stirred Issue of Same-Sex Marrlage Still Hopeful, N.Y. TiliEs, July 28,
1996, § 1, at 12 (reporting that Patrick Lagon, a Baehr litigant, Is of Filipino descent); Fern
Shen, A Same-Sex Couple Married to the Cause: Women Embrace National Fight They Helped
Spur Over Wedlock, WASIL POST, Sept. 10, 1996, at Al (reporting that Genora Dancel, a Baehr
litigant, is of Hawaiian descent).
152. HEMPHILL, supra note 54, at 118.
153. Eskridge and other proponents of gay and lesbian marriage argue that married couples
may take advantage of an array of economic and other preferences including inheritance and
tax law benefits and health insurance coverage from their partners' employers. See, e.g,
ESKR=DE, THE CASE FOP SAME-SEX MARIAGE, supra note 106, at 66-70; Moh, supra not 109,
at 227; Stoddard, supra note 109, at 399-400. Many of these benefits, however, will primarily
affect employed and economically privileged individuals, not the poor. See Colker, supra note
109, at 325 (discussing unequal class distribution of marriage's economic benefits); Duclos,
supra note 109, at 52-55 (same); Ettelbrick, supra note 108, at 402-05 (same); Robson, supra
note 12, at 182 ("Marriage will not be an advantage for lesbians in all classes. The very
availability of marriage could economically disadvantage lesbians receiving public entitlements
because the state imputes the income of one 'partner' to the other, thus disqualifying a partner
who might otherwise be eligible for 'welfare' benefits."). Furthermore, legal scholars have
failed to explain why the state should deny unmarried gays and lesbians (and heterosexuals)
these benefits. See Colker, supra note 109, at 324 ("It makes more sense to change institu-
tions so that their benefits are not marriage dependant rather than make lesbian and gay people
eligible for those benefits only by getting married."); PolikoffM supra note 108, at 1549
("[a]dvocating lesbian and gay marriage will detract from, even contradt, efforts to unhook
economic benefits from marriage and make basic health care and other necessities available to
all").
154. Venus' desire for marriage, wealth, and white female status actually affums-not chal-
lenges-racial, gender, and class hierarchy. See HENI'HLL, supra note 54, at 116 (the longing
to be white, wealthy, and female reflects a desire to be "in collusion with white supremacy");
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inequities destabilize essentialist claims regarding the potential
"mainstreaming" effects of same-sex marriage-regardless of whether
individual people of color wish to pursue it.
Despite his essentialism, Eskridge actually concedes that "[ihe
legitimate concern of the new insiders argument is that prejudice is
multilayered and synergistic in America."' 55  He, nevertheless, fails to
contend with-and dismisses-the reality of mulitidensional oppression
because "the availability or nonavailability of same-sex marriage does
not affect that reality. The gay man on average is still in a better
position, whether he can get married or not."1"6  Thus, Eskridge ac-
knowledges the existence of a privileged "gay man." This gay man,
however, seemingly represents the positionality of all gay men-his
experiences reflect "the" gay male experience. Eskridge also dismisses
the factors-race, class, and gender hierarchies-that create this man of
privilege. As Eskridge states,
[t]he gay man is less likely to commit himself to gender and
race discrimination issues than is the lesbian or the person of
color, again whether or not he can get married. The gay man
is already more likely to be an insider. Allowing him to many
another man will not change that.'57
Eskridge's gay man, who is--"more likely"--an insider apathetic to-
ward issues of race and gender inequity, is also "likely" white and
economically privileged.
Ironically, Eskridge implies that feminist critics should cease chal-
lenging efforts to allow "the gay man" to marry because he will not,
after all, develop a strong commitment to "gender . . . discrimination
issues" and will retain his "better position," "whether or not he can get
married." At the same time, however, Eskridge strenuously argues that
because the denial of same-sex marriage precludes "the gay man" from
marrying another man-an act a woman could do-and affirms per-
nicious gender-role stereotypes and hierarchies, it is a form of invidious
sex discrimination under the Constitution."'8 Eskridge neglects to ex-
HOOKS, supra note 57, at 148 ("[h]f the class, race, and gender aspirations expressed by the
drag queens ... is always the longing to be in the position of the ruling-class woman then .
. . there is also the desire to act in partnership with the ruling-class white male .... ThIls
combination of class and race longing that privileges the 'femininity' of the ruling-class white
woman, adored and kept, shrouded in luxury, does not imply a critique of patriarchy.').
155. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 106, at 1492 (emphasis added).
156. Id at 1492-93.
157. Iae at 1493.
158. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 106, at 162-72; Eskridge, A
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plain why "the gay man's" gender discrimination claim should have
priority over several lesbians' claims that marriage, as an institution,
oppresses them "as women"---particularly when "the gay man," as
Eskridge states, has no interest in "gender discrimination issues" and
will maintain "his" patriarchal privilege under marriage.
Eskridge then advances legal arguments for same-sex marriage al-
though, as he concedes, it will neither affect the reality of multilayered
oppression nor change the forces that make "the gay man" an insider.'59
If gay marriage does not challenge racial, class, and gender inequality,
then we should-in light of the "multilayered and synergistic" nature of
sexual subordination--continue to question its high priority,"co and even
legitimacy, as an instrument of gay and lesbian liberation. At a mini-
mum, we should examine-given the adverse impact poverty may have
on the level of benefits and attractiveness of marriage-what other legal
and policy reforms must occur in order to make marriage and family
life accessible to and meaningful for poor gays and lesbians.
History of Same-Sx Marriage, supra note 106, at 1510. The Baehr court also applied this
reasoning. See Baehr, 852 P2d at 44. Furthermore, several commentators have extensively
developed the theory, in same-sex marriage and other contexts, that discrimination against lesbl-
ans and gay men is sex discrimination. See, ag., Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE LI. 145 (1988) [hereinafter The Misce-
genation Analog,]; Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesblans and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexualy, and the
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L REV. 187; Francisco Valdes, Queer, Sints, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex" "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Socletv, 83 CAL. L REV. 1 (1995); L Bennett Capers, Note, SexCual
Orientation) and 77tle Yfl, 91 COLuM. L REV. 1158 (1991). These scholars argue that sexual
orientation discrimination is "sex" discrimination because it prohibits a woman, for example,
from engaging in an activity (eg. marriage to a woman) in which a man could lawfully en-
gage. This reasoning often extends, by analogy, the Supreme Court's ruling In Loving - )7r-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which found antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional on the
grounds that they prohibit blacks, for example, from marying whites-something a white per-
son could lawfully do-and that they reinforce white supremacy. For a more extensive discus-
sion of this analogy, see Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, .nzpra. See also EsmiuE,
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAG, supra, at 153-63.
159. See Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 106, at 1492-93.
160. See Colker, supra note 109, at 326 ("I would not encourage the lesbian and gay com-
munity to make [same-sex marriage] legislation a high priority item."); Dunlap, supra note 132,
at A12 (reporting view of black lesbian activist that health and anti-violence issues am "more
fundamental to [gay and lesbian] survival"); Hanania, supra note 144, at El (same-sex marriage
issue is "diverting limited resources and energies from other priorities desperately in need of
tending") (quoting Martin Duberman, a gay historian and Director of the Center for Gay and
Lesbian Studies at City University of New York); Spayd & Quinn, supra note 151, at Cl
(gays and lesbians should "focus oi rights fundamental to the gay movement's survival, like
combating workplace discrimination, AIDS and reproductive cancem, whose incidence is particu-
larly high among lesbians").
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Because he fails to consider, and even dismisses, the fact that racial
and economic subordination affect gay and lesbian experience, 16 1
Eskridge overstates the value of legalized same-sex marriage as an
instrument of social transformation and equality for all gay and lesbian
people and nullifies the diverse cultural practices and experiences of
people of color and the poor.
2. Focusing on "Commonality"
a. "Common," "Essentializing," and "Monolithic" Assumptions
In addition to rejecting the importance of racial and class privilege
and subordination in gay and lesbian lives, gay and lesbian legal theo-
rists also marginalize racial and class differences by attempting to artic-
ulate "common" experiences of or assumptions about all gay and lesbi-
an people. These common experiences and assumptions, however, may
obscure the realities of people of color and the poor. For example,
Marc Fajer, in a provocative analysis, endeavors to "re-tell" personal
narratives of gay and lesbian people in order to "counter and demon-
strate" homophobic stereotypes.6 2  Fajer compellingly argues, as have
other commentators, that these negative stereotypes affect judicial
decisionmaking in cases involving questions of gay and lesbian equality
and that their deconstruction is, therefore, an important task for legal
scholars and civil rights attorneys."" To begin the important project of
countering negative gay and lesbian constructs, Fajer borrows the "sto-
rytelling" technique from critical race scholars such as Richard
Delgado"' and Mar Matsuda. 65 Fajer notes that his attraction to this
161. It is in his legal arguments for same-sex marriage that Eskridge analyzes racial subor-
dination. Race enters his analysis, however, only by analogy. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 106, at 153-63. Eskridge likens bans on same-sex marriage to
antimiscegenation statutes, declared unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds in Loving, 388
U.S. at 1. Eskridge claims that both racial and gender exclusions in marriage perpetuate harm-
ful social hierarchies. Eskridge develops this reasoning from arguments Koppelman makes in
the sodomy context. See genera* Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 158.
Eskridge's racial analogy treats race and sexual orientation as unconnected and unrelated
identifies. Eskridge's distancing of race from sexuality through analogy, however, does not
diminish the importance of race and class in gay and lesbian lives or in his analysis. Rather,
by neglecting to interrogate issues of racial and economic subordination, Eskridge advances
arguments, e.g., that same-sex marriage will eradicate "insider-outsider" issues, based on racial
and class privilege.
162. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIMI L. REv. 511, 515
(1992).
163. See generally I
164.. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
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jurisprudential method stems from its powerful ability to offer "new
perspectives" into legal discourse.'" Fajer's analysis introduces to legal
theory an important dialogue, grounded on "gay and lesbian" experienc-
es, regarding issues of sexual subordination. His analysis, however,
could have benefitted from some consideration of the racial and class
complexity of homophobic stereotypes and the impact this complexity
has upon people of color.
As an initial matter, Fajer does not discuss the racial backgrounds
of the individuals whose stories he re-tells. This omission implies a
unitary gay experience, one unaffected by racial differences. 67 Fajer's
omission of race also directly impacts his analysis. For example, Fajer
characterizes "coming out"--or the "process of telling other people we
are gay"M--as "perhaps the central events in gay lives today."'6 Such
a characterization blurs race and class differences. Because race- and
class-subordinate individuals are burdened by multiple forms of social
and economic exclusion, they can likely point to other, perhaps more
"central" and "traumatic1M  experiences in their "gay lives"-such as
racial discrimination and economic deprivation."
Fajer also argues that coming out is "liberating and emotionally
helpful '  and that "concealment?' of one's gay identity, on the other
hand, "interferes with the creation and cohesion of a gay communi-
ty."" The coming out process, however, does not necessarily or auto-
matically "liberate" people of color, who, by revealing their sexual ori-
entation and attempting to integrate themselves within white gay and
lesbian communities, may encounter racial hierarchy. Thus, racial hier-
archy prevents the formation of a "cohesive" gay community-even
87 MicH. L REv. 2411 (1989).
165. See Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparatons, 22
HARV. CR.-C.L L. REV. 323 (1987).
166. See Fajer, supra note 162, at 517. Fajer argues that "[s]etoies from previously excluded
voices enrich our understanding of how the law operates and suggest new approaches to many
legal issues." Id at 519 (citations omnitted).
167. See Rosenbinm, supra note 12, at 88 (to label "parties in [litigation] as lesbian or gay
without specifying other aspects of their social position implies that they occupy a universal
position. The effect of these false universals is to erase other queers and to ignore their very
different experiences.").
168. Fajer, supra note 162, at 520.
169. Id (emphasis added).
170. See id
171. See sources cited supra note 116 (describing sexual orientation as an additional burden
for gays and lesbians of color).
172. Fajer, supra note 162, at 596 (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 598.
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among those gays and lesbians who do not "conceal" their sexual ori-
entation. Marion Riggs' experiences with racism in the predominately
white San Francisco gay and lesbian community demonstrate this aspect
of the coming out process. South Asian gays and lesbians have also
documented the racial and cultural marginalization they encounter in
gay and lesbian communities:
Once some of us entered the lesbian and gay subculture of the
West, our feeling of isolation did not fade as we had assumed
it would; it only changed face .. .None of our newly found
gay or lesbian friends and acquaintances spoke our languages,
shared our history, or really understood our culture. 74
These comments expose a fundamental weakness in the formation of
"gay" and "lesbian" communities. As lesbians of color have observed
in the context of lesbian separatism, these communities coalesce around
the singular issue of sexual identity, thereby denying racial and class
inequality and cultural differences. 5 A narrow portrayal of the coming
out process similarly blurs the racial complexity of sexual identity.7 6
Fajer's tendency to emphasize the experiences of class-privileged
individuals is further illustrated by his discussion of "romantic images
and symbols" invoked by gays and lesbians to describe their relation-
ships. 7 Seeking to demonstrate the "long-term" and monogamous
nature of gay and lesbian romances, Fajer lists, among other items,
"candlelight dinners, flowers, and Niagara Falls" as symbols of "love"
174. Introduction to LOTuS OF ANOTHER COLOR, supra note 9, at 12. See also Id. at 14 (The
gay and lesbian "subculture does not acknowledge that South Asians and other ethnically dis-
tinct groups have a different life experience, different societal and familial influences, and dif-
ferent needs . ..!).
175. See, e.g., Combabee River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in THis BRIDGE CALLED
MY BACK, supra note 1, at 214 (questioning "whether lesbian separatism is an adequate and
progressive political analysis and strategy, even for those who practice it, since it so completely
denies any but the sexual sources of women's oppression, negating the facts of race and
class'); Smith & Smith, supra note 105, at 120-23 (discussing racial and class essentialism of
lesbian separatism). See also PIELEN, IDENMTY POLITCS, supra note 105, at 161-66 (discussing
racial and class critiques of lesbian separatism).
176. Compare Introduction to A LOTUs oF ANOTHME COLOR, supra note 9, at 12, 14 (discussing
marginalization of South Asians within larger gay and lesbian community) with Gregory J.
Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, I LAW
& SEXUALnY 133, 145-46 (1991) (asserting that "lesbians and gay men probably maintain self
esteem most effectively when they identify with and are integrated into the larger lesbian and
gay community.").
177. See Fajer, supra note 162, at 552.
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in gay and lesbian relationships."78 He also re-tells the story of one
"male couple [that] returned to Europe to find the place they had [first]
met .... ."'" Such images subtly unveil the existence of economic
privilege among gays and lesbians by portraying the notion of "ro-
mance" in middle and upper-class terms. Fajer's conclusion that "[t]he
prohibition of gay marriage may be the most significant form of dis-
crimination against gay couples," ''  may also reflect a presumption of
racial and class privilege in gay and lesbian relationships.'8 '
The "exploitation" of economic privilege in the gay and lesbian
community has had a significant, negative effect on gay and lesbian
legal and political reform efforts and on heterosexual society's percep-
tions of gays and lesbians. Several surveys have fostered the develop-
ment of a stereotype that "all" gay men and lesbians are wealthy-rela-
tive to the "heterosexual" population." These surveys are based on
data compiled from reading lists of gay and lesbian magazines, mailing
lists of gay and lesbian political organizations, and polls of persons
attending gay and lesbian cultural events.' Gay and lesbian magazines
have "exploited" these surveys in order to solicit corporate advertise-
ments."" Anti-gay and lesbian groups, however, have appropriated the
surveys-in order to depict the gay and lesbian community as wealthy
and privileged and, therefore, undeserving of civil rights protection.8 5
178. Id.
179. Id at 553.
180. Id at 577 (emphasis added).
181. See supra pp. 589-602. Even if middle- and upper-class romantic ideals wero desired
by poor people of color, the result would not be unproblematic. The linkage of personal satis-
faction and self.worth with upper-class status has led to consumerism and nihilism among the
poor of color. See CORNELL WEST, RACE MATrERS 17-31 (1993). Indeed, the desire to achieve
upper-class status proved detrimental for both Rivera and Venus Xtravaganza. See .supra pp.
572-73 (describing Rivera's fatal quest to escape poverty); HE HULL, supra note 54, at 118
(noting Venus desire to have a "car" and "nice home" In "Peekskill" or "Florida," among
other things; describing how attempt to actualize this desire helps create circumstances surround-
ing her murder).
182. See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Bights" Canard In the Debate Over Les-
bian and Gay lights, 9 NoTRnE DAME J.L ETICS & PUB. POL'Y 137, 160 n.69 (1995) (discuss-
ing studies apparently indicating gay wealth); Margaret M. Russell, L.esblan, Gay and BLsexzal
Rghts and "The Civil Rights Agenda," I AFR. AML L & POL'Y REP. 33, 45 & n48 (994)
(discussing use of data apparently indicating gay wealth to bolster anti-gay political agendas);
Karen De Witt, Gay Presence Leads Revival of Declining Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 6,
1994, at A14 (discussing "notion that all homosexuals are rich"); Stuart Ellion, A Shaper Maew
of Gay Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at DI ("it has become conventional wisdom to
consider homosexuals far more affluent than the general population").
183. See VAID, supra note 9, at 252-53.
184. See id. at 252.
185. See id. at 250-52. See generally Schacter, supra note 104, at 291-94. Perhaps the
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These surveys, however, overstate gay and lesbian income levels. First,
the poor are less likely than the wealthy to hold magazine subscrip-
tions 86 or to join mailing lists of political organizations (a step typi-
cally taken after making a financial contribution to the organizations).
Consequently, the surveys tend to exclude the poor and, therefore, pro-
duce a biased sample of gays and lesbians. Furthermore, as Samuel
Marcosson observes,
[t]he lesbians and gay men most apt to respond to such surveys
most damaging use of these surveys was by the organization "Colorado for Family Values"
during the campaign to pass "Amendment 2" to the Colorado constitution. Amendment 2,
which passed on November 3, 1992, prohibited the state and its subdivisions from enacting leg-
islation or regulations which give gays and lesbians a "protected status or claim of discrimina-
tion." Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994), affld sub nom, Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The Supreme Court subsequently declared Amendment 2 unconstitu-
tional, reasoning that it targeted homosexuals for discrimination and lacked a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental purpose, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Evans, 116 S.Ct. at 1620. The Supreme Court invalidated the
amendment on different grounds than the Colorado Supreme Court. The latter court found that
the amendment violated the "fundamanetal right' of gays and lesbians to participate in the
political process. See Evans, 882 P.2d at 1335.
To help garner political support for Amendment 2, Colorado for Family Values distributed
highly effective literature which asked "[a]re homosexuals 'disadvantaged' economically? You
decide! Records show that even now, not only are gays not economically disadvantaged,
they're actually one of the most affluent groups in America!" VAID, supra note 9, at 252
(quoting organization's literature). See also Schacter, supra note 104, at 292 (reporting
organization's view that "militant gays would create a whole new protected class of affluent,
well-educated, sexually deviant political power brokers. The true meaning of civil rights would
never be the same.") (citing Will Perkins, Views on Gay Rights Conflict, DENVER POST, Oct. 11,
1992, at ID (opinion letter authored by the Executive Chairman of the Board of Colorado for
Family Values)).
This position has also been advanced in legal scholarship. Richard F. Duncan, for exam-
ple, attempts to distinguish discrimination against "racial and ethnic minorities" from discrimina-
tion against "homosexuals." Relying on the gay wealth studies, Duncan argues that "the avail-
able evidence indicates that [discrimination against homosexuals] is nether pervasive nor eco-
nomically devastating. Not only are homosexuals an affluent and a highly educated class, they
are also politically powerful." Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexu-
al Rights Leghlation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 409
(1994). Justice Scalia's dissent in Evans, in which Chief Justice Renquist and Justice Thomas
join, also portrays gays and lesbians as disproportionately wealthy and powerful and, therefore,
undeserving of even rational basis protection. See Evans, 116 S.Ct. at 1634 ("['hose who
engage in homosexual conduct tend to ... have high disposable income . . . [and] they
posess political power much greater than their numbers."). Justice Scalia characterizes Amend-
ment 2 as an "unimpeachable," "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those
mores through the use of the laws." , at 1629.
186. See VAID, supra note 9, at 254 (citing study finding income levels of periodical sub-
scribers exceed national average).
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are those who are in a position of relative comfort and security,
and not those in a position of relative economic insecurity, for
whom the loss of their job or home if their sexual orientation
became known would be most catastrophic. If relatively poor
gay men and lesbians are less willing to state their sexual ori-
entation in response to surveys, or simply do not participate in
them, the results will overstate the affluence of the overall gay
community. 1
7
Therefore, even if the poor have access to such surveys, they are less
likely than the wealthy to reveal their sexual orientation. Thus,
Marcosson's critique suggests a positive relationship between wealth
and the ability to come out--or to identify oneself publicly as "lesbian"
or "gay.'i8
Researchers are attempting to conduct studies that correct the sam-
pling bias of the earlier surveys and that more accurately portray the
economic condition of gay and lesbian people. One recent survey,
controlling for gender, has found "little noticeable difference" between
gay and heterosexual incomes."8 9 In addition, a University of Maryland
researcher has conducted a survey that focuses on the participants'
"sexual behavior" as opposed to requiring participants to identify them-
selves as "gay" or "lesbian." This study finds that the incomes of
"behaviorally" gay and lesbian individuals are lower than their hetero-
sexual counterparts-when education, occupation, and gender factors are
controlled. 9
The connection between economic security and the opportunity to
lead an openly gay or lesbian lifestyle means that gays and lesbians of
color, who are disproportionately poor, will face greater obstacles com-
187. Marcosson, supra note 182, at 160 n.69 (citing Gay Workr= Earn Less In Same Job,
Unfrersily of Maryland Study Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A9 (Aug. 16, 1994)).
See also De Witt, supra note 182, at A14 (assumption of gay wealth "based on market re-
search that had focused on white, high-income homosexuals") (quoting conductor of survey that
found gay and lesbian incomes less than heterosexual Incomes); Elliot, supra note 182, at D1
(controlling for gender, study found "little noticeable difference" in incomes of gays, lesbians
and heterosexuals); Russell, supra note 182, at 45 n.48.
188. Cf VArn, supra note 9, at 256 ("middle-class and wealthy gay people a r far more like-
ly to be visible than are working-class and poor queers").
189. Elliot, supra note 182, at DI.
190. VAID, supra note 9, at 255 (citing M.V. Lee Badgett, Economic Evidence of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination (Nov. 1993) (unpublished manuscript)); Marcosson, supra note 182, at
160-61. Additional surveys are required to determine the full impact of class on sexual orien-
tation discrimination and vice versa.
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ing out. Indeed, gays and lesbians of color have stated that racial,
gender, and class oppression force them to conceal their sexual orienta-
tion because they fear the "horrible risk . . . [of] further disenfran-
chise[ment]."''" Their testimony underscores the need for multidimen-
sional gay and lesbian liberation theory and political action. Moreover,
because the notion of gay and lesbian wealth renders appeals for "gay
rights" hollow in some circles, gay and lesbian legal theorists must be
careful not to affirm-and must make it a priority to deconstruct-this
perception in their work. 92 Furthermore, because the "gay and lesbian"
wealth stereotype evolves from race- and class-biased statis-
tics-statistics that are often contrasted with the low-income levels of
the presumedly distinct population of "people of color" 93 -it may more
subtly reflect society's views of white gays and lesbians or a perception
that all gays and lesbians are white. In either event, gay and lesbian
legal scholars must analyze and discuss both racism and poverty, and
how these forces constrain one's ability to "come out," in order to
challenge effectively this harmful construct.
In addition to discussing gay and lesbian romance, Fajer attempts to
support his argument that gays and lesbians form long-term relation-
ships by stating that "in the last several years, gay male sexual practic-
es have altered dramatically as more accurate information about the
transmission of HIV has become available.' 9 This statement ignores
the experiences of many gay and bisexual men of color, who have
persistently lacked access to effective sources of AIDS prevention infor-
mation (particularly during the early history of the epidemic when
Fajer's article was published) and, thus, have not "dramatically"
changed their sexual behavior-specifically by failing to adopt "safe-
sex" techniques.'95
191. Marta A. Navarro, Interview with Ana Castillo, in CHCANA LESBIANS, supra note 9, at
122 (quoting Ana Castillo). See also Patrice Gaines-Carter, Festival Will Celebrate the Pride
of Being Black and Gay, WASH. PosT, May 24, 1991, at CI (black gays and lesbians express
"fear that a public acknowledgement of homosexuality would add to the discrimination they
routinely face as blacks in employment and other areas"); Dorothy Gilliam, Coming Out of
Closet Is Tougher for Blacks, WASH. POST, July 14, 1980, at C1 (citing black homophobla and
employment concerns as reasons why black gays and lesbians remain In the closet).
192. See Robson, supra note 12, at 182 (criticizing gay and lesbian legal theorists for failing
to "effectively counter[]" the perception of gay and lesbian wealth).
193. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 185, at 406-09.
194. Fajer, supra note 162, at 561.
195. In 1990, a study conducted by the National Task Force on AIDS Prevention found that
nearly one-half of gay and bisexual black men continued to engage in anal intercourse without
condoms. See Malcolm Gladwell, Many Black Gays Missing Message on "Safe Sex," WASH
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The stated purpose of Fajer's discussion of long-term, monogamous
gay and lesbian relationships is to counter the stereotype of "gay people
as being empty and promiscuous, devoid of love, warmth, commitment,
or stability.""' Fajer, however, fails to consider the impact of racism
and class inequality upon this and other "gay" stereotypes. Fajer also
does not question whether racism and class inequality may limit, or
even preclude, gays and lesbians of color and the poor from escaping
negative "gay" constructs or, as a threshold matter, whether these ste-
reotypes even apply to them. Such an examination of race and class,
even if only brief and tentative, would have enriched Fajer's analysis
because racial and class hierarchies create numerous stereotypes that
impact gays and lesbians of color and that inform heterosexual-and
gay-society's perception of them.197  For example, under racial hierar-
chy, blacks are considered sexually deviant-promiscuous and preda-
tory. This racial stereotype may interact with and reinforce notions of
gay promiscuity. As a result, the "common" assumption of "gay" pro-
miscuity may have particularized effects on people of color. It may,
therefore, require an analysis of racism-rather than generalized claims
problematizing "gay" promiscuity-to be disarmed.
For example, the negative reaction to Riggs' film Tongues Untied
was particularly vitriolic and racially charged. Many of the responses
arose after the film's broadcast by the Public Television Service."' For
instance, one journalist offered the following editorial:
The program twice declares, "Black men loving black men is
the revolutionary ace' ....
It proceeds to show us how, with a trip through society's
sewers. Its actors and the producer, Marion T. Riggs, preen to
rap music, preach in free verse and dance. They also climb
PosT, June 14, 1990, at A17. That figure was more than 2.5 times higher than that of the gay
male population as a whole. Id. The conductors of the study stated that their findings "dem-
onstratel] that the traditional methods of promoting 'safer sex,' 'hich hm.e led may white gacys
to change their behavior dramaticaly,, have failed to reach the black community." Id. (empha-
sis added). The conductors also cited "an urgent need for more culturally specific education,
risk reduction training and ongoing support... 2' Id.
196. Fajer, supra note 162, at 550.
197. Gays and lesbians of color face homophobie stereotyping by heterosexuals (of all races)
and racist stereotyping by whites (of all sexualitides).
198. See genera, Verne Gay, "Tongues" Showing Splits PBS Stations, NMDAY, July 16,
1991, at 46; David Mils, Cry of "Tongues Untied": Controversial Documentar, on Gay
Blacks, WASH. POST, July 19, 1991, at BI; Frank J. Prial, 7V 'lhn About Gag, Black Men Is
Under Attack, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1991, at C13.
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into bed together naked. 99
To this viewer, black "rap music," poetry, dance, and sexual diversity
are threatening and connected--they all exist within "society's sewers."
Together, they render Tongues Untied "the most explicit, profane pro-
gram ever broadcast by a television network."'2 'o Thus, both racial and
sexual bias, instead of an isolated notion of "gay" promiscuity, frame
this viewer's disapprobation of the film.
In addition, Patrick Buchanan appropriated images from Tongues
Untied for use in a 1992 presidential campaign advertisement. The
advertisement criticized then President George Bush and the National
Endowment for the Arts, which awarded Riggs a $5,000 grant to pro-
duce the film.2 ' The advertisement presented men dancing in slow-
motion. 202  A voice accompanying the altered scene203 announced that
"[t]his so-called art has glorified homosexuality, exploited children and
perverted the images of Jesus Christ."2"4 Interestingly, the advertise-
ment presented one of the few scenes from the film that features white
men.0 ' Given Buchanan's negative record on issues of racial and sex-
ual subordination,20 6 it is likely that he whitened Tongues Untied to
199. Dick Williams, PBS Fare Tonight Shatters Bounds of Taste, Moralty, ATLANTA CONST.,
July 16, 1991, at 17 (emphasis added). The references in Tongues Untied to "black men lov-
ing black men" as a "revolutionary act" are not directly related, or limited, to sexuality-but to
broader notions of black male mutual support, collective responsibility, and resistance to nega-
tive racial constructs and disempowerment. The phrase is taken from an essay by the late
Joseph Beam who characterized "love" between black males as a necessary response to the
social and economic "barriers to our loving" and as "an autonomous agenda . . . which is not
rooted in any particular sexual, political, or class affiliation, but in our mutual survival." Jo-
seph Beam, Brother to Brother: Words from the Heart, in IN THE LI., supra note 9, at 242.
200. Williams, supra note 199, at 17.
201. See Renee Loth, Buchanan Says Bush Funded Obscene Art; Ad Uses Clip From Film
on Gay Blacks, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 1992, at 14.
202. See Susan Yoachum, Buchanan Calls AIDS "Retribution," S.F. CHRO,., Feb. 28, 1992, at
Al.
203. The original scene was not in slow-motion.
204. Yoachum, supra note 202, at Al.
205. This fact was not frequently noted in the media, and when it was, It was dismissed
without a discussion of its possible relevance. See, e.g., National Public Radio Transcripts,
Mar. 20, 1992 ("You know, the segments of the ad that are shown on the air are not black
homosexuals. They're white homosexuals, but that aside . . ").
206. Buchanan has made several statements and supported policies evidencing his animosity
toward racial and sexual diversity. During a 1991 interview on This Week With David
Brinkley, Buchanan expressed hostility toward the immigration of people of color Into the Unit-
ed States: "I think God made all people good. But if we had to take a million immigrants in,
say, Zulus next year, or Englishmen, and put them up in Virginia, what group would be easier
to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people of Virginia?" Maureen Dowd,
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prevent the public from perceiving his criticism of the film as a prod-
uct of both racial and sexual intolerance. Buchanan's advertisement
visually manipulated society's fear and hatred of a "white male homo-
sexual" in order to suppress black gay cultural expression. Buchanan
effectively employed homophobia to marginalize and subordinate black
people and to reinforce racism and homophobia. In response, Riggs
criticized Buchanan for "exploit[ingJ . . . race and sexuality to win
high public office.""0 7 Riggs argued that "[because . . . Tongues Un-
tied affirms the lives and dignity of black gay men, conservatives have
found it a convenient target, despite the awards and popular and critical
acclaim it received after its broadcast... on public television." '
The homophobic and racist responses to Tongues Untied demon-
strate the varying application, diverse impact, and multiple layers of
seemingly "common" gay and lesbian stereotypes. The racial complexi-
ty of sexual stereotypes may require gay and lesbian legal theorists and
civil rights attorneys to challenge racial hierarchy when they analyze
and litigate discrimination claims of gays and lesbians of color.
In a subsequent article, Fajer recognizes and explores the dangers
of essentialism in legal theory °9 He argues that essentialism can be
avoided if
[w]e ... tell stories about ourselves, not so much to show how
we are representative of our group, but how the society makes
Buchanan's Alternatve: Not Kinder or Gentler, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1992, at Al; _.J. Dianne
Jr, Ix Buchanan Courting Bias? Equivocatlons on Duke Pose Questions About Attitude, WAsH.
PoST, Feb. 29, 1992, at Al. Buchanan also stated that Jack F. Kemp, former Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development and 1996 Republican Vice Presidential candidate, had "gone
native," mocking Kemp's policies on behalf of people of color and the poor. Dowd, pplpra.
See also (Buchanan called Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping an "85-year-old chain-smoking Com-
munist dwarf'; Buchanan referred to Bush campaign strategist who lobbied on behalf of Japa-
nese trade consortium as a "geisha girl of the new world order"); Dianne, supra (reporting
charges of anti-semitism made against Buchanan). Buchanan has also claimed that AIDS is
nature's "awful retribution" against gays, Dowd, supra, and has called gays "sodomites" and
"the pederast proletariat," Dionne, supra.
Buchanan also emerged as a candidate in the 1996 presidential election. He sparked more
controversy over racism following reports that several members of his campaign staff had ties
to white supremacist organizations. See Douglas Frantz & Micheal Janofsky, Buchanan Draw-
ing Extremist Support, and Problems, Too, N.Y. TamES, Feb. 23, 1996, at Al. The co-chair of
Buchanan's campaign, Larry Pratt, resigned amidst such allegations. See Richard L Berke, Bu-
chanan Co-Leader Quits Under Fire, N.Y. TIm.s, Feb. 16, 1996, at A27.
207. Marion T. Riggs, Meet the New Willie Horton, N.Y. TIms, Mar. 6, 1992, at A33.
208. Id.
209. See Marc A. Fajer, Authori% Credlbill and Pre-Undersanding A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.. 1845, 1853-55 (1994).
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essentializing assumptions about us because of the groups to
which we belong. These stories do not purport to show that all
members of the group behave a certain way. Instead, they
demonstrate that people commonly believe members of a group
behave in specific ways ... 2o
Although Fajer acknowledges that people within groups do not nec-
essarily "behave a certain way," he focuses on countering the "common
beliefs" about members of these groups2 ' and on challenging the
"monolithic view of gay life."2 " Fajer's emphasis on "common be-
liefs," "essentializing assumptions," and "monolithic views" of "gay"
life, and his silence on issues of race, distort the culturally, racially,
and class contingent nature of these assumptions and the different ways
in which heterosexuals treat and perceive gays and lesbians due to race,
class, gender, and other inequities. The notion of gay and lesbian
wealth (versus a "common" image of impoverished communities of
color) and the collision between Julio Rivera's Latino ("macho") and
gay ("effeminate") statuses, for example, demonstrate the shifting nature
of these seemingly "essentializing" assumptions and reveal that many of
these prejudices may really reflect heterosexual society's negative per-
ceptions of white gays and lesbians (or, possibly, a perception that all
gays and lesbians are white). Furthermore, stressing the universality of
homophobic assumptions may obscure the fact that these assumptions
interact with, rely upon, and reinforce other negative constructs (such as
racial stereotypes).2"' Thus, even if a homophobic society believes "all"
gay people are promiscuous, this stereotype may support racial hierar-
chy and pose particular problems for gays and lesbians of color. Bu-
chanan's use of homophobic images to suppress black gay people and
perpetuate racial subordination illustrates this multidimensional aspect of
gay and lesbian stereotypes.214
The negative assumptions about gays and lesbians rely upon--and
are constructed in a context of-racial and class hierarchy. As a result,
210. Id. at 1854 (emphasis added).
211. See id.
212. Fajer, supra note 162, at 533 n.101 (emphasis added).
213. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory HeterosexualiO, and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN
& GAY STUmES READEa 239 (Abelove et al. ed., 1993) ('To equate lesbian existence with male
homosexuality because each is stigmatized is to deny and erase female reality once again.").
214. The interlocking gender, class, and sexual biases informed the trial court and the Virgin-
ia Supreme Court in Bottoms, see supra note 139, further demonstrate the need for a multidi-
mensional deconstruction of homophobie stereotypes.
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they may have particularized racial and class effects. Therefore, narrow
theories that stress the "common," "monolithic," or "essentializing" na-
ture of the stereotypes do not adequately depict or confront their com-
plexity.215
b. "Core" Experiences
Even those scholars who generally oppose essentialism in critical
legal theory may wish to guard, momentarily, sexuality discourse from
racial and class deconstruction. Lesbian theorist Patricia Cain, for ex-
ample, has criticized feminists for "fall[ing] into the 'essentialist trap'
by ignoring lesbian reality and attempting "to build a grand or totaliz-
ing feminist theory from the perspective of only a few women.""1 6
Cain also recognizes that attempts to develop a "lesbian legal theory"
"appear to embrace the concepts of essentialism" that sparked her earli-
er critique of feminism.21 7 Cain further notes that "[l]esbian perspective
and lesbian experience are no more monolithic than woman's perspec-
tive and woman's experience. '  Cain, however, feels "much more
comfortable challenging the monolithic and universal character of
'woman' than of 'lesbian."'2 9 Cain also argues that the category lesbi-
an and lesbian theory "should be protected" from anti-essentialist criti-
cism.?" Cain attributes her reluctance to problematize lesbian theory to
the following two factors. First, Cain argues that "[tihe category lesbi-
an is too young to be destabilized."' Second, Cain contends that
there is a "core lesbian experience that creates lesbian identity.'" Nei-
ther explanation convinces me that lesbian theory should be insulated
from a multidimensional analysis.
215. As Audre Lorde has argued:
The white women with hoods on in Ohio handing out KKK literature on the street
may not like what you have to say, but they will shoot me on sight. (If you ad I
were to walk into a classroom of women in Dismal Gulch, Alabama, where the only
thing they knew about each of us was that we were both LesbianfRadical/Fembnist,
you would see exactly what I mean).
.LORDE, An Open Letter to Mwy Daly, in SISTER OurSIDER, anpra note 9, at 70:
216. Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspectve, Lesbian Frperience, and the Risk of Essentialism,
2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 43 (1994) [hereinafler Risk of Essentialism]. See also Patricia A.
Cain, Feminist Jursprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BER. WoM 'sI L.J. 191, 206-07
(1990) (criticizing feminist essentialism).
217. Cain, Risk of Essentialism, supra note 216, at 43.
218. Id. at 43-44.
219. Id at 44.
220. See Id. at 68.
221. Id. at 56. See generally id. at 56-61.
222. Id. at 61. See generally Id. at 61-69.
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Cain contends that the category lesbian is a "new" construct, ap-
pearing in time after both "woman" and "homosexual." Cain ob-
serves that the lesbian subject is currently undergoing a "primary
deconstruction" aimed at dismantling the negative lesbian image "creat-
ed by the heterosexist and homophobic patriarchal systems."2 4 Accord-
ing to Cain, "[tlhe positive image of lesbians that is emerging as a
result of this first tier deconstruction is still new and fragile, too new
and fragile for me to want to start tearing it up under a second tier
deconstruction process, into race and class and other chards." Cain
compares the "positive" reconstruction of the category lesbian with
blacks' attempts, during the civil rights movement, to redefine black-
ness in order to dismantle its negative, racist construction. 226
Although I am sensitive to the need for a non-homophobic image
of lesbianism, Cain's arguments do not substantiate her claim that lesbi-
an theory should remain isolated-at least for the moment?--from
racial and class critiques. First, lesbian theory has already undergone
significant racial and class critiques. 22  Thus, Cain's concerns appear
untimely. In any event, Cain fails to explain how a narrow construc-
tion of lesbianism-freed from the troubling "fragmentation" of racial
and class analysis-produces a "positive image" of lesbians. The con-
struction of an "essential" lesbian is likely a "positive" process only for
those women whose life experiences happen to fit within its narrow
contours. Furthermore, if women of color and the poor must wait to
introduce their "second tier" issues of racial and economic injustice into
lesbian theory, then the theory will merely replicate dominant structures
of oppression by marginalizing poor women, women of color, and
issues of racial and class oppression. Therefore, lesbian theory should
223. See id. at 56-57.
224. Id. at 58 (citing CELIA KITEINGER, TiE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LESBIANISM (1987); EM.
ErrORuE, LESBIANS, WOMEN AND SOCIErY (1980)).
225. Id. at 58-59. "Gay man of color' and "lesbian of color" are even newer "postinodem"
categories than "gay" and "lesbian," yet I have not argued that these terms or the growing
theories surrounding them should escape deconstruction. In fact, I have "invited" and "encour-
aged" such criticism. See supra note 14.
226. See Cain, Risk of Eysentialiasm, supra note 216, at 59.
227. Cain does not specify when the door should be opened for racial and class critiques
within lesbian theory.
228. See supra note 105. See also Steven Seidman, Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern"
Gay Culture: Some Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLMCS
AND SOCIAL THEo.RY 118 (Michael Warner ed., 1993) (discussing racial critiques of gay and lesbl-
an theory and politics and observing that "lesbian women of color played a pivotal role In
[1980s feminist anti-essentialism] and implicated the lesbian community in the race issue").
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not evolve in separate tiers-with racial and class analysis relegated to
a secondary, unspecified, future phase of constructionF
Finally, Cain does not advance her argument by comparing the
"positive" construction of "lesbian" with the redefinition of blackness
during the civil rights movement. Despite its attempt to create an
affirming image of blackness, the civil rights movement suffered not
only from white resistance, but also because black leadership and mem-
bers of the black community constructed black politics and identity
around sexism, homophobia, and "black heterosexual maleness." ° As
a result, "black power" often became an oppressive concept for black
lesbians, gay men, and heterosexual women.P' Lesbian and gay legal
229. The false image of gay and lesbian wealth and its negative impact upon gay and lesbian
struggles for legal and political equality, see supra pp. 605-08, provides just one reason why
lesbian theory should not delay, even for a moment, class and racial analysis. As Ruthann
Robson has observed,
Not only does the dissipation of class analysis in lesbian and "queer" legal theory
result in a lack of resistance to commodification and the maintenance of heterosexist
structures, it also results in our failure to adequately respond to those who advocate
our demise ....
The portrait of lesbians and gay men as economically privileged serves New
Right rhetoric in at least two ways. First, the depiction taps Into class resentments
and anxieties. Second, economic advantage counters any claim that lesbians and gay
men are discriminated against. Yet our oun rhetoric has often not effectiely coun-
tered these falsehoods.
Robson, supra note 12, at 183 (emphasis added).
230. See HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN?, supra note 13, at 94-99 (describing failures of civil
rights movement due to homophobia and sexism within the black community); LORDE, Learing
from the 60's, in SISTER OUTrSD , supra note 9, at 134 (same).
231. HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN?, supra note 13, at 98 (CWhile the 60s black power movement
was a reaction against racism, it was also a movement that allowed black men to overtly an-
nounce their support of patriarchy"); LORDE, supra note 230, at 137 (rBlack women were told
that our only useful position in the Black Power movement was prone. The existence of
Black lesbians and gay people was not even allowed to cross the public consciousness of Black
america [sic]."). Black gay activist Bayard Rustin, for example, organized the 1963 "March on
Washington," but this fact was suppressed by leadership in the civil rights movement. See
Henry Louis Gates, Blacdash?, THE NEw YORKER, May 17, 1993, at 44 ("because of his homo-
sexuality . . . Rustin was prevented from being named director of the 1963 march"); Gilmoe
supra note 12, at 236 (Rustin "was dismissed by some other leaders of the civil rights move-
ment partly because of his sexual orientation"). Gates attributes the closeting of Rustin's role
in the march to a fear that his gayness "would be used to discredit the mobilization." Gates,
supra, at 44. See also GOMEa, Because Silence Is Costl,, In FoRTY-TmI E SEPTE ,ERS, srpra
note 9, at 71 (discussing Rustin's "working quietly" in civil rights movement due to fears of
white homophobia). While this "accommodation" might have reflected the fear of a white
homophobic backlash, it also evolves from a narrow definition of black liberation--one that
excludes sexual freedom and the liberty of black gays and lesbians. Had the civil rights move-
ment not been defined around heterosexual needs, black leaders would not have viewed Ru 's
sexuality and white homophobia as potential threats to the validit, of the movement. Rather,
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theorists should not repeat these harmful mistakes.
Cain's second reason for temporarily accommodating lesbian
essentialism-that a "core lesbian experience" exists-also fails. By
"core" experience, Cain "means an experience that is central to who we
are as lesbians, an experience that shapes our individual identities in a
way that causes us to identify as lesbians, and that unifies lesbians as a
category."
232
Cain seeks to discover the core lesbian experience despite her seem-
ingly contradictory challenge against feminist essentialism. Cain has ar-
gued that the "category 'woman' should remain open, should be
destabilized, so that all women might claim some piece of it. We
should not embrace definitions that are so fixed that we exclude some
women. Nor should we require a single core experience of all individ-
uals to be included in the class, because there is no core experience
that includes all women."'23 If lesbians of color and poor lesbians are
in fact "women," then inclusion of their racial and class concerns with-
in feminism and the "open" category woman, compels a concomitant
openness of lesbian theory and the category "lesbian."
Cain does not reconcile her conflicting positions. Instead, she de-
fines the core of lesbian experience as "the emotional and erotic attrac-
tion to another woman and the recognition that this attraction has oc-
curred.'2 4  Cain contends that this moment of self-discovery is
these issues would have been a central part of racial politics and of blacks' resistance to the
many ways in which they were marginalized in American society. The suppression of sexual
difference to advance purported racial freedom thus reflects an essentialist view that sexuality Is
separable from and unconnected to racial identity, subordination, and liberation. A multidimen-
sional racial struggle, by contrast, would have exposed and challenged the potential use of
white homophobia to advance racist agendas and to subordinate the march. See Kendall Thom-
as, "Ain't Nothin' Like the Real Thing" Black Masculiniy, Gay Sexuality and the Jargon of
Authentici, in REPREsETING BLACK MEN 66 (Marcellus Blount & George Cunningham eds.,
1996) ("Mhe heteronormative vision of racial identity that would exclude the expression of
sexual difference among African-Americans does not exorcise but rather incorporates the Ideolo-
gy of white supremacy into the very body of black America, and with it the phobic concep-
tions of black sexuality as such that white supremacy has always insinuated.") (emphasis in
original). Thus, a multidimensional politics would not have required black gays and lesbians to
suffer further marginalization in the name of black racial advancement Cf. Crenshaw, Mapping
the Margins, supra note 13, at 1295 ("Although collective opposition to racist practice has been
and continues to be crucially important in protecting Black interests, an empowered Black feml-
nist sensibility would require that the terms of unity no longer reflect priorities premised upon
the continued marginalization of Black women.").
232. Cain, Risk of Essentialism, supra note 216, at 62.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 66. Cain reasons that "[flf a lesbian is someone whose emotional and erotic
attention is directed toward another woman, then how can any self-identified lesbian not claim
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transformative because "[o]nce we realize the truth of our attraction, we
realize our difference from the rest of the world and our lives are dif-
ferent from that moment on." 5
While it is probably indisputable that all self-identified "lesbians"
discover they have a "lesbian" intimate attraction, this fact does not
eliminate race and class issues from lesbian experience, nor does it
render this process the "central" moment in lesbian lives. Indeed, the
centrality of this discovery to lesbian experience will likely depend
upon the very race and class factors that Cain believes lesbian theorists
should, for the moment, ignore.2 6  For example, while some women
may "realize [their] difference from the rest of the world" when they
discover their lesbian attraction, lesbians who are poor or of color like-
ly encounter marginalization and exclusion long before this moment
occurs.2  Consequently, their discovery of same-sex intimacy may not
be the event that renders them "differen[t] from the rest of the world."
Under a multidimensional framework, the homophobic oppression that
results from a woman's self-identification as a lesbian is just one im-
portant (or "central") aspect of being a lesbian. 8 Racial and economic
injustice are also core and central experiences of lesbian existence? 9
and, thus, require immediate analysis in lesbian theory.
Race and class also impact women after they discover their lesbian
identity, and these forces create varying lesbian perspectives. Although
Cain acknowledges this point,240 her desire to shield lesbian theory from
racial and class deconstruction means that such differences would indef-
initely go untold.
Cain correctly states that "[s]ome degree of generalization is neces-
this core experience of having her own attention be so captured?" Id. at 65.
235. Id.
236. See Spelman, supra note 13, at 139 (CSomeone might tell me that we have something
in common, but even if I agree, I may find that utterly insignificant In terms of my identity
and plans for action.").
237. See Gomez, supra note 116, at 938 (stating that when she discovered the Isolation that
homophobia causes, she "was already struggling with another reality-black skin-that was hn-
mensely more devastating in [her] daily life.").
238. See Arriola, Gendered Inequalitv, supra note 12, at 133 (Women are oppressed in many
ways, and sexuality is only one of them.").
239. As this Article has argued, these factors also shape homophobla.
240. See Cain, Risk of Ersentiallsm, supra note 216, at 69 ("Once a woman discovers that
she is a lesbian, she begins to develop a lesbian perspective on life. That perspective varies
based on the life that each individual lesbian lives, her specific circumstances, her geographic
location, and her economic security.).
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sary to theorize.""24  Cain, however, implies that generalizations and a
focus on "commonalities" are critical for the construction of a meaning-
ful-even authentic-lesbian theory. She argues that "[a]lthough we
certainly know that there must be differences amongst us, lesbian theo-
ry must be based on our commonalities. Otherwise, the theory might
be interesting, but it would not be lesbian."' Z
I share Cain's opinion that the discussion of racial and class differ-
ences among lesbians is an "interesting" project. I do not believe,
however, that discussion of these differences merely adds "color" to
lesbian theory. Rather, such a discourse is crucial for the construction
of a theory that adequately responds to the needs of women of color
and the poor. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable to discuss both
differences and similarities concurrently, during the same phase of theo-
rizing.243 Nevertheless, because gay and lesbian theorists have focused
so extensively on sameness, to the nearly complete exclusion of differ-
ence, they probably should intensely focus on issues of racial and class
diversity in order to fill the holes in their theories.
Concentrating on these differences, moreover, does not neutralize
the "lesbian" character of lesbian theory, as Cain implies. Instead, a
multidimensional analysis permits us to examine how racial and eco-
nomic subordination affect poor lesbians and lesbians of color and how
an essentialist lesbian theory is itself grounded upon racial and class
privileges and the experiences of white and economically advantaged
lesbians. Thus, to theorize about the needs of women of color and the
poor is no less "lesbian" than the construction of a theory devoid of
racial and class analysis, one that likely reflects whiteness and econom-
ic privilege.
Multidimensionality, therefore, does not destroy the category lesbian
(or gay) or disturb its usefulness as a basis for theorizing. Instead, it
merely attempts to make explicit the multiple dimensions (e.g., race and
class) of the category and to examine how these dimensions should
(and do) affect gay and lesbian legal theory, public policy, and political
agendas.244
241. Id. at SO.
242. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
243. Indeed, this Article discusses both. See supra pp. 567-83 (discussing vulnerability of all
gays and lesbians to homophobic violence but highlighting differences supplied by racial and
class inequality); supra note 95 (recognizing failure of state to protect gays and lesbians from
domestic violence but pinpointing possible racial and class differences in this heterosexist prac-
tice); supra pp. 609-12 (discussing assumption of gay and lesbian promiscuity but analyzing
racial complexity of this stereotype).
244. See PHELAN, GmrrING SPEFCmc, supra note 105, at 140 ("Coalition cannot be simply the
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B. Essentialist Political Agendas
Gay and lesbian legal theorists must also carefully analyze the con-
struction of gay and lesbian political discourse because gay and lesbian
civil rights litigation and legal analysis often evolve from and parallel
arguments advanced and agendas pursued in gay and lesbian political
activism.2  My examination of gay and lesbian political discourse
reveals that it, like gay and lesbian legal theory, fails to engage critical-
ly issues of racial and class subordination and privilege. Consequently,
gay and lesbian political agendas may conflict with, or fail to include,
the goals of gays and lesbians of color. For example, Martin Omelas,
a member of LLEGO, the National Latina/Latino Lesbian and Gay
Organization, complains that issues of Latino gays and lesbians are
often excluded from mainstream gay and lesbian political agendas24
Ornelas expresses an interest in gay and lesbian agendas that include
intersecting issues of racism, poverty, and homophobia, guch as sub-
stance abuse and the lack of educational opportunities among gay Lati-
nos.247
strttegic alignment of diverse groups over a single issue, nor can coalition mean finding the
real unity behind our apparently diverse struggles. Our politics must be informed by affinity,.
. . not simply because we are not all alike, but because we each embody multiple, often con-
flicting identities and locations.") (citing Donna Haraway, A Manyfesto for 0jborgs, in FLJI-
NsMiPosTmODERNISM (Linda . Nicholson ed, 1990)).
245. See Patricia A. Caln, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Pghtr. A Legal HIstory, 79 VA. L.
REv. 1551 (1993) (discussing historical nexus between gay political action and civil rights liti-
gation). The politics of homophobia also constrain gay and lesbian legal reform efforts. See,
e.g., inf-a p. 626 (discussing how societal and state homophobia limited efforts to end the
exclusion of gays and lesbians from the military).
246. See David James Rose, Coming Out, Standing Out: Hlpnia American Gays and Lesbi-
ans, HfsPAmc, June 1994, at 44.
247. Id. Ornelas also injects issues of race, national origin, and, perhaps, nationalism into the
debates surrounding the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the military. He
asks Hispanic gays and lesbians to contemplate whether they are prepared to patrol
the Mexican border with the National Guard or shoot down their lesbian and gay
compaficros the next time the U.S. government decides to invade Panama, Nicaragua,
or Cuba "Are we expected to join a prior list of issues that does not reflect our
realities?"
Id. AccordToMMI A. MECCA, BE'TWEN LrIE RocK A D A HARD PLACE 125-27 (1993) (criticiz-
ing gay military movement and arguing that gays and lesbians should instead advocate for
civilian employment, anti-poverty, and social welfare programs); Colman McCarthy, Equally for
Warriors: A Phony Gain, WASH. POST., May II, 1993, at CIO (criticizing feminist and gay
efforts to join military on grounds that military supports abusive foreign policy); David Tullcr,
Some Lesbians, Gays Don't Like Focus on Military Ban Issue, S.F. CHRO.L, July 12, 1993, at
A4 (reporting that some gays and lesbians oppose struggle to end mitary's anti-gay/lesbian
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1. Race and Sexuality
As Ornelas' comments suggest, gay and lesbian political agendas
may not fully capture the interests of gays and lesbians of color in
racial and economic equality. Indeed, several prominent commentators
in gay and lesbian politics have even argued that racial and class strug-
gles should have no role in gay and lesbian liberation.
Richard Mohr, for example, urges "gay organizations" not to
"buildi coalitions with other groups," including "blacks" and "wom-
en.""24  Mohr contends that such efforts are "[u]necessary and ...a
wasteful drain on the movement."2 ' Mohr dismisses the expectation of
political success from such strategies as "a communist fantasy." '
Mohr also claims that blacks' and women's "groups' fights are not
gays' fights."251
Mohr seemingly does not contemplate-or he considers irrele-
vant-the existence of black gay men, black lesbians, and lesbians in
general. To these individuals, feminism and antiracism are not "waste-
ful" frolic. Rather, these political movements are crucial to their
"fight" for liberation. Furthermore, if, as Mohr contends, "[c]oming
out is the fundament of gays' existence as political creatures," 2' then
gay and lesbian politics must combat racial and class inequali-
ty-because racism and poverty constrain gays and lesbians and limit
their ability to reveal publicly their sexual identities. 2 3
Mohr attempts to defend his narrow conceptualization of gay poli-
tics by claiming that "[tihe black movement achieved its political sue-
cesses without coalitions of the dispossessed." 4 Mohr's assertion mis-
.states history. Although the civil rights movement responded primarily
policies because of military's "history of supporting authoritarian regimes and of helping over-
throw elected leaders in Latin America and other regions"). Thus, Omelas' comments regard-
ing the appropriateness of political challenges to the military's ban on gays and lesbians also
reflect a conservative/liberal divide within gay and lesbian politics.
248. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSnCE: A STUDY OF EmIcs, SOCIMrY, AND LAW 328 (1988).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 329.
251. Id.
252. Id at 327. For a discussion of the importance and complexity of "coming out," partic-
ularly for people of color, see GOMEZ, supra note 231, at 169 ("[Ain individual's need to
come out of the closet and name her/himself sexually is not only part of a political strategy,
but is, more fundamentally, at the core of accepting adulthood and validating one's own experi-
ence.").
253. See supra pp. 608.
254. MOHR, supra note 248, at 329.
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to the oppression of black people, much of the activism it generated
involved a coalition of black, Jewish, labor, and Latino groups.25
Mohr's statement also ignores the failure of the civil rights movement
to advance the particular needs of black lesbians, gay men, and hetero-
sexual women-due to its construction of blackness around heterosex-
uality and maleness. 6  A narrow "gay" politics further marginalizes
gay and lesbian people of color by repeating the errors of antiracism.
Bruce Bawer, a gay cultural critic, similarly challenges the necessity
of multilayered gay political struggle. In his excoriating review of
Virtual Equality, Bawer argues that sexism, racism, and economic injus-
tice are "issues yes-but gay issues?" In addition, Marshall Kirk and
Hunter Madsen consider antiracist, poverty, and feminist concerns "su-
perfluous issues" to "gay" liberation. To Kirk and Madsen, coali-
tional and multidimensional politics detract from gay political issues.O9
Mohr, Bawer, Kirk, and Madsen offer a narrow gay politics-a
politics devoid of antiracist, poverty, and feminist concerns. This sin-
gular politics responds only to the needs of individuals who do not
suffer racial, class, or gender exclusion-namely, white, male, middle-
and upper-class persons. Although these authors contend that race,
class, and gender detract--or are separate-from gay politics, the politi-
cal vision they prescribe rests fimly upon racial, class, and gender
255. See Anthony E. Cook, God-Talk in a Secular World, 6 YALE J.L & HUMAN. 435, 450
(1994) ("[Tjhe liberal coalition of the Civil Rights movement consisted of a precarious alliance
of Blacks, Jewish and Christian progressives, and the progressive wings of labor, white wom-
en's groups, young white college students, and intellectuals."); Kevin R. Johnson, Civil . ights
and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Communitv in the Tweni)-Flrst Centuro; 8 LA RAZA
LJ. 42, 56 (1995) ("In the 1960s, many achievements of the civil rights movement were
gained through a coalition of Affican-American, labor, Latino, Jewish and other progressive
organizations:).
256. See supra pp. 615-16 & n. 231.
257. Brce Bawer, Under Glass, N.Y. TImES, Oct. 29, 1995, § 7, at 24 (emphasis added).
Bawer has also expressed a distaste for gay and lesbian multiculturallsm. See BRUcE BAwEt, A
PLACE AT ThE TABLE 37 (1993) (describing creation of a "queer people of color media production
company" and the publication of an "anthology of lesbian, gay and bisexual Asian/Pacillc writ-
ers" as "constricting" and as "Balkanization'); Id. at 216 (dismissing scholarly research on the
links between gender, class, race, and sexuality as "[p]olitically correct and multiculturalist rhet-
oric"). Bawer is not alone in his dismissal of gay and lesbian multiculturalism. See Andrea
LUwis & Robin Stevens, At the Crossroads: Race, Gender and the Gay Rights Mfarement, ETH-
NIC NEWSWATCH, Apr. 30, 1996, at 22 ('There is more resistance to conscious efforts to Inte-
grate [racially] the movement and its organizations. It's somehow become viewed as political
correctness rather than as a sound strategy.") (quoting white gay activist Eric Rofes).
258. See MARSHALL KIRK & Hum' MASEN, A rER mm BALL: How A.IouCA Wu., Co m ITs




privilege. Thus, by portraying coalitional and multidimensional politics
as "non-gay," the authors falsely imply that their own essentialist poli-
tics is authentic and pure, i.e., not contaminated by race and class; they
also deny the racial, class, and gender privileges upon which their own
political theories reside.26 A multidimensional gay politics that con-
fronts racial, class, and gender subordination is no less valid or "gay"
than a politics grounded upon racial, economic, and male privilege.
Although several members of the gay political community explicitly
reject the importance of incorporating antiracist and poverty concerns in
gay and lesbian politics, issues of racial and class subordination are
more often marginalized by omission, silence, and neglect. The white
gay political response to the work of white gay photographer Robert
Mapplethorpe provides an excellent example of the neglectful absence
of racial discourse in gay and lesbian politics. The controversy also
illustrates the potential tension between antiracist politics and essentialist
gay and lesbian political agendas.
In the late 1980s several museums, members of Congress, and the
National Endowment for the Arts attempted to censor Mapplethorpe's
work, some of which contained "homoerotic" themes.2 61 Many gay and
lesbian activists rallied behind Mapplethorpe, charging the censors with
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and insensitivity to free
expression.2  Both prior to and during the conflict with the censors,
260. The authors' denial of the racial basis for their theories perhaps results from a tendency
of many whites not to perceive that they even have a "race." HARLON DALTON, RACIAL HEALING
109 (1996). Dalton explains that "race obliviousness is the natural consequence of being in the
driver's seat. We are all much more likely to disregard attributes that seldom produce a ripple
than we are those that subject us to discomfort... For most whites, race-or more precisely,
their own race-is simply part of the unseen, unproblematic background." Id. (emphasis add-
ed). See also HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN, supra note 13, at 138 ("[The dominant race...
reserves for itself the luxury of dismissing racial identity while the oppressed race is made
daily aware of their racial identity.). Barbara Flagg has also written extensive analyses on
"the transparency phenomenon: the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness or about
norms, behaviors, experiences or perspectives that are white-specific:' Barbara J. Flagg, "Was
Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Dscritinatory In-
tent, 91 Mmcr-. L. REv. 953, 956 (1993) (emphasis added). See also Barbara J. Flagg, Chang-
ing the Rules: Some Preliminary Thoughts on Doctrinal Reform, Indeteminacy, and Whiteness,
11 BERKELEY WoMN's LJ. 250 (1996); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Pro-
cess, and Constitutional Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1995); Barbara . Flagg, Fashioning a Title
VII Remedy for Transparent4 White Decisionmaking, 104 YALE LJ. 2009 (1995); Barbara L
Flagg, On Selecting Black Women as Paradigms for Race Discrimination Ana'ses, 10 BERKLEY
WOMEN'S LJ. 40 (1995). These arguments also apply to class, sexuality, and gender.
261. See Alan. Artner, The Eye of the Storm: Mapplethorpe's Unblinking Vision Sparked a
Continuing Battle Over Art, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 31, 1989, at C4.
262. d See also Christopher Knight Censorship and Photography's 150th: Controversy Over
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however, political activists in the gay and lesbian community failed to
engage in a substantial conversation around the racial issues implicated
by Mapplethorpe's work.2c
A significant dialogue on race did emerge among some black gay
activists, however. While they did not align themselves with the cen-
sors of Mapplethorpe's work, many black gay men were disturbed by
Mapplethorpe's photographic display of black men, which they believed
reinforced racist sexual stereotypes. Essex Hemphill, for example,
argues that Mapplethorpe's "work artistically perpetuates racial stereo-
types constructed around sexuality and desire. In many of his images,
Black males are only shown as parts of the anatomy--genitals, chests,
buttocks-close up and close cropped to elicit desire. ' Similarly,
Isaac Julien and Kobena Mercer comment that "Robert Mapplethorpe's
catalogue Black Males . . . appropriates the conventions of porn's
racialized codes of representation, and by abstracting its stereotypes into
'art,' [Mapplethorpe] makes racism's phantasms of desire respect-
able.""65 Pervasive race-sex stereotypes may have dictated that the
identity and emotions-elements of personhood--of the black male
models in Mapplethorpe's work escape presentation." Rather, the ste-
Serrano and Mapplethorpe Works Overshadows Observances of the Form's Sesquicentennial,
L.A. TomS, Dec. 17, 1989, at 5; Andrew L. Yarrow, Action Is Condemned by Artists and
Institutions, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1989, at C18.
263. By criticiimg the absence of a noticeable white gay and lesbian political discussion of
the racial aspects of Mapplethorpe's work, I do not intend to suggest that this work should
have been censored, nor do I wish to argue that an individual should oppose the content of the
work or conclude that Mapplethorpe is "racist." Rather, I wish to argue that by falling to
engage in a rigorous discussion of the issues of race and sexual representation Implicated by
Mapplethorpe's work, gay and lesbian political leaders marginalized--or treated as Insignifi-
cant-issues of race.
264. HM HIL., Does Your Mama Know About Me?, In CEOMONES, .supra note 9, at 38 (em-
phasis in original).
265. Isaac Julien & Kobena Mercer, True Confessions: A Discourse on Images of Black Male
Sexuality, in BROTHER TO BROTHER, supra note 9, at 169. Black gay opinion on this issue, how-
ever, was not uniform. In fact, one of Mapplethorpe's models, Ken Moody, stated that he did
not believe that the artst's work perpetuated the "exploitation" of black men. See KOBEN,
MERcER, Reading RacialFetithLm in WELCOME TO nm JuNGLE: NEW Pcsrris iN BLAcK CuLreu, ..
STuDIEs 197 (1994) (quoting television interview with Moody). Furthermore, Mercer subsequent-
ly changed his position and argued that Mapplethorpe and his work do not subordinate, but
rather elevate, black men by presenting them in a-t. See Id. at 194-204. Moody's opinion
and Mercer's flip-flop, however, do not affect my position. I have not argued that
Mapplethorpe is racist or that we should condemn his work. Rather, I have only argued that
his work presents "issues" of race and that silence on these issues reflects the general
marginalization of race in the gay and lesbian political community.
266. See Jane Caputi & Helen Vann, Imperfect Afomentr: The MAaplethorpe Debate, S.F.
Ct ON, Feb. 21, 1990, at A19 (Mapplethorpe's obscuring of the faces of many of his black
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reotypical notion of black male "sexual prowess," presented through
phallocentric imagery, assumes centrality.267
Thus, black gay criticism of Mapplethorpe's exhibition did not stem
from a homophobic drive to censor. Instead, it emanated from an
historical concern regarding the negative representation and stereotyping
of black male sexuality. Such concerns exist beyond the Mapplethorpe
controversy. Julien and Mercer, for example, observe that "in the gay
subculture ...[b]lack men ...[are] confined to a narrow repertoire
of types-the super-sexual stud and the sexual savage on the one hand,
the delicate and exotic 'Oriental' on the other." 68 Unless the gay and
lesbian community begins to engage in discourse around issues of race
and sexual representation, its ability to form political coalitions across
racial groups-to the extent that it even considers such coalitions im-
portant-will be limited. Mapplethorpe's work provided an excellent
opportunity to begin such a dialogue.
2. Race versus Sexuality
While the Mapplethorpe controversy exemplifies the potential for
conflict around omitted issues of race and sexuality in gay and lesbian
communities, the Broadway musical Miss Saigon has engendered direct
conflict on these issues. In 1991, the Lambda Legal Defense and Edu-
cation Fund sponsored a benefit of Miss Saigon, a musical that portrays
a romance between a white American soldier and a Vietnamese woman
during the Vietnam War. The benefit sparked protests by Asian gay
and lesbian groups which believed the play perpetuated stereotypes of
Asian men as "villains" and Asian women as "docile" and the sexual
objects of white men.269 Despite the protests, the benefit took place
subjects reinforces dominant structures of racism).
267. See HEPHILL, supra note 264, at 38 (in Mapplethorpe's work "[t]he penis becomes the
identity of the Black male, which is the classic racist stereotype presented as Art in the context
of a gay vision") (emphasis in original); Julien & Mercer, supra note 265, at 169 (in
Mapplethorpe's "'Man in Polyester Suit,' the dialectics of fear and fascination in colonial fanta-
sy are reinscribed by the centrality of the black man's 'monstrous' phallus").
268. lt at 169. See also Rose, supra note 246, at 44 ('Latino gays are [often] eroticized
and .. . fetish[ized] by gay white men") (quoting Philadelphia activist and writer Roberto
Vasquez-Pacheco).
269. Aileen Jacobson, Protest Planned for "Saigon" Opening, NEWSDAY, Apr. 10, 1991, at 57.
These protests, however, were not limited to the Asian gay community nor to New York. See
Karl Granville, Protests Aside, "Miss Saigon" Show Goes On, L.A. lIMES, Apr. 13, 1991, at
F3 (reporting coalition of Asian, theatrical, legal, women's, and and-racist gay groups opposed
to New York Broadway opening); Thomas Walsh, "Saigon" Arrival Brings Storms of Protest
and Anger, BACK STAGE, Apr. 19, 1991, at 3 (same); Mike Steele, The Other Side of the Story;
"Mss Saigon" Hits a Nerve Among Asians, STAR TRIB., Jan. 9, 1994, at IF (reporting criticism
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because, as Thomas Stoddard, then the Executive Director of Lambda,
explained, the organization "was too far along in ticket sales ....
Canceling. .. would have resulted in 'a diminution of our program,
our ability to fight discrimination directly. " "70 Thus, the Asian groups'
interests in racial equality threatened to diminish the "fight' against gay
and lesbian discrimination-essentially constructed. The true aim of the
Asian groups' protests was to challenge negative racial and gender
constructs of Asian men and women. Under a framework that views
racial liberation necessary for, rather than separate from, complete sexu-
al equality, this antiracist goal does not threaten to "diminish," but
rather strengthens, the "fight' against gay and lesbian discrimination.
Had gay and lesbian advocates developed a greater consciousness of,
and sensitivity towards, issues of racial and gender subordination (and
if Asians had greater representation within gay and lesbian organiza-
tions), the Miss Saigon conflict would likely have not occurred."'
Recently, the most volatile public conflict between race and sexuali-
ty has occurred in political discourse surrounding the military's discrim-
inatory policy against gays and lesbians. During the 1992 presidential
campaign, candidate Bill Clinton promised to repeal the policy.tm
surrounding opening of show in Minneapolis).
The Broadway production of the musical, however, generated racial controversy before the
Lambda benefit. The controversy arose when the play's director cast a caucasian male as the
Eurasian lead character without allowing auditions for the role. See Mervyn Rothstn, Equity
Will Reconsider °Miss Saigon" Decision, N.Y. TIWEs, Aug. 10, 1990 at C3. People of color
claimed that the decision limited acting opportunities for Asians. See, eg.. Paul Winfield,
Equity Was Right the First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1990, § 1, at 25. The governing
board of Equity, an actors' union, voted to reject the musical's Broadway application. See
Rothstin, supra. Equity, however, subsequently reversed its decision amidst charges of dis-
crimination. See Mervyn Rothstein, Equity Reverses "Saigon" Vote and Welcomes English
Star, N.Y. TiMs, Aug. 17, 1990, at Al.
270. Jacobson, supra note 269, at 57 (quoting Thomas Stoddard). A future showing to bene-
fit the Lesbian and Gay Community Services Center of New York City, however, was cancel-
led aftr the protests. Id.
271. Vaid comments that gay and lesbian organizations need to pay closer attention to how
"messages" are interpreted by members of different racial groups. She opines that had Lambda
engaged in such an inquiry prior to scheduling the Miss Saigon benefit, this, possibly, "would
have led them early to conversations with the Asian gay and lesbian community. Such conver-
saions, held while the event was still in the planning stages, could have saved the organization
a great deal of pain." VAIn, supra note 9, at 304. Eventually, after meeting with Asian
groups, Lambda stopped selling tickets to the musical, sent ticket holders a statement from the
protestors explaining why they believed the musical affirmed racial stereotypes, and offered
ticket holders the opportunity for a refund. Jacobson, supra note 269 at 57. Stoddard stated
that the experience was "unbelievably painful:' Id.
272. Michael Isikoff; Gays Mobilking for Clinton As Pdghts Become an Issue, WASH. POST,
Sept. 28, 1992, at Al.
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Clinton's announcement, during the early days of his presidency, that
he would keep his campaign promise sparked outrage and opposition
from military officials, members of Congress, and the public.27" Gay
and lesbian groups countered this criticism by comparing the military's
anti-gay policy to its earlier policies of racial exclusion and arguing
that both forms of discrimination are unjust.2 4
Many blacks, particularly heterosexual males, criticized the analo-
gies.27 Two observations can be made regarding the black responses
to the race-sexuality analogies. First, black responses attempt to engage
issues of racial hierarchy that the analogies obscure. Second, black
responses stem from homophobia and from a disregard for gay and
273. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Military People Split Over Ban on Homosexuals: Army
Ranks Are Split, As in Socle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at A16; Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay
Groups Regrouping for War on Military Ban, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1993, at A6; Eric Schmitt,
Months After Order on Gay Ban, Military Is Still Resisting Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1993, at Al; Bernard E. Trainor & Eric L. Chase, Keep Gays Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1993, at AIS. President Clinton eventually retreated from his promise and instead implemented
a policy dubbed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue." Under this policy, "homosexual con-
duct" remains prohibited; a statement demonstrating a "propensity" to engage in homosexual
conduct (e.g., "coming out") gives rise to a presumption of homosexual conduct (and thus a
basis for discharge), and the military will, allegedly, no longer actively seek to discover and
discharge gay and lesbian troops. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976-77
(E.DIN.Y. 1995), rev'ak 88 F. 3d 1280 (2nd Cir. 1996); Thomas L. Friedman, Accord Is
Reached on Military Rules for Gay Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1993, at Al; Michael R.
Gordon, Pentagon Spells Out Rules for Ousting Homosexuals; Rights Groups Vow a Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1993, at Al. The military, however, has, reportedly, continued to "ask"
some of its members to disclose their sexual orientation. See Philip Shenon, Armed Forces
Still Question Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at Al (reporting results of interviews
with service members and review of Pentagon documents).
274. See, e.g., Lisa Keen, The Fears Are Unjustified, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1993, at C7; Art
Pine, Gay Issue Quietly Spreads Rfls Through Civil Rights Groups, Lobbyists: High Profile
Black and Latino Groups Are on Sidelines in Battle to End Military's Ban on Homosexuals,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1993, at A20; Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Aides to Study Option of Segrega.
tion for Gay Soldiers, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1993, at Al.
275. See, e.g., Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels-Gays and Blacks: Linking Military Ban to
Integration Fight Stirs Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al; Susan Feeney,
Echoes from the Past: Sides at Odds over Parallel of Military Integration, Gay Ban, DALLAS
MORNING NEWs, May 23, 1993, at Ji; David Lightman, To Congressman, Military's Gay Ban
Not Like Racial Bias, HARTFoRD CoURANr, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al; Joe Rogers, Spare Us the Com-
parisons Between Gays and Blacks, WASH. TIM s, July 29, 1994, at A21; Lena Williams,
Blacks Reject Gay Rights Fight As Equal to Theirs, N.Y. TIMs, June 28, 1993, at Al. Black
opinion on this issue, however, was not uniform. Many individual blacks-including Coretta
Scott King and Jesse Jackson-as well as the NAACP, spoke out against the military's anti-gay
policy. See Williams, supra, at Al. In fact, a New York Times/CBS News Poll conducted In
February 1993-during the height of controversy surrounding the military ban-indicated that 53
percent of blacks, compared to only 40 percent of whites, supported legislation guaranteeing




A review of the black responses reveals that blacks are troubled
that white gays, by comparing their experiences with discrimination to
those of blacks, trivialize the impact of racial subordination and privi-
lege in the lives of blacks and white gays.276 For example, Joe Rogers,
staff counsel to United States Senator Hank Brown, opines that "to the
best of my knowledge, no group in America, save Native Americans,
can claim comparison to the unfortunate, aching and miserable experi-
ence of slavery and segregation suffered by African-Americans." 2"
Rogers compares "the behavior of homosexuality, which a person may
practice or nof' to race, which is immutableP s Rogers asserts that
gays and lesbians can, much like "chameleons," "pass through life and
selectively shield themselves from criticism, praise, negative attitudes or
other perceptions. 279 Finally, Rogers relies upon misleading statistics
which purport to demonstrate that gays and lesbians have much higher
levels of wealth and formal education than the general population and,
even more so, blacks.280 Rogers concludes that "[tihe obvious differ-
ences are key and show a hint of the baselessness of the compari-
sons.) 28 1
Rogers, like many other blacks, expresses a concern that analogies
between racism and homophobia obscure racism and racial privilege.
Some blacks, not unlike other Americans, believe that because white
gays can conceal, or even change, their sexual orientation, they, unlike
blacks, may evade societal exclusion and take advantage of racial hier-
archy. Although their statements dangerously overstate the fluidity of
sexual orientation and the wealth of the gay and lesbian community and
imply a lack of harm in concealing one's sexual orientationw these
critiques, nevertheless, raise legitimates and important discussions re-
276. VAn,, supra note 9, at 187 (To a large extent, black resentment at our use of the ra-
ciaI analogy arises from the persistence of racism, despite the best efforts of a seasoned move-
ment to eradicate it"); Gates, supra note 231 at 42.
277. Rogers, supra note 275, at A21.
278. See id.
279. Id.
280. Id. See supra pp. 605-08 (discussing misleading nature of surveys that Ourport to dem-
onstrate "gay" wealth).
281. Rogers, supra note 275, at A21.
282. See Schacter, supra note 104, at 299 (Far from the innocuous safe haven pictured by
opponents of gay rights, the closet exacts a high price in self-esteem, emotional health, and
access to the community.").
283. There is no conflict in my observation that these responses are at the same time Inaccu-
rate and "legitimate." I have also argued that gay and lesbian theory Is "essentialist" and that
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garding the racial and economic privileges of white gays and lesbians.
A multidimensional framework, however, could challenge Rogers'
essentialist assertion that all gays and lesbians are wealthy and, thus,
buffered from subordination. Such a framework could also destabilize
Rogers' depiction of the black community as a monolith of poverty and
oppression-and heterosexuality. Indeed, despite the existence of class
stratification and privilege within black communities, all blacks, includ-
ing Senate Counsel Rogers, are entitled to civil rights protection due to
their vulnerability-albeit varying-to racial discrimination. Although
privilege exists in gay and lesbian communities, civil rights protection
is necessary to secure the interests of the more marginalized (and even
privileged) sectors of these communities.
While some of the black responses to the race-sexuality analogies
represent a legitimate attempt to problematize gay and lesbian essen-
tialism, some of them flow from a disapprobation of homosexuality and
an opposition to gay and lesbian rights.284 Rogers' comments, for ex-
ample, are blatantly homophobie and antagonistic to gay rights. Simi-
larly, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin L. Powell disagrees
with both the analogies and the lifting of the military ban because, he
argues, "[Hiomosexuality is not a benign ... characteristic such as skin
color . . . It goes to one of the most fundamental aspects of human
behavior."2 5 Powell conflates homosexual status and "behavior" and
concludes that "homosexuality" is "threatening" (i.e., not "benign") and,
therefore, incompatible with military service.286 Moreover, Lieutenant
General Calvin A. H. Waller, a retired army officer, believes that there
is a "'fundamental difference between being black and being gay"' and
that "'[w]hen gays want to openly have their lifestyle foisted upon sol-
diers and airmen . . . I draw the line.""'2 7  Contextually, these homo-
phobic and essentialist responses illuminate the marginalization and
invisibility of black gays and lesbians within black communities.288
it marginalizes and subordinates people of color, yet I have not dismissed it as completely
wasteful.
284. See VAIl, supra note 9, at 187 ("[S]ome of the [black community's] anger at the analo-
gies sterns from homophobia!). As this Article demonstrates, a critique of gay and lesbian
essentialism need not lead to a wholesale rejection of gay and lesbian rights.
285. Duke, supra note 275, at Al (ellipses in original).
286. See Id.
287. Id (emphasis added). See also Williams, supra note 275, at Al ("I believe God loves
the individual homosexual, but He hates the homosexual lifestyle:) (quoting Lester James, a
Washington, D.C. minister).
288. See generally Cheryl Clarke, The Failure to Transform: Homophobia in the Black Com-
munth,, in HOMEGIRLS, supra note 9, at 197-208; Marion Riggs, Black Macho Revisited: Rflee.
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Gay and lesbian rebuttals to the black critiques of the analogies
include acceptance of the anti-essentialist portion of the criticisms, 9
dismissal or disbelief of black rejection of gay rights,,' and general
assertions that gays and lesbians, despite the incompleteness of the
analogies, still deserve civil rights protection."' In none of these re-
torts, however, do gay and lesbian activists employ a multidimensional
lens to frame issues of sexual subordination. For example, throughout
the debates on the military's policy, many activists and other opponents
of the policy made narrow appeals to patriotism, equal citizenship, and
excellency in service to support their opposition to the homophobic
policy 2 The possible economic impact of the military's anti-gay and
lesbian policy, however, was largely omitted from the debates-despite
the fact that "[t]o the poor, the working class, and people with mod-
erate means... the armed forces represent a chance for a good educa-
tion, a steady job, a decent income, and health care benefits." Some
racial critics have also indicated that the military's "gay" ban may have
a disparate impact upon people of color.P Information on the possible
tions of a SNAPI Queen, in BROTHER TO BROTHER, supra note 9, at 253-57; Thomas, .rupra note
231, at 55.67.
289. Williams, supra note 275, at A12 CI know I've had privileges that black gay men do
not have.") (quoting Thomas Stoddard).
290. Responding to an article reporting black criticism of the analogies, Kevin M. Catcheart
of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund commented that "Itihe Inference that a false
dichotomy exists between the black and gay communities Is misleading and offenive." Kevin
M. Cathcart, Gay Cause Is the Same As Black Cause, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1993, at AIS.
291. See id. ("Oppression, no matter what its shape, does harm to all of humanity."); Wil-
liams, supra note 275, at Al ("oppression has many faces") (quoting Thomas Stoddard).
292. See VAID, supra note 9, at 173 (Campaign for Military Service, a gay political group
formed for the purpose of challenging the militar,'s anti-gay policy, "appealed to patriotism,
duty, and gay and lesbian valor"); EJ. Dionne, Jr., Isn't Bigotry A Sin?, WASH. POST, Apr. 27,
1993, at A17 (by challenging military policy "homosexuals are [not] demanding... protection
for 'bizarre' behavior, but the ability to do something we admire: To put their lives on the
line for their country. There is no more basic expression of full citizenship."); Andrew
Sullivan, Gay Values, Truly Conservatve, N.Y. TImES, Feb. 9, 1993, at A21 ('The values that
gays in the military are espousing, patriotism and public service, are traditional values. And
the effect that ending the ban could have on the gay community Is to embolden the forces of
responsibility and integration."); Tracy WJ. Thome Senate Hearings Afirror a Distorted Image;
Gays in the Military: The Criterion Should Be Conduct, Just As in the Business Word, L.A.
TIMES, May 7, 1993, at B7.
293. VAIM, supra note 9, at 153.
294. See Eaton, Homosexual Unmodified supra note 12, at 72 n38 ('[Scattered accounts
suggest that the military's discharge practices may follow a racial pattern.") (citing RANnY
SMrS, CaMWrT U F O.: GAYS AM LESBIAN IN THE U.S. MLiTARY 337, 352 (1993) (observ-,
ing that lesbian purge aboard Navy's Norton Sound targeted eight of the ship's nine black
women among a total of nineteen women investigated for lesbianism, and noting that three of
eight women actually indicted were black)); Lewis & Stevens, supra note 257, at 22 C[Df you
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racial effects of the ban was completely missing from the military de-
bates. The absence of an integrated-rather than analogical and exter-
nal-discussion of racism in the context of the military debates echoes
the general lack of knowledge about, animosity for, and ambivalence
towards the meaning of race in gay and lesbian politics.
The activists' refusal to challenge racial and class subordination
while insisting upon using racial analogies troubles many gays and
lesbians of color. Urvashi Vaid has observed that the gay and lesbian
community's
use of racial analogies is suspect, coming as it does from a
movement deeply splintered over the relevance of racism to the
fight against homophobia. Interestingly, even those who believe
that the racial justice movement should be completely distinct
from the gay rights movement often draw analogies in order to
defend gay rights.295
Charles Fernandez similarly notes that "it's troubling to witness a
white-dominated movement compare its gains and grievances to those
of communities of color . . . . [O]ne cannot help but appreciate the
irony of [sic] white-led movement with limited racial consciousness
turning around and appropriating ethnicity and the stigma of race as
watched the media and looked at all of the poster children-the people in the military kicked
out because of the ban and filing cases against the military-they were white officers and they
were almost all men. But when you look at the numbers, the ban actually disproportionately
affects enlisted personnel not officers. So there is a class distinction, and it affects people of
color and women proportionately more.") (quoting Mike Perez of the United States Students
Association, an organization that lobbied against the ban).
295. VAID, supra note 9, at 186. Vad recounts several instances where her attempts to In-
corporate an antiracist agenda in gay politics were met with stiff resistance by white gays and
lesbians. See, e.g., id at 274-306. As this Article argues, such resistance to antiraclsm and
racial diversity is a problem in the gay and lesbian political community. See David W.
Dunlap, Three Black Members Quit AIDS Organization Board, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at
B2 (reporting resignation of three black members from board of directors of Gay Men's Health
Crisis, the country's largest AIDS legal and social services organization, due to organization's
alleged insensitivity toward people of color and issues of racism); Charles Fernandez, Undocu-
mented Aliens in Queer Nation, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW, supra note 108, at 239
(criticizing racism in the gay and lesbian community); Lewis & Stevens, supra note 257 (de-
scribing racial conflicts within gay and lesbian organizations); Valdes, supra note 158, at 354
n.1252 (discussing dissolution of San Francisco chapter of Queer Nation, a gay and lesbian
political organization, due to, among other things, "allegations of racism... .'). Vad Is also
correct in observing that individuals hostile or opposed to incorporating racial struggle within
gay rights may themselves invoke racial suffering in order to defend gay rights. See, e.g.,
Mo-m, supra note 248, at 188-211; BAwER, A PLAcs AT THE TABLE, supra note 257, at 85-87.
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legitimating tools"' 96 Thus, the lack of an agenda for racial and class
equality in gay and lesbian politics may have also influenced the criti-
cal black response 97
3. Beyond Analogies
Clearly, the race-sexuality analogies have failed as a political strate-
gy. This failure results, in part, from the very nature of the analogies.
By comparing "blacks" and "gays" (or racism and homophobia), users
of the analogies, in addition to omitting black gay people, purport to
equate, or to locate similarities between, the historical experiences of
the two groups (really, white gays and black heterosexuals). In so
doing, they ignore a legacy of racial and class hierarchy-of racial and
economic privilege and subordination. Consequently, under the analo-
gies the white gay child of a white slaveowner-or even a white gay
slaveowner-occupies the same (or lower) social position as a black
heterosexual slave: the former is stripped of his or her racial and class
privileges; the suffering of the latter is distorted. Andrew Sullivan, for
example, argues that the oppression of (white) gays and lesbians is not
less intense than that against, say, heterosexual blacks ...
There was no slavery for homosexuals, for example; but even
slaves, if they were heterosexual, were occasionally allowed the
right to marry the person they loved. That right was often
peremptorily taken away, but when it was, the hideousness of
the injustice was clear. But that injustice is unavailable to
homosexuals, because they haven't even been deemed eligible
for the institution of marriage in the first place; they have al-
ways been, from one particular perspective, beneath slaves.
And they still are.?"
Sullivan's comparison completely obfuscates the oppression of slav-
296. Fernandez, supra note 295, at 241.
297. The virtual absence of black gays and lesbians in the military discourse likely results
from this narrow focus of gay rights. For example., Petny Watkins, a black soldier who is one
of a few gays to receive a favorable adjudication in a lawsuit challenging the military's anti-
gay policy, see Watkins v. United States, 837 P.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), amended, 847 F.2d
1329, different results reached on reh'g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane), cerL dented,
498 US. 957 (1990) (finding military estopped from barring Walkins' re-cnlIstment solely on
basis of sexual orientation), claims that he was not asked by the "anointed leadership" of the
gay and lesbian community to contribute to the public debate on the ban. Wfliams, supra
note 275, at Al (quoting Watkins). Watkins also notes that racism within the gay and lesbian
community "is a big problem." Id.
298. SULUVAN, supra note 145, at 154-55.
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ery. It also purposefully erases "homosexual" slaves.299 Slave marriag-
es, like same-sex unions, had no legal significance. °" Thus, from this
"particular perspective," white gays and lesbians are not, as Sullivan
contends, "beneath slaves." In addition, slave women-whether married
or not-were "property" and frequently subjected to sexual assault by
white men."' Furthermore, slaves were often compelled to "breed," not
to fulfill their own interests in raising children, but to bring economic
gain to slaveowners °  Moreover, because slaves and their offspring
could readily be sold if their masters so desired, slave families were in-
herently unstable. Finally, the treacherous institution of slavery per-
sisted for over two centuries in the United States-despite "the hideous-
ness of the injustice." Thus, the concept of a "humanizing" slave mar-
riage seems rather strained and inconceivable.s Accordingly,
Sullivan's comparison of white gay experience to slavery distorts the
latter's brutality?"4
In addition to obscuring a history of racial and class hierarchy, the
analogies ignore the persistence of racial inequality. By employing the
analogies as a plea to obtain civil rights, gay and lesbian political activ-
299. See Id. (comparing "homosexuals," for which "there was no slavery" to "heterosexual
blacks").
300. See HOOKs, AIN'T I A WOMAN, supra note 13, at 43.
301. See id. at 25-43.
302. Id. at 39-42.
303. Because "married" slaves remained the objects of dehumanization, the social benefits of
marriage that Sullivan himself finds most compelling-stable environments for "rearing" children
and commitment between two adults, see Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A Corner-
vative Case for Gay Marriage, NEw REuBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 22-were either non-existent
or subject to the control and direction of slavowners, not the slaves.
304. Sullivan is not alone in his comparison of contemporary gay and lesbian experiences to
slavery. Several gay and lesbian legal theorists, attorneys and political activists have compared
the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 1039 (1986) (denying gay
male's due process challenge to Georgia's sodomy statute on the grounds that there is no "fun.
damental right' to engage in "homosexual sodomy"), with its decision in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that blacks-whether enslaved or "free"-are
not United States citizens and, thus, are entitled to no Constitutional liberties). See, e.g., David
Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection
of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 319, 323 (1994) C'Bowers Is
to the growing gay rights movement what . . . Dred Scott v. Sanford was to the abollflon-
ists."); Gillerman, supra note 104 ("Bowers v. Hardwtick should be recognized as the outcome
of a deep and virulent prejudice against homosexuals, fully equal to the prejudice against blacks
exhibited by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford"); Ban on Homosexual 4ctvity is
Upheld, THE RECORD, July 1, 1986, at Al ("Twenty-five years from now, [Bowers] will be
viewed as the Dred Scott case of the gay rights movement") (quoting Thomas Stoddard);
Powell Wavered on Sodomy Ruling, Ci. TRm., July 14, 1986, at A3 ("Opponents of the Bow-
ers ruling have compared it to the famous Dred Scott decision in 1857.").
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ists and legal theorists imply that blacks, as a group, have attained the
political, economic, and legal equality that white gays now seek (e.g.,
blacks have equality under "the law," but white gays are '"eneath
slaves?)? 5 Despite some civil rights gains, blacks and whites remain
unequal,3°  and legal remedies to narrow this gulf-at least symbolical-
ly-are being rethought,3 °7 repealed,30. reformed,3 9 and subjected to
greater judicial scrutiny?"t The analogies overlook this static inequality
between blacks and whites and the growing hostility toward public
policies enacted to narrow this inequality.
In order to avoid the failures of the analogies, gay and lesbian legal
theorists and political activists should advocate sexual equality by ad-
dressing the many harms sexual subordination causes. These harms
require legal and political remedies for their own sake-without refer-
ence to the rights and injuries of black heterosexuals. Furthermore,
these harms are not universal but are varied--due to race, class, gender,
and other influences. Thus, multidimensionality provides a more effec-
tive and accurate framework for discussing these harms. Instead of
conceptualizing race as separate from and oppositional to sexuality
305. See Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Discourse: Learning from the Ch-ll Bights
Movement in the Quest for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rghts, 40 N.YL. ScH. L REv. 679, 683
(1996) (discussing the race and sexuality analogies and observing that "[iccause the African-
American civil rights movement has been so metaphorized and removed from Its historical
context, the gains of that struggle tend to be exaggerated").
306. For example, in 1992 the poverty rate of whites and blacks was 11.6% and 33.3%,
respectively. See Robert Pear, Poverty in U.S. Grew Faster than Population Last Year, N.Y.
TIMs, Oct. 5, 1993, at A20 (reporting Census Bureau findings). See general4, A D vW HACK-
ER, Two NATTOM: BLACK AND WHmRE- SEPARATE, HOMsL, UNTQUAL (2d e. 1995) (dscusing social
and economic inequality between blacks and whites).
307. Clinton Plans a Review of Affirmati'e Action Programs, N.Y. TIas, Feb. 24, 1995, at
A17 (announcing executive review of federal affi'ratve action programs).
308. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., California Board Ends Preferences In College System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al (reporting decision of Califomla Board of Regents to revoke race
and gender affirmative action programs for admitting students, hiring professors, and awarding
contracts); Pentagon Halts an Affi-mative Action Rule, N.Y. TIMS, Oct. 22, 1995, at 22 (re-
porting revocation of a Department of Defense affirmative action contracting policy for "disad-
vantaged" and "minority-owned" businesses).
309. Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role, N.Y. Im,
Aug. 23, 1996, at Al (reporting enactment of welfare "reform" law th"i, nter alto, terminates
federal guarantee of welfare benefits, shifts spending authority to states In block grant regime,
reduces federal welfare funding by $55 billion--S24 billion of which represents cuts in the
Food Stamp program--imposes work requirements on recipients, and provides for a five-year
lifetime limit on benefits).
310. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995) (reviewing Congressionally




(and, thus, susceptible to comparison), multidimensionality examines the
interactions of these statuses to highlight the diverse harms gays and
lesbians face. Multidimensionality portrays these harms without dimin-
ishing-but rather, acknowledging and emphasizing-the importance of
race and other sources of empowerment and disempowerment. Thus,
multidimensionality provides a methodology for moving beyond the
failed analogies while recognizing-rather than distorting-the true im-
pact of race."'
Gay and lesbian legal theory and politics do not evolve from the
social realities of Julio Rivera, Venus Xtravaganza, the victims of
Dahmer, and the scores of other poor and people of color within the
gay and lesbian community. Rather, gay rights discourse arises from
an artificial world where racism, sexual subordination, and class oppres-
sion resist convergence, or where their convergence is ignored. By
excluding issues of racial and class subordination from analysis, gay
and lesbian legal theorists and political activists negate the experiences
of people of color and the poor and give centrality to the experiences
of race- and class-privileged individuals. Consequently, they create
harmful conflicts with antiracist agendas and people of color and pro-
pose theories that inadequately explain and confront (if at all) the sub-
ordination of the poor and racially marginalized. Part IV of this Arti-
311. Professors Jane Schacter and Margaret Russell have written insightful articles on the
essentializing nature of the race-sexuality analogies. While Schaefer notes that the analogies
"erasea 'vertical' differences within a group" (e.g. denies the existence of black gays),
Schacter, supra note 104, at 295, she focuses primarily on how the attempt to equate racism
and homophobia "erases 'horizontal' differences across the spectrum of legally protected
groups," id., and thereby creates a rigid "singular definition of discrimination," Id. at 298.
Schacter concludes, as I have, that the analogies do not "serve . . . the cause of gay civil
rights. . . ." Id. at 315.
Margaret Russell recognizes that the analogies may obscure the potency of racism and
marginalize gays and lesbians of color. Russell, supra note 186, at 35. Russell, however, be.
lieves that the analogies may help build coalitions between people of color and gays and "help
to uncover the intersectional experiences of those who are racial and sexual minorities . . . ."
Id. I am not as optomistic on this issue as is Russell. Because gay and lesbian political ac-
tivists often ignore or even reject the importance of antiracist struggle, it is unlikely that their
use of the analogies will lead them to build coalitions with people of color. Furthermore, the
"dominant' gay and lesbian community has failed to "uncover" the experiences of gays and
lesbians of color directly-by affirmatively seeking to understand their lives and the general
diversity of gay and lesbian existence. Therefore, it is doubtful that the analogies, which actu-
ally place a wedge between racial and sexual statuses, will lead them to an integrated under-
standing of gay and lesbian identity.
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cle urges gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists to engage
in a dialogue regarding the nexus betveen racial, class, and sexual
subordination so that gay and lesbian legal theory and political action
may effectively mediate the needs of all gay and lesbian people.
As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different
ingredients of my identity, and a woman committed to racial
and sexual freedom from oppression, I find I am constantly
being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of myself and
present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the
other parts of self. But this is a destructive and fragmenting
way to live.? 2
312. LORD, Age. Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, In S i"m OursIDR,,
m.pra note 9, at 120.
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IV. CREArING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL
GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION DIscouRsE
A. Confronting the Skeptics
When I discussed the themes of this Article and the general theme
of multidimensionality with colleagues and friends, some of them ques-
tioned the need for multidimensional analysis. One such individual
raised this issue and suggested, for example, that had the police in the
Dahmer and Rivera tragedies acted on sexual bias alone, the same
results would likely have occurred. Thus, this person argues that a
multidimensional analysis "simply does not matter," or it is just an
"interesting," academic enterprise. This criticism is problematic for at
least five reasons.
First, as this Article has argued, it is highly unlikely that the results
of these scenarios would have been the same if the victims had been
white and wealthy and their assailants poor people of color."3 Under
racial and class hierarchies, poor people of color-particularly black
and Latino men-are considered "criminal." Therefore, it is difficult to
conceive of them as "victims," rather than predators, and thus worthy
of any assistance or protection.314 One should not expect this element
of racial hierarchy to vanish simply because the individual person of
color is gay or lesbian and, therefore, vulnerable to homophobia. Such
reasoning implies that sexual orientation eclipses, or otherwise over-
shadows, race and class statuses and that race and class are irrelevant
features of sexual subordination. Accordingly, if the races of the vic-
tims and assailants in the Rivera and Dahmer tragedies were inverted, a
different police response might have occurred.
Second, legal scholars, as such, must search for "the truth" and
present it in their work. To the extent that essentialism distorts reality,
it conflicts with this scholarly mission. While essentialism is often nec-
essary in order to contain and focus a discussion, the systematic exclu-
sion of issues of race and class from gay and lesbian legal theory hin-
ders the academic search for truth and renders our theories incomplete
and inaccurate. Thus, it is both intellectually dishonest and "unscholar-
ly" to cling to essentialism even if in certain instances the presence of
313. See supra note 95.
314. See supra p. 570.
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multiple forms of discrimination does not affect the outcome of a par-
ticular discriminatory act.
Third, by marginalizing issues of race and class, gay and lesbian
essentialism replicates patterns of social exclusion-racism, sexism, eco-
nomic oppression, people of color, women, and the poor remain irrele-
vant. Scholars who are committed to racial, gender, class, as well as
sexual justice, should endeavor not to perpetuate social domination in
their work.
Fourth, this criticism centralizes the importance of overt, individual
"acts" of discrimination and diminishes the relevance of structural barri-
ers to equality. While an isolated act of discrimination may possibly
result from a single form of bias, people's life choices and experiences
are undoubtedly shaped by the interaction of numerous structures of
power and disempowerment.315 Essentialism obscures this reality.
Finally, even if a single source of subordination could have pro-
duced the same results in the events detailed in this Article (which I
doubt), this fact would not preclude the occurrence of other scenarios
that implicate multiple forms of inequality." 6 When we consider the
stark reality of poverty and racism, it becomes troubling-and even im-
possible-to deny the vulnerability of gays and lesbians of color and
the poor to specific harms. For example, poor gay and lesbian people
of color face barriers-due to racial and class inequality-in leading
openly gay lives and in obtaining physically safe and meaningful op-
portunities for economic gain. Economic status, in addition to affecting
one's ability to "come out' and to lead a life free of violence, impacts
a variety of other gay and lesbian legal and political concerns-includ-
ing access to health care (especially in the midst of an epidemic of
AIDS and HIfV). Thus, if "coming out," physical safety, and access to
healthcare are indeed important issues in gay and lesbian politics and
legal equality, gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists must
315. Indeed, as several critical race and feminist theorists have observed, racial animus (or
"discrimination") is not even required for a policy or action to have a negative impact on an
oppressed social group. Rather, the negative impact may result when facially neutral policies
perpetuate social inequality caused by past and present acts of discrimination and subjugation.
See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above Ali- Sme Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L
RE. 1003 (1986); Roberts, supra note 13, at 1419.
316. Even if multiple oppressions at times exist in fragments, Independent of one another, I
do not believe that analysis of these instances should dominate gay and lesbian theory or pre-
clude multidimesionality-given the prevalence of intertwined oppressions and the fact that we
all have multiple identities (e.g., race, gender, sexual identity). In any event, they certainly
should not provide the foundation for theories explaining the subordination of gays and lesbians
of color and the poor.
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analyze and confront racial and class subordination." 7
To recognize multidimensional oppression, however, is not to sug-
gest that every negative event in the lives of poor gay people of color
results from a plethora of subordinating forces. Rather, it merely ac-
knowledges that in most instances, multiple sources of disempowerment
affect their lives in concrete ways. Accordingly, it is imperative that
gay and lesbian legal theorists and political activists adopt a multidi-
mensional framework for analyzing and combatting sexual subordina-
tion.
B. Sources of Multidimensional Thought: Critical Race Theory and
Feminist Legal Theory
Lesbian theorists and a small group of race theorists have intro-
duced anti-essentialism into gay and lesbian legal theory. The most
extensive anti-essentialist critiques in equality jurisprudence, however,
have occurred in critical race theory and feminist legal theory.31
Women of color, and other scholars, writing in these areas have gener-
ated a sizeable body of literature that analyzes "intersectional" oppres-
sion, specifically racism and sexism, and that exposes the inadequacies
of essentialist theories of equality. These critics .argue for the develop-
ment of equality theories that confront multiple forms of
disempowerment-theories that respond to the complexity of subordina-
tion. Their scholarship has greatly informed this Article and offers gay
and lesbian scholars and activists guidance for the task of recentering
gay and lesbian political discourse and legal theory away from
essentialism and toward multidimensionality.
Kimberle Crenshaw, for example, explores the interactions of race
and gender utilizing "intersectionality." Crenshaw states that "[i]n ex-
amining the intersections of race and gender, I engage the dominant
assumptions that these are essentially separate . *. .."' In addition,
Mari Matsuda observes that "working in coalition forces us to look for
both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping
317. See VAID, supra note 9, at 271 (gay and lesbian activists must become involved In de-
bates around "raising the minimum wage, welfare reform, AFDC programs, free school lunches,
immigration, poverty, and other issues that affect gay and lesbian families and individuals-but
do not affect the middle-class people who are most involved in our movement").
318. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 13.
319. Kimberle Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogty: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew, In
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRTITCAL RACE THEORY, ASsAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMFr 114
(Gordon et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Beyond Racism].
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us to realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone."' 2
Matsuda encourages legal scholars to "ask the other question," that is,
to examine what multiple forms of subordination a particular act or
structure of exclusion may involve32 Similarly, Angela Harris, criticiz-
ing "the attempt to extract an essential female self and voice from the
diversity of women's experience," argues that the survival of feminist
legal theory depends upon its proponents' ability "to root out and ex-
amine [their] differences . . . ."' Harris thus argues that feminist
legal scholars must "subvert [legal theory] with . . .accounts of the
particular, the different, and the hitherto silenced."'1 Finally, Elvia
Arriola
rejects the idea of arbitrarily separating out categories to ad-
dress discrimination in our society. Instead [she] understands
discrimination as a problem that arises when multiple traits and
stereotypes constructed around them converge in a specific
harmful act. Traditional categories then become points of de-
parture for a deeper, more subtle analysis that explores the
historical relationships between certain special groups, as well
as an individual's experience within each of these groups? 4
These critics challenge legal scholars and activists to endeavor to-
ward discovering the multiple perspectives of the oppressed by employ-
ing "intersectionality,"' "multiple consciousness,"' and "holistic"''
liberation theories. They counter, moreover, the notion that we can
adequately examine or dismantle any one form of subordination without
considering its interaction with other sources of disempowerment.?2 s
320. Mari Matsuda, Besie My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43
STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1189 (1991) (citing SUZANNs PHARR, HOMOPHOBA: A WEAPON OF S-USM
(1988)).
321. See id ("When I see something that looks racist, I ask, 'Where is the patriarchy in
this?' When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, 'Where is the heterosexism in thO?'
When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, 'Where are the class interests in this?"').
322. Harris, supra note 13, at 615.
323. Id.
324. Arriola, Gendered Inequallty supra note 12, at 141.
325. See generally Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersectlon, =upra note 13; Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins, supra note 13; Crenshaw, Beyond RacLsm, supra note 319, at 111-32.
326. Mni Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consctousne As Jurisprudential
Method, II WOMEN'S Rirrrs L REP. 7, 9 (1989) (multiple consciousness "is not a random
ability to see all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint
of the oppressed').
327. Arriola, Gendered Inequalito supra note 12, at 139-41.
328. See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 13, at 1252; Matsuda, supra note 320,
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Their scholarship therefore serves as a model for moving gay and lesbi-
an legal theory away from essentialism.
C. Multidimensionality: An Extension of Intersectional Analysis
This Article prescribes multidimensionality for gay and lesbian legal
theorists. I see multidimensionality as a methodology by which to
analyze the impact of racial and class oppression (or other sources of
social inequality) upon sexual subordination and gay and lesbian experi-
ence and identity and to cease treating these forces as separable, mutu-
ally exclusive, or even conflicting phenomena. Multidimensionality
exposes the various layers of social power that inform heterosexism and
homophobia. Multidimensional analysis also reveals the multiple di-
mensions of social identity categories and offers a comprehensive
framework for conceptualizing sexual subordination that neither "de-
stroys" nor "fragments"329 our lives.
Multidimensionality does not require every piece of scholarship to
reflect everyone's personal histories. This is an impossible task. Rath-
er, multidimensionality demands that we make explicit the racial and
class (and other) assumptions that undergird our theories, realize these
assumptions might (and likely do) limit the application of our theories,
strive to discover the vast differences among individuals in oppressed
social groups, and learn how these differences should (and do) affect
theory and politics. Ultimately, I view multidimensionality as a discur-
sive project aimed at unveiling the complexity of subordination and
identity and reshaping legal theory to reflect and respond to this com-
plexity.
The extensive, pre-existing body of anti-essentialist legal scholarship
on race and gender and on the general connections between multiple
oppressions is most commonly referred to as "intersectionality" by com-
mentators, including Kimberle Crenshaw, its most notable theorist (and,
perhaps, founder). Some readers may then wonder why I have chosen
a new term---"multidimensionality"--to represent my analysis. I have
done so for the following reasons.
First I believe that the terms "gay," "lesbian," "woman," "person
of color," "racism," "sexism," and "homophobia" possess multiple di-
at 1190.
329. LORDW, supra note 312, at 120.
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mensions and contextual layers. "Gay," for example, has racial, gender,
and class dimensions. Therefore, "gay" may describe a poor, Latino
male, a black, lesbian feminist, or a white, middle-class male-de-
pending on the context of its usage. I also believe that these various
dimensions are inextricably and forever intertwined. Multidimensional-
ity accurately captures this reality.
"Intersectionality," by contrast, subtly implies a convergence, partic-
ularly in the lives of people of color, of otherwise separate and inde-
pendent categories. The term "intersectionality" thus suggests a separa-
bility of the host of identities and forces that define social groups and
social power. I therefore prefer multidimensionality because it more
effectively captures the inherent complexity and irreversibly multilay-
ered nature of everyone's identities and of oppression. While the term
intersectionality suggests a separability of identities and oppressions, the
scholarship in this area has forcefully taught us otherwise. Crenshaw,
for example, wishes "ultimately" to "disrupt the tendencies to see race
and gender as exclusive or separable categories." '  Accordingly, she
views "intersectionality" as a '!provisional" or "transitional concept that
...can be replaced as our understtnding of each category becomes
more multidimensional."331 Viewed in this context, multidimensionality
is not a wholly alternative paradigm. Rather it can be seen as drawing
upon, extending, and developing intersectionality by pushing legal theo-
rists and political actors toward a "more multidimensional" understand-
ing of social identity categories and subordination.
D. Reconstructing Gay Rights
Willing' 32 gay and lesbian scholars and political activists may also
330. Crenshaw, Beyond Racism; supra note 319, at 114.
331. Id. (emphasis added).
332. Although I hope this Article will educate (and even persuade) gay and lesbian legal
theorists and political activists of the need for a broader gay and lesbian liberation, the absence
of multidimensional resistance in gay and lesbian politics and legal theory does not result mere-
ly from a lack of information on the connections between race, class, and sexual orientation.
Rather, racial and class subordination issues are missing from gay and lesbian liberation dis-
course because these issues and the people they most directly affect-people of color and the
poor-have been historically and continually marginalized and ignored In our society. Narrow
equality theories and political resistance also result because theorists and activists fail to ac-
knowledge their own racial and class privileges and how these privileges shape their discourses.
Ultimately, recognition of privilege and subordination still may not engender changes In theory
and politics. See DALTON, supra note 260, at 115 C'lt is one thing to recognize that one has
White skin privilege. It is quite another to do something about iV"). Multidimensional theory
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adopt multidimensionality and analyze the diverse ways in which race
and class frame sexual subordination and how this reality should impact
legal analysis. While this Article provides some illumination on the
subject, it is intended to serve primarily as the source of a more help-
fuIl and accurate jurisprudential paradigm and as an invitation for con-
tinued examination and discussion.
The solution to the exclusion of people of color and the poor from
gay and lesbian legal theory and political discourse, however, "does not
merely entail arguing for the multiplicity of identities or challenging
essentialism generally."333  Rather, once gay and lesbian legal scholars
and political activists have collected data on the "differences" in gay
and lesbian experiences supplied by racial and class hierarchies, they
should, ultimately, re-assess their theories and activism and begin to
reconstruct them to reflect these differences.334
By resting their theories and activism upon difference, gay and
lesbian scholars and activists may then conduct a "deeper, more subtle
analysis" of power inequality between gays, lesbians, and heterosexuals
and within the population of gays and lesbians. For example, a multi-
dimensional framework that examines the links between racial, class,
gender, and sexual inequality destabilizes claims that "the gay man?' is
an "insider." Rather, this supposed "insider" may actually be an "out-
sider" excluded from structures of power by his race, class, and sexual
orientation. Multidimensionality also calls into question the policies
and legal remedies hailed by commentators as vital for gay and lesbian
equality. Legalized same-sex marriage, for example, may have little
impact upon poor gay and lesbian people of color struggling, for eco-
nomic or other reasons, to conceal their sexual orientation (and there-
fore hardly thinking about "going to the chapel"). Multidimensionality
thus exposes the inefficiencies and domination that result from centering
the liberation of all gay men and women around the privileged "insider
gay male" experience.
If gay and lesbian legal theorists and activists focus upon difference
and upon multiple forms of disempowerment, they will begin the im-
thus cannot answer the difficult political and sociological questions of "whether" and "how" the
gay and lesbian community (and society in general) can begin to appreciate, and positively
respond to, the need for racial and economic justice, a deeper restructuring of society, and a
more egalitarian distribution of power.
333. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 13, at 1298-99.
334. Id.; SPELMAN, supra note 13, at 172 ("[W]e should not be surprised if certain assump-
tions at the heart of much feminist theory will have to be discarded or revised if the experi-
ences of women of color are to be taken as seriously as those of white middle-class women.").
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portant project of including people of color and the poor in gay and
lesbian liberation discourse. This process may help ease tensions be-
tween white gays and people of color as antiracism is no longer viewed
as separate from or threatening to gay and lesbian civil rights?" Final-
ly, a multidimensional gay and lesbian political agenda that seeks to
improve the lives and reduce the invisibility of the scores of economi-
cally subordinate gay and lesbian people, could destabilize destructive
perceptions of a monolithically wealthy (i.e., privileged) gay and lesbi-
an community, one undeserving of civil rights protection.
The process of exploring and giving voice to differences, however,
is not without risks 6 This process involves an interrogation of re-
pressed, volatile issues-the perpetuation of racial, gender, and class
privileges within gay and lesbian communities, the silencing of gays
and lesbians of color and the poor, and the inadequacy or extreme
limitations of painstakingly planned and well-supported legal and politi-
cal agendas-such as same-sex marriage. Nevertheless, because these
issues limit the effectiveness of gay and lesbian liberation discourse,
their discussion must be part of any inquiry undertaken to strengthen it.
Only then can we begin to design theories and politics that accurately
reflect our multiple needs and experiences?3"
[S]uddenly she saw her hands and thought with a clarity as
simple as it was dazzling, "These hands belong to me. These
my hands." Next she felt a knocking in her chest and discov-
ered something else new: her own heartbeat Had it been there
335. See PHELN, GE'nNG SPEaIC, supra note 105, at 145 ("If we challenge the grand naun-
tives of race, class, gender and sexuality in favor of more local and speclfic anal)ses, we find
that our allies are everywhere:'); Hars, supra note 13, at 615 Cr[tlhe discovery of shared
suffering is a connection more illusory than real; what will truly bring and keep us together is
the use of effort and imagination to root out and examine our differences"). But see Ariola,
Gendered Inequality, supra note 12, at 134 ("Giving voice to minority perspectives Is a valid,
yet delicate and possibly dangerous endeavor."); Matsuda, supra note 320, at 1191 (including
"other forms of subordination [within racial struggle] risks breaking coalition").
336. See Arriola, Gendered Inequalitp supra note 12, at 134; Malsuda svpra note 320, at
1191.
337. As bell hooks opines, "any progressive political movement grows and maure only to
the degree that it passionately welcomes and encourages, in theory and practice, diversity of
opinion, new ideas, critical exchange, and dissent." BELL HOOKS, Censorship from Left to Right,
in Ouri.w CULTURE RES~sn REPRESEDAnIOM 66-67 (1994). See also NP AN, GUsNO SpEcmC,
supra note 105, at 145-46 (stating that a "deesentialized identity politics" "privilegels] no one
axis of oppression. Instead, the space is opened simultaneously for a multiplicity of claims and
struggles. Without a [universal] theory to tell us what and who belongs where, e have to




all along? This pounding thing? She felt like a fool and be-
gan to laugh out loud ...
V. CONCLUSION
The examples of multidimensional oppression presented in this
Article will appear extreme to some readers. A sampling of contempo-
rary vital social statistics, however, confirms that in communities bur-
dened by multiple forms of disempowerment, the "wages of
sin"'-death-are indeed "visible everywhere." '339  Although the new and
evolving gay and lesbian legal theory has engendered important discus-
sions surrounding power inequality, its proponents' failure to interrogate
issues of racial and class subordination makes it impossible for them to
propose solutions to the multilayered "sins"--homophobia, racism, eco-
nomic injustice, and patriarchy-gay and lesbian people face. Ultimate-
ly, an essentialist and narrowly focused gay and lesbian liberation de-
nies the benefits of freedom-life 4 ---to persons who suffer multiple
forms of oppression.
While a small number of gay and lesbian activists and scholars in
non-legal disciplines are presently constructing a healthy anti-essentialist
discourse that continues to develop and unfold, most participants in gay
and Ilesbian legal theory have yet to explore substantially how racial
338. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 141 (1988).
339. BALDWIN, supra note 18, at 20. For example, blacks and Latinos account for nearly
one-half of AIDS cases although they represent only 21% of the overall population. See NAT'L
COMM'N ON AIDS, AIDS: AN EXPANDING TRAGEDY-THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON AIDS 5 (1993). In addition, the infant mortality rate among blacks is twice the rate
for whites, see Death Rates for Minorih Infants Were Underestimated, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1992, at A14 (reporting results of federal study), and among Native Americans and
Puerto Ricans, the infant mortality rate exceeds the rate for whites by 50% and 40%, respec-
tively, see Malcolm Gladwell, Life .xpectancy of Black Males Falls to 64.9, WASH. POST, Apr.
9, 1991, at AS (citing Department of Health and Human Services study). Furthermore, due to
rising rates of AIDS and homicide, in 1991 the life expectancy of black males declined to 64.9
years, compared to 72.3 years for white men. See id. Also, in 1992, the poverty rate of
whites, blacks, and Latinos was 11.6%, 33.3%, and 29.3%, respectively. See Pear, supra note
306, at A20. See also sources cited supra notes 42-44 (reporting poverty, employment and
educational statistics for Latinos). See generally HACKER, supra note 306. Also, I note that
several of the writers whose work inspired this Article--Marlon Riggs, Essex Hemphill, and
Audre Lorde-suffered untimely deaths.
340. See MORRISON, supra note 338, at 141. This excerpt describes former slave Baby Suggs'
passage into freedom. At the moment Baby Suggs enters free territory, she experiences
life-her heart starts beating.
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and class subordination and privilege shape gay and lesbian experiences
and how these forces should and do inform their analyses. By speak-
ing the theme of multidimensionality into gay and lesbian legal theory,
I wish to initiate a dialogue regarding the diversity of gay and lesbian
experience, from which a theory more reflective of our social reality
might emerge.

